Category Archives: Freedom of Information

May 29, 2014 · 8:31 am

Data Protection rights of on-the-run prisoners

Does data protection law prevent the disclosure under the FOI Act of the identities of prisoners who have absconded?

The Mail reported recently that the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) had refused to disclose, in response to a request made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA), a list of prisoners who have absconded from open prisons. The MoJ are reported to have claimed that

under Freedom of Information laws, there is a blanket ban on releasing the criminals’ identities because it is their own ‘personal data’

but the Justice Secretary Chris Grayling was reported to be

furious with the decision, which was taken without his knowledge. He is now intending to over-rule his own department and publish a list of all on-the-run criminals within days

and sure enough a few days later the Mail was able to report, in its usual style, the names of the majority of the prisoners after Grayling

intervened to end the ‘nonsense’ of their names being kept secret…[and stated] that data protection laws will not be used to protect them, arguing: “They are wanted men and should be treated as such. That’s why on my watch we will not hold back their names, unless the police ask us not to for operational reasons”

Regarding the initial article, and in fairness to the MoJ, the Mail does not publish either the FOI request, nor the response itself, so it is difficult to know whether the latter was more nuanced than the article suggests (I suspect it was), but is it correct that disclosure of this information was prevented by data protection law?

More information was given in a follow-up piece on the Press Gazette website which cited a spokeswoman from the MoJ’s National Offender Management Service’s Security Group:

She said the department was “not obliged” to provide information that would contravene the Data Protection Act, adding, “for example, if disclosure is unfair”, which also meant that it did not have to consider “whether or not it would be in the public interest” to release the information

This is technically correct: FOIA provides an exemption to disclosure if the information requested constitutes personal data and disclosure would be in contravention of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA), there is no “public interest test” under this exemption, and whether disclosure is unfair is a key question. The reference to “fairness” relates to the first data protection principle in Schedule One to the DPA. This provides that

Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully and, in particular, shall not be processed unless—

(a)at least one of the conditions in Schedule 2 is met, and

(b)in the case of sensitive personal data, at least one of the conditions in Schedule 3 is also met

As the Information Commissioner’s Office says (page 13 of this guidance) “fairness can be a difficult concept to define”, and assessing it in a FOIA context will involve whether the information is “sensitive personal data” (it is in this instance – section 2 of the DPA explains in terms that data about prison sentences is included in this category); what the possible consequences of disclosure are on the individual; what the individual’s reasonable expectations are; and the balance of the interests of the public against the rights of the individual (this last example shows that there is, in effect, if not in actuality, there is a kind of public interest test for the FOIA personal data exemption).

With this in mind, would it really have been “unfair” to disclose the identities of on-the-run prisoners? The consequences of disclosure might be recapture (although I concede there might also be exposure to risk of attack by members of the public), but does an absconder really have a reasonable expectation that their identity will not be disclosed? I would argue they have quite the opposite – a reasonable expectation (even if they don’t desire it) that their identity will be disclosed. And the balance of public interest against the absconders’ rights surely tips in favour of the former – society has a compelling interest in recapturing absconders.

But this doesn’t quite take us to the point of permitting disclosure of this information under FOIA. If we look back to the wording of the first data protection principle we note that a condition in both Schedule Two (and, this being sensitive personal data) Schedule Three must be met. And here we note that most of those conditions require that the processing (and FOIA disclosure would be a form of processing) must be “necessary”. The particular conditions which seem to me most to be engaged are the identically worded 5(a) in Schedule Two, and 7(1)(a) in Schedule Three:

The processing is necessary for the administration of justice

What “necessary” means, in the context of a balance between the FOIA access rights and the privacy rights of individual has been given much judicial analysis, notably in the MPs’ expenses case (Corporate Officer of the House of Commons v The Information Commissioner & Ors [2008] EWHC 1084 (Admin)), where it was said that “necessary”

should reflect the meaning attributed to it by the European Court of Human Rights when justifying an interference with a recognised right, namely that there should be a pressing social need and that the interference was both proportionate as to means and fairly balanced as to ends

In this way “necessary” in the DPA, accords with the test in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides that any interference with the right to respect for private and family life etc. must be

necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others [emphasis added]

Deciding whether there was a “pressing social need” to disclose, under FOIA, the absconders’ identities to the Mail was not straightforward, and no doubt the civil servants at MoJ erred on the side of caution. I can imagine them thinking that, if it was necessary in a democratic society to publish these names, they already would be published as routine, and the fact that they hadn’t meant that it would not be proportionate to disclose under FOIA (I happen to think that would be wrong, but that’s not strictly relevant). But this is an interesting case in which the subsequent intervention by the Justice Secretary created the justification which perhaps did not exist when the FOIA request was being handled: after all, if the Justice Secretary feels so strongly about publishing the names, then doing so must be necessary in the interests of public safety etc.

As it was, five of the names (out of eighteen) were not disclosed, no doubt for the police operational reasons that were alluded to by Grayling. And this, of course, points to the most likely, and the most strong, exemptions to disclosure of this sort of information – those relating to likely prejudice to law enforcement (section 31 FOIA).

p.s. I am given to understand that the Information Commissioner’s Office may be contacting the MoJ to discuss this issue.

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Filed under Data Protection, Freedom of Information, human rights, police

Tagged as DPA, FOI, Human Rights, police

April 25, 2014 · 1:28 pm

The slings and arrows of FOI

“…investigation by and even adverse comment from the Ombudsman is one of the slings and arrows of local government misfortune with which broad shouldered officials have to cope…” (Feld v London Borough of Barnet [2004] EWCA Civ 1307)

Ombudsmen loom over the actions of many public authorities. Particularly, the NHS and local authorities are subject to the scrutiny of respectively, the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO), and the Local Government Ombudsman (LGO). The Ombudsmen themselves must have broad shoulders, subject as they are to the oversight of both parliament, and, because they are public authorities subject to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA), the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO).

The PHSO was recently asked, under FOIA, for the email address and telephone number of the Ombudsman herself, Dame Julie Mellor. The request was refused, on the basis of the exemption at section 40(2) of FOIA – namely that the requested information was Dame Julie’s personal data, and disclosure would breach the first data protection principle in the Data Protection Act 1998. This refusal has now been upheld by the ICO, in a decision notice which explains that

the data requested relates to a living individual who may be identified from that data and that [therefore] it constitutes personal data

That much is uncontroversial: a person’s email address and telephone number will generally be held to be their personal data, even in a professional context, providing that they can be identified from that data. However, the ICO goes on to say

the Commissioner considers that the Ombudsman would have a reasonable expectation that her email address and direct telephone number would not be placed into the public domain by disclosure under the FOIA…

…The Commissioner is aware that the requested email address and telephone number are personal to the Ombudsman but are professional contact details. He considers that their disclosure is unlikely to cause the Ombudsman distress on a personal level. However the Commissioner is satisfied that disclosure would disrupt the running of the organisation and it is apparent that the consequences would have a negative impact upon the PHSO

This seems to conflate two quite separate issues – personal privacy, and organisational impact. As far as I can understand it the argument is that, because this is personal data, and because disclosure would disrupt the running of the organisation, disclosure would not be “fair”, in line with the requirements of the first data protection principle. But, as the ICO’s own guidance on disclosure of personal data under FOIA explains (paragraph 44), the consequences to be taken into account are those to the data subject, not to their organisation, or a third party.

If disclosure of information would disrupt the running of a public authority, there are other, more appropriate FOIA exemptions which might apply. Specifically, section 36(2)(c), for situations where disclosure would prejudice, or would be likely otherwise to prejudice, the effective conduct of public affairs.

But even then I struggle to see how disclosure of such innocuous information would really cause sufficient prejudice to warrant keeping this information secret – shouldn’t the Ombudsman be able to implement systems to deal with a possible increase in emails and calls if the email address and phone number were made public? Isn’t this sort of potential irritation one of the slings and arrows of administrative misfortune with which broad shouldered officials have to cope?

(As a footnote to this piece, neither the section 40(2), nor the section 36(2)(c) are going to carry much weight when the information is readily available online already. I will not link to it, because I’m a cautious soul, but Dame Julie’s email address, at least, has been published on the internet as part of a document created by her, and hosted by a reputable academic institution.)

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Filed under Data Protection, Freedom of Information, Information Commissioner, ombudsman, transparency

Tagged as DPA, FOI, ICO

March 12, 2014 · 5:36 pm

The FOI ministerial veto – why not?

The Court of Appeal has ordered disclosure of private correspondence between Prince Charles and the government. The judgment is potentially a triumph for transparency, but I have my doubts whether it reflects Parliament’s intentions when passing the FOI Act. And there will be a further appeal…

In September 2012 the Administrative Appeals Chamber of the Upper Tribunal (UT) handed down a judgment which struck me then, as it does now, as a remarkable work of research and scholarship. It was ruling on requests by the Guardian journalist Rob Evans – made as far back as April 2005 – under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (EIR) for disclosure of information in private letters sent by the Prince of Wales to government ministers on matters of official policy. The UT’s judgment ran to 65 pages with three annexes, went into detailed analysis of constitutional conventions regarding the heir to the throne, and its decision was that the correspondence should be disclosed (overturning the prior decisions of the Information Commissioner (IC)). Subsequently, the Attorney General issued a certificate under section 53 FOIA – a “ministerial veto” – whose effect was to disapply the UT’s decision. The Attorney General’s certificate, in rather wider-spaced text, ran to ten pages.

Section 53 requires only that the accountable person (a minister)

gives the [Information] Commissioner a certificate signed by him stating that he has on reasonable grounds formed the opinion [that there had not been a failure to comply with the FOIA]

It is, as I’ve argued before , a bludgeon of an executive weapon, but it is, as are all acts of public authorities, potentially amenable to judicial review. So it was that, despite any statutory right of appeal, the Guardian made such an application. However, in July 2013, the High Court effectively decided that, although the ministerial power to override a superior court of record (let alone the statutory decision-maker, in the form of the IC) appeared to be a “constitutional aberration”, the proposition that “the accountable person is not entitled simply to prefer his own view to that of the tribunal” must be rejected. As Davis LJ said (para 111)

why not? It is inherent in the whole operation of s.53 that the accountable person will have formed his own opinion which departs from the previous decision (be it of Information Commissioner, tribunal or court) and may certify without recourse to an appeal. As it seems to me, therefore, disagreement with the prior decision (be it of Information Commissioner, tribunal or court) is precisely what s.53 contemplates, without any explicit or implicit requirement for the existence of fresh evidence or of irrationality etc. in the original decision which the certificate is designed to override

However, Davis LJ refused to accept that the wording of section 53 (“…stating that he has on reasonable grounds formed the opinion…”) permitted of an interpretation that:

the accountable person can, as it were, self-certify as to the availability of reasonable grounds

rather,

In my view, the language chosen clearly is sufficient to connote that an objective test is to be applied

But how to conduct that objective test? For Davis LJ, it must be that the reasonable grounds are “cogent”:

if an accountable person is to interfere, by way of exercise of the power of executive override, with the decision of an independent judicial body then that accountable person must be prepared and able to justify doing so. I am reluctant to talk in terms of burden of proof. But in terms of burden of argument the burden is in practice on the accountable person to show that the grounds for certifying are reasonable

Lord Dyson in the Court of Appeal has taken issue with this, saying (para 38) that

I do not consider that it is reasonable for an accountable person to issue a section 53(2) certificate merely because he disagrees with the decision of the tribunal. Something more is required […]

Examples of “something more” are given as

a material change of circumstances since the tribunal decision or that the decision of the tribunal was demonstrably flawed in fact or in law

Accordingly, as the Attorney General failed to give this “something more” but “simply disagreed with the evaluation made by the UT”, he failed to give reasons amounting to “reasonable grounds”. Thus (putting to one side a crucial other ground on which the appeal succeeded, relating to the EIR and European law, which I will deal with in a later blog post) the certificate had to be quashed.

As Dr Mark Elliot argues Lord Dyson here “adopted a significantly more exacting conception of reasonableness” than had the High Court and I would commend Dr Elliot’s piece to you as an expert analysis I am not competent to give.

However – and it pains me to say it, because I really don’t like section 53 – wasn’t it precisely Parliament’s intention that the accountable person did “merely” have to state that he had formed – on reasonable grounds – a different opinion to the preceding tribunal? If he cannot arrive at a different opinion, in the absence of “something else”, isn’t section 53 fundamentally weakened, even sidestepped? Indeed, Lord Dyson in my view arrives at this point, when he says

On the approach of the Divisional Court to section 53(2), the accountable person can override the decision of an independent and impartial tribunal which (i) is reasonable, (ii) is the product of a detailed examination (fairly conducted) of the issues after an adversarial hearing at which all parties have been represented and (iii) is not challenged on appeal. All that is required is that the accountable person gives sensible and rational reasons for disagreeing with the tribunal’s conclusion. If section 53(2) has that effect, it is a remarkable provision not only because of its constitutional significance (the point emphasised by the Divisional Court), but also because it seriously undermines the efficacy of the rights of appeal accorded by sections 57 and 58 of the FOIA

to which I am tempted to respond, adopting Davis LJ’s rhetorical device, “why not?” – that seems to have been what Parliament intended.

No doubt we shall see this explored more – the Attorney General is reported to have sought, and been given, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

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Filed under Environmental Information Regulations, Freedom of Information, Information Commissioner, Uncategorized, Upper Tribunal

Tagged as EIR, FOI, ICO

March 7, 2014 · 8:29 am

The Ellison Review and records management

Failings in records management hampered the Ellison Review. In the absence of legal enforcement mechanisms, we should recognise the important of records managers

It is a truism that good records management is essential to good information rights practice. Section 46 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 requires the Lord Chancellor to issue a records management code of practice, and the code itself says

Freedom of information legislation is only as good as the quality of the records and other information to which it provides access. Access rights are of limited value if information cannot be found when requested or, when found, cannot be relied upon as authoritative

Similarly, records management is embedded in the principles of Schedule One to the Data Protection Act 1998, particularly those relating to adequacy, accuracy and retention of personal data.

But Mark Ellison QC’s report following The Stephen Lawrence Independent Review throws even sharper focus on how important records management can be in the service of justice, and the rule of law. Ellison’s Review was not a statutory inquiry, and thus did not have the legal powers to search records, or compel production of information (although its terms of reference did say that it should be given access to all necessary files). However, it appears to have been hampered by what looks like failings in records management. The report notes that

a number of potentially important areas of documentation…have not been provided to us. The explanation for this absence varies between:

a) a suspicion (or sometimes hard evidence) that they have been destroyed;
b) a belief that they must exist but cannot be found; or
c) that there simply is no record available and no way of knowing if one was ever made

Note that none of these explanations gives an indication that information has been deliberately withheld, so the subsequent announcement by the Home Secretary that there will now be a public inquiry (with full legal powers to gather information) into the infiltration methods of undercover police does not necessarily mean that information-gap will be filled.

The revelations of the disgraceful “spying” on the Lawrence family during the initial McPherson inquiry into Stephen’s death are, of course, the most important outcome of the Ellison Review. However, what unnerves me about the Ellison Review’s difficulties in getting information is that they starkly show that a failure to follow good records management practice potentially enables corruption and illegality to be covered-up, and that there is a lack of enforcement and regulatory mechanisms to prevent or punish this. The criminal sanctions regarding wilful destruction or withholding of information under FOIA apply only if the actions occur following the submission of a FOIA request, and, under the DPA, criminal sanctions only apply to unlawful obtaining or disclosure of personal data: destruction or hiding of information is unlikely to be a criminal act, in the absence of other factors.

I think this shows that Records Managers hold an exceptionally important role, one which is vital for organisational governance and compliance, and one which is sadly not recognised by some organisations. Records Managers should sit on information governance boards, should have a hotline to the Chief Information Officer, Head of Legal, Senior Information Risk Officer etc., and should be properly resourced and supported by those senior officers.

Stephen Lawrence would have been forty this year. The Stephen Lawrence Charitable Trust helps transform the lives of the young people it supports.

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Filed under Data Protection, Freedom of Information, police, records management

Tagged as DPA, FOI, police

December 30, 2013 · 1:47 pm

Making Motorman names public

UPDATE: 7 January 2014

In the comments to this piece the requester has informed me that the ICO is appealing this decision. Given how long the Upper Tribunal takes to turn things round, I don’t think we’ll be seeing these names for some time (if at all – if the ICO succeeds). I’ll keep the original post up though for the time being

END UPDATE.

So…will we get to see the names of the Operation Motorman journalists within the next week? Or will there need to be a bit of an extra push?

I tweeted earlier today to the effect that time is nearly up for the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) to disclose names of some of the journalists named in the ICO “What Price Privacy” report as having engaged the services of rogue private investigator Steve Whittamore, who was convicted in 2005 under the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) of offences of illegally obtaining personal data.

My blog post from earlier this month describes how the First-tier Tribunal ordered on 29 November 2013, after a rather convoluted series of hearings on the papers, that the ICO disclose within 35 days

many, but not all, of the names of journalists recorded…as clients of the investigator at the heart of Operation Motorman…together with the names of the media outlet with which [they were recorded as having been] associated at the time

By my calculations, those 35 days are up at 17:00 next Monday (see part 2.8 of Civil Procedure Rules and rule 12(1) of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009). This is, of course, unless the ICO has appealed the decision, but, as at 19 December, no such appeal appeared to have been lodged.

It is possible, however – bear in mind that the Order was for disclosure within 35 days – that the information has already been disclosed to the applicant – a Mr Christopher Colenso-Dunne. If that is the case, and if the applicant chooses not to make it public, then we may not yet see those names (it has been suggested to me that the person by that name for whom Google gives a search return may not be the applicant here). The Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) does not, in strict terms, oblige a public authority to make information public. Rather, it must “communicate” information to a person who has requested it (subject to the application of any exemptions). Although it is often said that disclosure under FOIA is to be taken as disclosure to the world at large, this operates as a concept, not a requirement. Some public authorities do, however, operate a “disclosure log” where some or all information disclosed under FOIA is made publicly available.

The ICO itself has a disclosure log, although it restricts this to responses “which we feel are of wider public interest”. There also appears to be a bit of lag in uploading responses (the last was one from 18 October).

One would certainly hope that, if the ICO is not appealing the decision, it will proactively disclose the information ordered to be disclosed. But, just in case, I’ve made a FOIA request for the same information, via whatdotheyknow.com, where it would be available for anyone to see (and which, of course, I’ll withdraw if the information becomes public in the interim).

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Filed under Data Protection, Freedom of Information, Information Commissioner, Information Tribunal, journalism

Tagged as DPA, FOI, ICO

November 29, 2013 · 5:07 pm

ICO must disclose Motorman journalists’ names

The ICO has been ordered to disclose the names of some of the journalists referred to in “What Price Privacy” as having engaged the services of rogue private investigator Steve Whittamore

In April 2006 the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) published “What Price Privacy?” on what it described as “the unlawful trade in personal information”. The report revealed

evidence of systematic breaches in personal privacy that amount to an unlawful trade in confidential personal information

Those breaches were potential criminal offences under section 55 of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA), and the report – which drew on the findings of documentation seized during Operation Motorman, arising from the activities of private investigator Steve Whittamore, said

Among the ‘buyers’ are many journalists looking for a story. In one major case investigated by the ICO, the evidence included records of information supplied to 305 named journalists working for a range of newspapers

In December 2006 the six-month follow-up report “What Price Privacy Now?” was published. This gave further details about the 305 journalists mentioned in the first report, and broke the data down into “Publication”, “Number of transactions positively identified” and “Number of journalists/clients using the services”.

And of course, this trade in personal information formed the basis of the first module (“The relationship between the press and the public and looks at phone-hacking and other potentially illegal behaviour”) of part one of Lord Justice (as he was then) Leveson’s inquiry into the culture, practices and ethics of the press.

In 2011 a request was made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) to the ICO, for (1) “the number of transactions per journalist of each of the 305 identified journalists for each of the 32 identified publications” and (2) the journalists’ identities. The first request was refused by the ICO, on the basis that it would require a search through 17000 documents, and, therefore, section 12 of FOIA provided a statutory cost limit which meant it did not have to comply. Having been given these apparent facts the requester dropped his first request, but pursued the second. This was also refused, on the basis that the information was exempt under section 40(2) and section 44 of FOIA (the latter by virtue of the statutory bar on disclosure at section 59 of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA)), in both cases because disclosure would be an unfair and unlawful disclosure of personal data of the journalists involved.

Because the ICO is the regulator of FOIA, a complaint about its handling of a FOIA request falls to be determined by the same office (a statutory arrangement which was to be described as an “unusual, and unsatisfactory, feature” of the law by the First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights) (FTT)). Accordingly, the office (describing itself as “the Commissioner”, as distinct from the “ICO”, which was the authority refusing the request) issued a Decision Notice which held that

the ICO correctly withheld the information by virtue of section 40(2). He has also found that the information could also be correctly withheld by virtue of section 44(1)

This decision was appealed to the FTT, which has today, after what has clearly been complex and strongly argued litigation, handed down three judgments (1, 2, 3) (two of which were preliminary or interim rulings, publication of which has been held back until now) which are, taken together, extraordinary, both for their criticism of the ICO, and for the outcome.

Taken as a whole the judgments find that, regarding some of the journalists named in the information held by the ICO, the balance of the public interest in receiving the information outweighs the legitimate interest of an individual to protect his or her privacy.

The FTT found that the information wasn’t sensitive personal data (which is afforded a greater level of protection by the DPA). This is at first blush rather surprising: section 2(2) of the DPA provides that sensitive data will be, inter alia, “data consisting of information as to…the commission or alleged commission by [the data subject] of any offence”. However, the FTT found that, although the information

does contain evidence that the investigator [Whittamore] engaged by the journalist committed, or contemplated committing, criminal activity. And, self-evidently, it discloses that the investigator received some form of instruction from the journalist. But there is no suggestion…that the journalist had instructed the investigator to use unlawful methods or that he or she had turned a blind eye to their adoption or, indeed, whether he or she had in fact expressly forbidden the investigator from doing anything that was not strictly legal [para 11 of third ruling]

The FTT had also invited submissions from the parties on the significance to the instant case of some of the passages from the Leveson inquiry, and, having received them, took note from those passages of

the issues of impropriety (which, while very possibly not involving criminality on journalists’ part, is nevertheless serious) and corporate governance in the context of the privacy rights of the [journalists]. We believe that, together, they give rise to a very substantial interest in the public knowing the identities of those who instructed the investigators [para 18 of third ruling]

But also tending towards favouring disclosure in the public interest was Leveson’s suggested criticisms of the ICO

We also give some weight to the public interest in knowing more about the information which was in the possession of the ICO and which the Leveson Report suggested it failed adequately to pursue [para 18 of third ruling]

The FTT noted the interests of the journalists, for instance that they would have had an expectation that details of their day-to-day professional activities would remain confidential, and that the Commissioner had argued that

publication of information indicating that they had engaged the services of the investigators concerned would be so unfair as to outweigh the factors in favour of disclosure [para 19 of third ruling]

but the FTT also noted, in effect, that the journalists involved must have had some idea of what was going on when they engaged Whittamore

it must have been well known within the profession what types of information could be obtained with the help of investigators, even if the means of obtaining it were not fully understood. The rights of individuals under data protection laws would also have been widely known at the time. In those circumstances those engaging the particular services…should have known that they ran the risk of becoming involved in behaviour that fell short of acceptable standards. This seriously dilutes the weight to be attributed to their privacy rights and leads us to conclude that the balance tips in favour of disclosure [para 19 of third ruling]

Accordingly, and, unless there is an appeal (Iwould be surprised if there isn’t) the names of some of the journalists who engaged Whittamore must be disclosed.

Other matters – criticism of ICO

In its preliminary ruling (November 2012) the FTT makes some trenchant criticism of the ICO’s handling of the requester’s first request (even though, as the requester did not pursue it, it was outwith the FTT’s jurisdiction). The refusal on costs grounds had been made, based upon a statement that the information requested had not been recorded in a database. Yet less than two months later the Leveson inquiry began, and, at that inquiry, evidence presented by the ICO effectively, in the FTT’s view, contradicted this statement

we do not understand how the Appellant could have been given such a misleading response to the First Information Request…as a result of the misleading information given to the Appellant, he was not able to pursue his request…We only became aware of the ICO’s error after the Appellant drew our attention to the evidence presented to the Leveson Inquiry regarding the Spreadsheets. We assume (and certainly hope) that those in the Commissioner’s office handling this appeal had not become aware sooner [para 28 of first ruling]

The ICO clearly did not take well to this criticism, because the second interim ruling records that

the Commissioner has complained about part of the decision which he believes includes unfair criticism of his office and has asked us to correct the impression given [para 3 of second ruling]

but the FTT stood firm, saying

We continue to believe that our criticism was justified. The Appellant was told that he was wrong to assume that any database of information existed that could be interrogated…However, it is now known that the ICO held the Spreadsheets at the time…[and although the information in them] may not have provided the Appellant with precisely the information he requested, but it would have come close. Against that background we believe that the ICO was open to criticism for asserting, without further qualification, that it would be necessary to search through the 17,000 documents in order to respond to the request. [para 6 of second ruling]

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Filed under Confidentiality, Data Protection, Freedom of Information, Information Commissioner, Information Tribunal, journalism, Leveson, Privacy

Tagged as DPA, FOI, ICO, journalism

November 27, 2013 · 4:46 pm

Reducing regulation…by clogging up the courts

The only thing that made me stop laughing about the Cabinet Office’s arguments in a doomed Tribunal appeal was thinking about the cost to the public purse.

Soon after it was formed the coalition government made an admirable commitment to cut government red tape, by reducing the amount of domestic regulation

Through eliminating the avoidable burdens of regulation and bureaucracy, the Government aims to promote growth, innovation and social action

A Cabinet sub-committee – the Reducing Regulation Committee (RRC) – was set up, to “take strategic oversight of the delivery of the Government’s regulatory framework”.

Around the same time the government was also trumpeting its transparency agenda, with the Prime Minister saying, in an Observer article in September 2010

For too long those in power made decisions behind closed doors, released information behind a veil of jargon and denied people the power to hold them to account. This coalition is driving a wrecking ball through that culture – and it’s called transparency

One might not have supposed, therefore, that it would have been necessary in August 2012 for a request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) to be made, for (merely) the number of times the RRC had met. Surely this is the sort of information which should be made public as a matter of course? But it was necessary. Moreover, this particular door stayed shut, despite the gentle tapping of transparency’s wrecking ball, when the Cabinet Office refused the request, citing the FOIA exemption which applies to information held by a government department which relates to a) the formulation or development of government policy, or (b) Ministerial communications (section 35(1)(a) and (b)).

The Cabinet Office continued to argue that this exemption was engaged, and that the public interest favoured non-disclosure, when the requester complained to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). And when the ICO held that, yes, the exemption was engaged, but, no, the public interest favoured disclosure , the Cabinet Office appealed the decision.

The First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights) (FTT) has now handed down its judgment, and it makes amusing if dispiriting reading. Wholly unsurprisingly, the ICO’s decision is upheld, and it seems that the Cabinet Office’s argument boils down to two main points: “if we tell you how often the RRC has met then it might mislead you into missing all the great work being done elsewhere, and as a result that great work elsewhere might be adversely affected” (my apologies to the Cabinet Office if this misrepresents their position, but I’ve really tried my best).

The FTT had very little time for these arguments. The only thing vaguely in the Cabinet Office’s favour was that, as a lot of information about “reducing regulation” processes was already publicly available, the public interest in disclosure was small. But, rather devastatingly, the FTT says

the public interest in maintaining the exemption is so weak that it does not equal, let alone outweigh, the, admittedly light, public interest in disclosure (para 27) [emphasis added]

It is worth reading the judgment (which I won’t dissect in detail), as an example of a particularly weak argument against FOIA disclosure, but I would add three closing observations from which you might deduce my level of approval of the Cabinet Office’s conduct:

1. this was a request simply and merely for the number of times a government committee has met (how “transparent” is a refusal to disclose that?)
2. taking a case to FTT is not without significant costs implications (bear in mind this was an oral hearing, with a witness, and with counsel instructed on both sides)
3. the whole litigation in any case carries a huge hint as to the nature/substance of the information held (if the RRC had met often, would the Cabinet Office really want to withhold that fact?)

Knowing what to overlook

The Upper Tribunal has allowed an appeal by an appellant whose pre-hearing language and allegations had led the First-tier Tribunal to strike out his case.

In a recently handed down judgment Upper Tribunal Judge Jacobs says

Most appellants correspond with the tribunal only when necessary, make moderate criticisms and allegations, and express themselves politely. There is, however, a small body of appellants who are persistent in their correspondence which contains wild allegations that are expressed in an intemperate or aggressive tone…

What gave rise to the proceedings in question was an appeal, by a certain Mr Dransfield, of a decision by the First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights) (FTT) to strike out proceedings remitted to it by a decision of Judge Wikely in the Upper Tribunal (UT). That remittal decision was case reference GIA/1053/2011 – unhelpfully not currently available on the UT website – and is not to be confused with another (leading) decision by Wikely J in relation to an unsuccessful appeal by Mr Dransfield (reference GIA/3037/2011).

The FTT struck out the remitted case using powers conferred by rule 8(3)(b) of Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 (SI No 1976) (“the Rules”), which permits a strike-out if

the appellant has failed to co-operate with the Tribunal to such an extent that the Tribunal cannot deal with the proceedings fairly and justly

It appears that Mr Dransfield was warned by the FTT judge by a direction on 11 January 2012 (I think this should say “2013”, but I quote from paragraph 4 of the UT’s judgment) about the unfortunate, although perhaps unintentional “hectoring tone” of his emails, and rule 8(3)(b) was specifically cited to Mr Dransfield, with the observation that

Co-operation, in this context, includes using moderate language and an appropriate tone

The warning was reinforced orally, and repeated on 29 April 2013.

Despite this, Mr Dransfield then sent an email on 12 May 2013, which the UT declines to quote in full but which is described thus

Mr Dransfield accused the Commissioner and Council of ‘conniving and colluding to pervert the Course of Justice’ and of producing ‘a pack of lies and deception’. He later referred twice to a ‘wider conspiracy to pervert the course of justice’ and said that there was sufficient evidence to justify arresting the Commissioner’s legal representative and Judge Wikeley for conspiracy to pervert the course of justice

Accordingly, the proceedings were struck out, the same day.

Interestingly (and no doubt to the frustration of some of those involved), Mr Dransfield’s appeal of this strike out has succeeded. Jacobs J follows the words I quote at the start of this piece with

It is usually possible to deal with that small minority of appellants without resorting to the power to strike out proceedings. It is possible to ban a party from using emails and direct that any that are sent will be ignored. Another way is to limit a party to communicating in writing and only when requested, with other letters being filed but ignored. At a hearing, it is possible to limit the time allowed to a party or, if necessary, to require a party to leave the hearing room. In my experience, measures such as this are usually effective

In short, Jacobs J says that case management powers can be properly used to manage a potentially difficult litigant, and should not in this case have led to the “draconian step” of striking out Mr Dransfield’s appeal. The type of allegation made by Mr Dransfield is “regularly made in appeals before this Chamber and just as regularly ignored by the judges”. The power to strike out and the duty to cooperate are in a “reciprocal relationship” with the overriding objective “to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly” at Rule 2, and specifically those parts of Rule 2 which require flexibility in the proceedings (2(2)(b)) and that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings (2(2)(c)).

Jacobs J ends his judgment by noting that the FTT could have employed more flexible responses “without depriving Mr Dransfield of his right of appeal” and observes, by quoting William James

‘the art of being wise is the art of knowing what to overlook.’

Very true, but I think I would just add a general point that – sometimes – some things can be too big to overlook. There will still be some cases where the failure to comply with the duty to cooperate properly merits the striking out of proceedings.

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Filed under Freedom of Information, Information Tribunal, Upper Tribunal, vexatiousness

Tagged as FOI

November 18, 2013 · 4:46 pm

In which I ask the ICO for a Decision Notice

In September of this year I blogged about a request I made to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) for details of which website some personal data had been inadvertently uploaded to, by a council employee, which had led to a monetary penalty notice. I have now had the ICO’s response to my internal review. I do not have (and haven’t sought) permission to upload that response, but suffice to say it doesn’t uphold my complaint. For those of you still awake I append my response to it here:

I am reluctantly now applying to the Commissioner for a decision whether my request for information has been dealt with in accordance with the requirements of Part I of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA).

I am of the view that you do have lawful authority to disclose the information, and, therefore, section 59(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) is not engaged (and by extension nor is the substantive exemption claimed: section 44 of FOIA). Before I give my reasons I would just like to clarify an error on my part: I erred in my request for internal review when I queried whether section 59(1)(c) DPA was met. What I meant was that I accepted that sections 59(1)(a-c) were met, but I doubted whether there was a lack of lawful authority for the ICO to disclose.

My reasons why I believe you do have lawful authority to disclose are substantially the same as I gave in the rest of my request for internal review. I will repeat them here for completeness’ sake:

Section 59(2)(e) says that disclosure is made with lawful authority if “having regard to the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of any person, the disclosure is necessary in the public interest”. I would argue that analysis of whether this provision permits disclosure requires a two-fold test. Firstly, is disclosure necessary in the public interest? Secondly, if it is, do the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of any person militate against this public-interest disclosure?

On the first point, I am not aware of any direct authority on what “necessary” means in section 59(2)(e) of DPA, but I would argue that it imports the meaning adopted by leading European authorities. Thus, as per the high Court in Corporate Officer of the House of Commons v The Information Commissioner & Ors [2008] EWHC 1084 “‘necessary”…should reflect the meaning attributed to it by the European Court of Human Rights when justifying an interference with a recognised right, namely that there should be a pressing social need and that the interference was both proportionate as to means and fairly balanced as to ends”. It is my view that there is a pressing social need to recognise the risks of indavertent uploading to the internet, by public authorities and others, of sensitive personal data, especially when this is by automatic means. Other examples of recent incidents and enforcement action illustrate this. For instance, as your office is aware, there have been reports that a regional Citizens’ Advice Bureau has indavertently made available on the internet very large amounts of such data, probably because of a lack of technical knowledge or security which resulted in automatic caching by Google of numerous files https://informationrightsandwrongs.com/2013/09/24/citizens-advice-bureaucracy/. Also for instance, as you are aware, there have been many many examples of indavertent internet publishing of personal data in hidden cells in spreadsheets http://www.ico.org.uk/news/blog/2013/the-risk-of-revealing-too-much. There is a clear lack of public understanding of the risks of such indavertent disclosures, with a consequent risk to the privacy of individuals’ often highly sensitive personal data. Any information which the regulator of the DPA can disclose which informs and improves public understanding of these risks serves a pressing social need and makes the disclosure “necessary”.

On the second point, I simply fail to see what rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of any person can be engaged, let alone suffer a detriment by disclosing what public website the Council employee uploaded this to. If there are any, it would be helpful if your response to this Internal Review could address this. It may be that you would point to the information having been provided to you in confidence, but I similarly fail to see how that can be: was this an express obligation of confidence, or have you inferred it? In either case, I would question (per one the elements of the classic formulation for a cause of action in breach of confidence given by Megarry J in Coco v A.N.Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] R.P.C. 41) whether the information even has the necessary quality of confidence (this was a public website after all).

However, I make the following further observations.

You say “I consider that the public interest here has been largely, if not entirely, met by the issuing and publication of the Monetary Penalty Notice dated 27 August 2013, the publication of the ICO News release dated 30 August 2013, and other press coverage concerning this particular data breach and how it occurred. I do not consider that disclosure of the name of the website would further this to any significant extent”. However, these sources of information were noticeably lacking in detail about how exactly the rather bizarre and worrying circumstances described in the Monetary Penalty Notice (MPN) could have happened: automatic upload to cloud storage can happen, but normally this will be to private storage – automatic upload to a “public website” is rather alarming.

I note, in passing, some recent criticism of the level of detail, or lack of clarity, in MPNs made by the First-tier Tribunal (see para 17 of the Scottish Borders case, and, the Niebel case, effectively throughout).

I also note that you say “when considering the balance of the public interest in relation to section 59(2)(e) it has to be borne in mind that the threshold is very high because disclosure in contravention of section 59, by the Commissioner or a member of ICO staff may/will constitute a criminal offence under section 59(3)”. With respect, whether the Commissioner or a member of his staff might commit a criminal offence is not relevant to whether the public interest means disclosure is necessary. If disclosure is necessary section 59(1) does not apply, and no suggestion of a criminal offence can arise. Moreover, you say “unless there is ‘lawful authority’ to disclose the information, to do so would constitute a criminal offence” and “disclosure in contravention of section 59, by the Commissioner or a member of ICO staff may/will constitute a criminal offence under section 59(3)”, and “Releasing information of this nature without lawful authority would not only constitute a criminal offence…”: all of these omit the crucial mens rea aspect of that offence, which is that the disclosure would have to be made knowingly or recklessly.

You go on to say “There is a strong public interest in information being provided to the Commissioner in confidence, to enable him to carry out his statutory duty, remaining confidential and that this information will not be disclosed without lawful authority. Releasing information of this nature without lawful authority would not only constitute a criminal offence but would also undermine the regulatory function and powers of the ICO. It would damage public trust in the Commissioner’s processes and make organisations less willing to share information on a voluntary basis making it difficult for the ICO to operate an efficient and effective regulatory system”. This repeats the earlier assertions, or implications, that the information in question is “confidential” or has been “provided…in confidence”, which I continue to dispute for reasons previously given (and not controverted), and makes further assertions that disclosing such information now would “make organisations less willing to share information on a voluntary basis making it difficult for the ICO to operate an efficient and effective regulatory system”. There appears simply to be no basis for this “chilling effect” assertion (is there, for instance, evidence to back it up?).

Finally, I note that you say “we did consult with Aberdeen City Council and we do not have explicit consent for disclosure”. You do not say when this consultation took place, but it appears that Aberdeen at some point changed their mind on this, because on 15 October they disclosed the information to me under FOIA (see https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/ico_monetary_penalty_notice#outgoing-307019). Clearly, this means that I do not continue to seek disclosure. It also explains why I say I make this application reluctantly (I have no wish to have you, or me, epxend time and resources unnecessarily). But I do wish to dispute that my request to you was handled according to requirements in part 1 of FOIA.

I am happy to provide any further information you might need.
with best wishes

etc

Will there be blood?

The First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights) (FTT) has overturned a decision by the Information Commissioner that the Northern Ireland Department for Health, Social Services and Public Safety (DHSSPS) should disclose advice received by the Minister of that Department from the Attorney General for Northern Ireland regarding a policy of insisting on a lifetime ban on males who have had sex with other males (“MSM”) donating blood.

On 11 October 2013 the Northern Ireland High Court handed down judgment in a judicial review application, challenging the decision of the Minister and the DHSSPS maintain the lifetime ban. The challenge arose because, in 20011, across the rest of the UK, the blanket ban which had existed since 1985 had been lifted.

DHSSPS lost the judicial review case, and lost relatively heavily: the decision of the Minister was unlawful for reasons that i) the Secretary of State, and not the Minister, by virtue of designation under the Blood Safety and Quality Regulations 2005, was responsible for whether to maintain or not the lifetime ban, ii) similarly, as (European) Community law dictated that this was a reserved matter (an area of government policy where the UK Parliament keeps the power to make legislate in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales), the decision was an act which was incompatible with Community law, iii) the Minister had taken a decision in breach of the Ministerial Code, by failing to refer the matter, under Section 20 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, to the Executive Committee, and iv) although a ban in itself might have been defensible, the fact that blood was then imported from the rest of the UK (where the ban had been lifted) rendered the decision irrational.

Running almost concurrently with the judicial review proceedings was a request, made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA), for advice given to the Minister by the Attorney General for Ireland. The FOIA exemption, at section 42, for information covered by legal professional privilege (LPP) was thus engaged. The original decision notice by the Information Commissioner had rather surprisingly found that it was advice privilege, as opposed to litigation privilege. The IC correctly observed that for litigation privilege to apply

at the time of the creation of the information, there must have been a real prospect or likelihood of litigation occurring, rather than just a fear or possibility

and, because the information was dated October 2011, and leave for judicial review had not been sought until December 2011

at the time the information was created, ltigation was nothing more than a possibility

But one questions whether this can be correct, when one learns from the FTT judgment that DHSSPS had been sent a pre-action protocol letter on 27 September 2011. Again rather surprisingly, though, the FTT does not appear to have made a clear decision one way or the other which type of privilege applied, but its observation that

when the request was made judicial review proceedings…were already underway

would imply that they disagreed with the IC.

This discrepancy might lie behind the fact that the FTT afforded greater weight to the public interest in favour of maintaining the exemption. It was observed that

[the existence of the proceedings] at the time of the request seems to us to be an additional specific factor in favour of maintaining the exemption. It seems unfair that a public authority engaged in litigation should have a unilateral duty to disclose its legal advice [para 19]

Additionally, the fact that the advice was sought after the decision had been taken meant that it could give “no guide to the Minister’s motives or reasoning”.

Ultimately – and this is suggestive that the issue was finely balanced – it was the well-established inherent public interest in the maintenance of LPP which prevailed (para 21). This was a factor of “general importance” as found in a number of cases summarised by the Upper Tribunal in DCLG v The Information Commissioner and WR (2012) UKUT 103 (AAC).

Because the appeal succeeded on the grounds that the section 42 exemption applied, the FTT did not go on to consider the other exemptions pleaded by DHSSPS and the Attorney General – sections 35(1)(a) and 35(1)(c), although it was very likely that the latter at least would have also applied.

Aggregation of public interest factors

Because the other exemptions did not come into play, the FTT’s observation on the IC’s approach to public interest factors where more than one exemption applies are strictly obiter, but they are important nonetheless. As all good Information Rights people know, the European Court of Justice ruled in 2011, that when more than one exception applies to disclosure of information under the Environmental Information Regulations 20040 (EIR), the public authority may (not must) weigh the public interest in disclosure against the aggregated weight of the public interest arguments for maintaining all the exceptions. The IC does not accept that this aggregation approach extends to FOIA, however (see para 73 of his EIR exceptions guidance) and this was reflected in his decision notice in this matter, which considered separately the public interest balance in respect of the two exemptions he took into account. He invited the FTT to take the same approach, but, said the FTT, had the need arisen, the IC would have needed to justify how this “piecemeal approach” tallied with the requirement at section 2(2)(b) of FOIA to consider “all the circumstances of the case”. Moreover, the effect of the IC’s differing approaches under EIR and FOIA means that

there will be a large number of cases in which public authorities, the ICO and the Tribunal will be required to make a sometimes difficult decision about which disclosure regime applies in order to find out how to conduct the public interest balancing exercise

I am not aware of anywhere that the IC has explained his reasoning that aggregation does not apply in FOIA, and it would be helpful to know, before the matter becomes litigated (as it surely will).

And I will just end this rather long and abstruse piece with two personal observations. Firstly, donating blood is simple, painless and unarguably betters society – anyone who can, should donate. Secondly, denying gay men the ability, in this way, to contribute to this betterment of society is absurd, illogical and smacks of bigotism.