Category Archives: Information Commissioner

FOI needs a strong regulator

Slightly more than twenty working days ago I made a request to a government department under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. Following the structure of section 1(1) of the same, I asked

Please confirm whether you hold [X information] regarding [Y]

If you hold this information, please disclose it.

There are relatively mundane reasons why I am keen to know the first point, and, following on from that, to have the information if it exists.

On the twentieth working day (give or take a bank holiday or two) I received a reply to the first point, but total silence on the second:

I can confirm that [government department] does hold [X information] regarding the [Y].

Although this is rather a bizarre approach to an FOI request (FOIA is after all, primarily about access to information, not just knowledge that it exists) I have no reason to think that the failure to note the second point of my very short request was anything other than an innocent mistake.

Accordingly, I pointed the mistake out to the government department, asking them to send the information by return. (I had to do this by email, because no phone number is given on the correspondence or on the relevant (sparse) website (query whether the service is accessible, therefore, to people who may have difficulties in communicating in writing.)) However, not only did I not get the information by return, I got a template reply, and a new reference number, indicating that my follow-up email is being treated as a wholly new request. I would not be surprised for it to take another twenty working days to get a substantive reply (if I’m wrong, I will update this post accordingly).

So what to do? Well, I could complain to the government department, or ask for an internal review, but that would likely take at least another twenty working days to get a response. I could complain to the Information Commissioner’s Office, but, anecdotally, I understand they are taking some months to allocate and deal with complaint, and the only likely outcome would be a declaration that the government department had failed to comply with its section 10 and section 17 FOIA obligations, and giving them another period of days to comply. I can’t make an application for judicial review because a) the idea is completely ridiculous (have you seen my bank balance?) and b) in March the High Court rather peremptorily dismissed an argument that JR should be available for FOIA cases of urgency (on the grounds that the right of appeal under the statutory scheme was sufficient.

And FOIA delays are not isolated incidents; the BBC’s Martin Rosenbaum has written recently, following up his and others’ research, about the apparent contempt with which some public authorities treat FOIA and the Information Commissioner. Yet the latter appears unwilling, despite having the powers to do so, to act. As the Campaign for Freedom of Information recently noted, her recent draft regulatory action policy effectively ignored the fact that she is responsible for FOIA regulation, as well as for data protection and eprivacy.

Data protection and privacy are certainly hot topics (try counting the number of arriviste consultants who’ve sprung up over the last year to get an idea of how hot) but freedom of information laws are a legislative expression of another fundamental human right. I don’t think it’s the case that as a society we just don’t care about FOI (look back to the MPs’ expenses scandal to see how important and high-profile it can be) so why is it that there appears to be no effective mechanism to enforce our rights in a timely way against a recalcitrant public authority?

The views in this post (and indeed all posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Filed under access to information, Article 10, Freedom of Information, Information Commissioner, Uncategorized

It’s all about the fineszzzzz

It can be unwise to make too much of reported and/or throwaway remarks, but I’m going to look at a recent reported, and possibly throwaway, remark by a senior manager from the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) at a recent Law Society conference on the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

Giving “A perspective from the ICO” Richard Nevinson, Group Manager for Policy and Engagement, was reported by the Law Society Gazette to have said, on the subject of potential administrative fines under GDPR

If a breach warranted a fine of £30,000 under the Data Protection Act it probably warrants a similar fine under GDPR

This perhaps doesn’t at first blush sound that notable: the Commissioner herself – Elizabeth Denham – has been at pains, over the months leading up to GDPR coming into direct effect, to stress that, although the maximum fine will increase from £500,000 to €20m or 4% of annual global turnover (whichever is larger), such fines are not her focus:

Predictions of massive fines under the GDPR that simply scale up penalties we’ve issued under the Data Protection Act are nonsense

(despite this, somecommentators have continued to employ such “nonsense”).

What Nevinson said though, goes further than anything I’ve seen so far from the ICO. Because, if what he is reported to have said is correct, it would mean that we should see no change in frequency or amount of fines, unless there is a contravention on an unprecedented scale. The highest fine levied under the existing Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) has been £400,000 (twice – once to Talk Talk and once to Carphone Warehouse) – only 80% of the current maximum. This means that the ICO cannot feel that the current maximum sets a cap which frustrates them by preventing them from issuing higher fines. One would assume, therefore, that the ICO would (must?) see GDPR’s legislative intent as being to “scale up” fines in some way. But no – says Nevinson – £X under DPA will equate to £X under GDPR.

Following that line of argument, as we have never seen a fine of £500,000 under DPA we will not see one of that size (or higher) under GDPR, unless a contravention emerges that is worse than anything seen before.

I may be wildly over-analysing what he was reported to have said, but I thought it noteworthy enough to blog about it at 06:00 in the morning, so I thought you might too.

Oh, and Nevinson might not be right or might not have been accurately reported, and I definitely might not be right. So you’d be silly to pay too much attention, and you certainly shouldn’t forget about the risks that fines may represent under GDPR.

The views in this post (and indeed all posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Filed under 7th principle, Data Protection, GDPR, Information Commissioner, monetary penalty notice

The “GDPR consent” email I’d like to receive

“Dear Jon

You know us. We’re that firm you placed an order with a few months ago. You may remember that at the time we took your order we explained we were going to send occasional marketing emails to you about similar products and services, but you could opt out then, and at any subsequent point.

We know that since 2003 (with the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations) (PECR) it’s been unlawful to send unsolicited marketing emails except in circumstances like those above.

We’re contacting you now because we’ve noticed a lot of competitors (and other firms) who are either utterly confused or utterly misrepresenting a new law (separate to PECR) called the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). They’re claiming it means they have to contact you to reconfirm your consent to receive marketing emails.

GDPR actually says nothing of the sort. It does explain what “consent” means in data protection terms in a slightly more strict way, but for companies like us, who’ve respected our customers and prospective customers all along, it makes no difference.

In fact, the emails you’re getting from those companies, asking you to “reconsent”, are probably actually direct marketing emails themselves. And if the companies don’t already have your consent to send them they may well be breaking the law in sending them. If you think we’re exaggerating, look at the fine the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) levied on Honda last year.

In fact, you’d do well to look at the ICO’s website – it’s got some good stuff on this, both for customers like you, and for companies who are confused by this.

It all really boils down to treating customers well, and not assuming you can send direct electronic marketing without actually looking at what the law says.

So yes, this is a marketing email, and yes, it is lawful, and yes, it is more than a little pompous.”

The views in this post (and indeed all posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Filed under consent, GDPR, Information Commissioner, marketing, PECR, spam

Rennard, the facts

Has the former LibDem Campaigns guru been engaging in unsolicited electronic marketing?

If I want to market my product or service to you as an individual, the general rule is that I cannot do so by email unless I have your prior consent informing me that you wish to receive it. This applies to me (if, say, I’m promoting this blog by email), it applies to any business, it applies to political parties, and it also applies to Baron Rennard of Wavertree, when he is promoting his new memoirs. However, a recent media story about the Lord Rennard’s promotional activities suggests he may not be aware of his legal obligations here, and for someone who has held senior roles within the Liberal Democrats, someone renowned as a “formidable and widely respected practitioner of political campaigning”, this is rather concerning.

The law (regulation 22 of the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (as amended)) outlaws the sending of unsolicited email marketing to individuals, unless the recipient has previously consented to receive the marketing (the exception to the general rule is that email marketing can be sent if the sender has obtained the recipient’s email address “in the course of the sale or negotiations for the sale of a product or service to that recipient” and if it is explained to the recipient that they can opt out – this is often known as the “soft opt-in“).

Lord Rennard is reported as saying

I have emailed people from my address book, or using publicly available email addresses, about the publication of a volume of memoirs

But just because one already holds someone’s email address, or just because an email address is in the public domain, this does not justify or permit the sending of unsolicited marketing. The European Directive which the PEC Regulations implement makes clear that people have a right to respect for their correspondence within the context of electronic communications, and that this right is a part of the fundamental rights to respect for protection of personal data, and respect for a private and family life. It may be a lot to expect the average person sending an email promoting a book to know this, but when the sender is someone whose reputation is in part based on his skills as a political campaigner, we should surely expect better (I say “in part” because, of course, the Lord Rennard is known for other things as well).

At a time when the use of digital data for political campaigning purposes is under intense scrutiny, it will be interesting to see what the Information Commissioner (who is said to be investigating Rennard’s marketing exercise) says. It might not seem the most serious of issues, but it encapsulates a lot.

The views in this post (and indeed all posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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On the breach

Failure to notify the ICO in a timely manner of a personal data breach under PECR carries a £1000 fixed penalty notice – why not something similar under wider data protection law?

When the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (“PECR”) were amended in 2011 to implement the Citizens’ Rights Directive, an obligation was placed upon providers of a public electronic communications service  (“service providers”) to notify personal data breaches to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) “without undue delay”, and in 2013 article 2(2) of European Commission Regulation 611/2013 provided , in terms, that “without undue delay” would mean “no later than 24 hours after the detection of the personal data breach, where feasible”. The 2011 amendment regulations also gave the ICO the power to serve a fixed penalty notice of £1000 on a service provider which failed to comply with notification obligations.

Thus it was that in 2016 both EE and Talk Talk were served with such penalties, with the latter subsequently unsuccessfully appealing to the Information Tribunal, and thus it was that, last week, SSE Energy Supply were served with one. The SSE notice is interesting reading – the personal data breach in question (defined in amended regulation 2 of PECR as “a breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed in connection with the provision of a public electronic communications service”) consisted solely of the sending of one customer email (containing name and account number) to the wrong email address, and it appears that it was reported to the ICO two days after SSE realised (so, effectively, 24 hours too late). If this appears harsh, it is worth noting that the ICO has discretion over whether to impose the penalty or not, and, in determining that she should, the Commissioner took into account a pour encourager les autres argument that

the underlying objective in imposing a monetary penalty is to promote compliance with PECR. The requirement to notify…provides an important opportunity…to assess whether a service provider is complying with its obligations under PECR…A monetary penalty in this case would act as a general encouragement towards compliance…

As any fule kno, the looming General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) expands to all data controllers this obligation to notify the ICO of qualifying personal data breaches. Under GDPR the definition is broadly similar to that in PECR (“a breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed”) and a breach qualifies for the notification requirements in all cases unless it is “unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons”. Under GDPR, the window for notification is 72 hours.

But under GDPR, and under the Data Protection Bill currently in Parliament, there is no provision for similar fixed penalty notices for notification failures (although, of course, a failure to notify a breach could constitute a general infringement under article 83, attracting a theoretical non-fixed maximum fine of €10m or 2% of global annual turnover). Is Parliament missing a trick here? If the objective of the PECR fixed penalty notice is to promote compliance with PECR, then why not a similar fixed penalty notice to promote compliance with wider data protection legislation? In 2016/17 the ICO received 1005 notifications by service providers of PECR breaches (up 63% on the previous year) and analysing/investigating these will be no small task. The figure under GDPR will no doubt be much higher, but that is surely not a reason not to provide for a punitive fixed penalty scheme for those who fail to comply with the notification requirements (given what the underlying objective of notification is)?

I would be interested to know if anyone is aware of discussions on this, and whether, as it reaches the Commons, there is any prospect of the Data Protection Bill changing to incorporate fixed penalties for notification failures.

The views in this post (and indeed all posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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My small business advice…let’s be blunt.

In recent months I’ve seen plenty of articles and comments, on regular and social media, to the effect that either the government, or the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), or both, must do more to educate businesses about the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and to help them comply with its requirements.

My response to this is blunt: when setting up and when running a business, it is for the owner/directors/board to exercise appropriate diligence to understand and comply with the laws relating to the business. Furthermore, the costs of this diligence and compliance have to be factored into any new or ongoing business plan. Even more bluntly – if you can’t afford to find out what the applicable law is, and you can’t afford to comply, then you haven’t got a viable business.

(Less bluntly, there is of course a wealth of information, mostly from the ICO, about what GDPR means and how to comply. Ultimately, however, data protection law is principles-based and risk-based and no one but those responsible for running it can reasonably say what compliance means in the context of that particular business).

The views in this post (and indeed all posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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This old world will never change

Complacency about data protection in the NHS won’t change unless ICO takes firm action

Back in September 2016 I spoke to Vice’s Motherboard, about reports that various NHS bodies were still running Windows XP, and I said

If hospitals are knowingly using insecure XP machines and devices to hold and otherwise process patient data they may well be in serious contravention of their [data protection] obligations

Subsequently, in May this year, the Wannacry exploit indicated that those bodies were indeed vulnerable, with multiple NHS Trusts and GP practices subject to ransomware demands and major system disruption.

That this had enormous impact on patients is evidenced by a new report on the incident from the National Audit Office (NAO), which shows that

6,912 appointments had been cancelled, and [it is] estimated [that] over 19,000 appointments would have been cancelled in total. Neither the Department nor NHS England know how many GP appointments were cancelled, or how many ambulances and patients were diverted from the five accident and emergency departments that were unable to treat some patients

The NAO investigation found that the Department of Health and the Cabinet Office had written to Trusts

saying it was essential they had “robust plans” to migrate away from old software, such as Windows XP, by April 2015. [And in] March and April 2017, NHS Digital had issued critical alerts warning organisations to patch their systems to prevent WannaCry

Although the NAO report is critical of the government departments themselves for failure to do more, it does correctly note that individual healthcare organisations are themselves responsible for the protection of patient information. This is, of course, correct: under the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) each organisation is a data controller, and responsible for, among other things, for ensuring that appropriate technical and organisational measures are taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data.

Yet, despite these failings, and despite the clear evidence of huge disruption for patients and the unavoidable implication that delays in treatment across all NHS services occurred, the report was greeted by the following statement by Keith McNeil, Chief Clinical Information Officer for NHS England

As the NAO report makes clear, no harm was caused to patients and there were no incidents of patient data being compromised or stolen

In fairness to McNeil, he is citing the report itself, which says that “NHS organisations did not report any cases of harm to patients or of data being compromised or stolen” (although that is not quite the same thing). But the report continues

If the WannaCry ransomware attack had led to any patient harm or loss of data then NHS England told us that it would expect trusts to report cases through existing reporting channels, such as reporting data loss direct to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) in line with existing policy and guidance on information governance

So it appears that the evidence for no harm arising is because there were no reports of “data loss” to the ICO. This emphasis on “data loss” is frustrating, firstly because personal data does not have to be lost for harm to arise, and it is difficult to understand how delays and emergency diversions would not have led to some harm, but secondly because it is legally mistaken: the DPA makes clear that data security should prevent all sorts of unauthorised processing, and removal/restriction of access is clearly covered by the definition of “processing”.

It is also illustrative of a level of complacency which is deleterious to patient health and safety, and a possible indicator of how the Wannacry incidents happened in the first place. Just because data could not be accessed as a result the malware does not mean that this was not a very serious situation.

It’s not clear whether the ICO will be investigating further, or taking action as a result of the NAO report (their response to my tweeted question – “We will be considering the contents of the report in more detail. We continue to liaise with the health sector on this issue” was particularly unenlightening). I know countless dedicated, highly skilled professionals working in the fields of data protection and information governance in the NHS, they’ve often told me their frustrations with senior staff complacency. Unless the ICO does take action (and this doesn’t necessarily have to be by way of fines) these professionals, but also – more importantly – patients, will continue to be let down, and in the case of the latter, put at the risk of harm.

The views in this post (and indeed all posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Filed under 7th principle, Data Protection, data security, enforcement, Information Commissioner, NHS

Serious DCMS error about consent and data protection 

I blogged on Monday about the government Statement of Intent regarding the forthcoming Data Protection Bill. What I missed at the time was an accompanying release on the Department for Digital, Culture,  Media and Sport (DCMS) website.  Having now seen it, I realise why so many media outlets have been making a profoundly misleading statement about consent under the new data protection law: they have lifted it directly from DCMS. The statement is

The Data Protection Bill will require ‘explicit’ consent to be necessary for processing sensitive personal data

It should only take a second to realise how wrong this is: sensitive personal data will include information about, among other things, health, and criminal convictions. Is the government proposing, say, that, before passing on information about a critically injured patient to an A&E department, a paramedic will have to get the unconscious patient’s explicit consent? Is it proposing that before passing on information about a convicted sex offender to a local authority social care department the Disclosure and Barring Service will have to get the offender’s explicit consent? 

Of course not – it’s absolute nonsense to think so, and the parliamentary drafters of the forthcoming Bill would not dream of writing the law in such a way, not least because it would contravene our obligations under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) around which much of the Bill will be based. GDPR effectively mirrors the existing European Data Protection Directive (given effect in our existing Data Protection Act 1998). Under these laws, there are multiple circumstances under which personal data, and higher-category sensitive personal data can be processed. Consent is one of those. But there are, in Article 9(2) of GDPR, nine other conditions which permit the processing of special category data (the GDPR term used to replicate what is called “sensitive personal data” under existing domestic data protection law), and GDPR affords member states the power to legislate for further conditions.

What the DCMS release should say is that when consent is legitimately relied upon to process sensitive personal data the consent must be explicit. I know that sentence has got more words on it than the DCMS original, but that’s because sometimes a statement needs more words in order to be correct, and make sense, rather than mislead on a very important point regarding people’s fundamental rights.

I tweeted Matt Hancock, the minister, about the error, but with no answer as yet. I’ve also invited DCMS to correct it. The horse has already bolted though, as a Google news search for the offending phrase will show. The Information Commissioner’s Office has begun a series of pieces addressing GDPR myths, and I hope this is one they’ll talk about, but DCMS themselves should still issue a corrective, and soon.

The views in this post (and indeed all posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Filed under consent, Data Protection, DCMS, GDPR, Information Commissioner, Uncategorized

DCMS Statement of Intent on the Data Protection Bill

Not so much a Statement of Intent, as a Statement of the Bleeding Obvious

The wait is not quite over. We don’t yet have a Data Protection Bill, but we do have a Statement of Intent from DCMS, explaining what the proposed legislation will contain. I though it would be helpful to do a short briefing note based on my very quick assessment of the Statement. So here it is

IT’S JUST AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF ALL THE THINGS THE UK WOULD HAVE TO IMPLEMENT ANYWAY UNDER EUROPEAN LAW

By which I mean, it proposes law changes which will be happening in May next year, when the General Data Protection Regulation becomes directly applicable, or changes made under our obligation to implement the Police and Crime Directive. In a little more detail, here are some things of passing interest, none of which is hugely unexpected.

As predicted by many, at page 8 it is announced that the UK will legislate to require parents to give consent to children’s access to information society services (i.e. online services) where the child is under 13 (rather than GDPR’s default 16). As the UK lobbied to give member states discretion on this, it is no surprise.

Exemptions from compliance with majority of data protection law when the processing is for the purposes of journalism will remain (page 19). The Statement says that the government

believe the existing exemptions set out in section 32 strike the right balance between privacy and freedom of expression

But of potential note is the suggestion that

The main difference will be to amend provisions relating to the ICO’s enforcement powers to strengthen the ICO’s ability to enforce the re-enacted section 32 exemptions effectively

Without further details it is impossible to know what will be proposed here, but any changes to the existing regime which might have the effect of decreasing the size of the media’s huge carve-out will no doubt be vigorously lobbied against.

There is confirmation (at pp17 and 18) that third parties (i.e. not just criminal justice bodies) will be able to access criminal conviction information. Again, this is not unexpected – the regime for criminal records checks for employers etc was unlikely to be removed.

The Statement proposes a new criminal offence of intentionally or recklessly re-identifying individuals from anonymised or pseudonymised data, something the Commons Science and Technology Committee has called for. Those who subsequently process such data will also be guilty of an offence. The details here will be interesting to see – as with most privacy-enhancing technology, in order for anonymisation to be robust it needs to stress-tested – such testing will not be effective if those undertaking do so at risk of committing an offence, so presumably the forthcoming Bill will provide for this.

The Bill will also introduce an offence of altering records with intent to prevent disclosure following a subject access request. This will use the current mechanism at section 77 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. Whether that section itself will be amended (time limits for prosecutions militate against its effectiveness) remains unknown.

I also note that the existing offence of unlawfully obtaining personal data will be widened to those who retain personal data against the wishes of the data controller, even where it was initially obtained lawfully. This will probably cover those situations where people gather or are sent personal data in error, and then refuse to return it.

There is one particular howler at page 21, which suggests the government doesn’t understand what privacy by design and privacy by default mean:

The Bill will also set out to reassure citizens by promoting the concept of “privacy by default and design”. This is achieved by giving citizens the right to know when their personal data has been released in contravention of the data protection safeguards, and also by offering them a clearer right of redress

Privacy by design/default is about embedding privacy protection throughout the lifecycle of a project or process etc., and has got nothing at all to do with notifying data subjects of breaches, and whether this is a drafting error in the Statement, or a fundamental misunderstanding, it is rather concerning that the government, which makes much of “innovation” (around which privacy by design should be emphasised), fails to get this right.

So that’s a whistle stop tour of the Statement, ignoring all the fluff about implementing things which are required under GDPR and the Directive. I’ll update this piece in due course, if anything else emerges from a closer reading.

The views in this post (and indeed all posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Filed under Data Protection, GDPR, Information Commissioner, journalism

On some sandy beach

[EDITED 25.07.17 to include references to “sandpits” in the report of the Deepmind Health Independent Review Panel]

What lies behind the Information Commissioner’s recent reference to “sandbox regulation”?

The government minister with responsibility for data protection, Matt Hancock, recently spoke to the Leverhulme Centre. He touched on data protection:

a new Data Protection Bill in this Parliamentary Session…will bring the laws up to date for the modern age, introduce new safeguards for citizens, stronger penalties for infringement, and important new features like the right to be forgotten. It will bring the EU’s GDPR and Law Enforcement Directive into UK law, ensuring we are prepared for Brexit.

All pretty standard stuff (let’s ignore the point that the “right to be forgotten” such as it is, exists under existing law – a big clue to this being that the landmark case was heard by the CJEU in 2014). But Hancock went on to cite with approval some recent words of the Information Commissioner, Elizabeth Denham:

I think the ICO’s proposal of a data regulatory “sandbox” approach is very impressive and forward looking. It works in financial regulation and I look forward to seeing it in action here.

This refers to Denham’s recent speech on “Promoting privacy with innovation within the law”, in which she said

We are…looking at how we might be able to engage more deeply with companies as they seek to implement privacy by design…How we can contribute to a “safe space” by building a sandbox where companies can test their ideas, services and business models. How we can better recognise the circular rather than linear nature of the design process.

I thought this was interesting – “sandbox regulation” in the financial services sector involves an application to the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), for the testing of “innovative” products that don’t necessarily fit into existing regulatory frameworks – the FCA will even where necessary waive rules, and undertake not to take enforcement action.

That this model works for financial services does not, though, necessarily mean it would work when it comes to regulation of laws, such as data protection laws, which give effect to fundamental rights. When I made enquiries to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) for further guidance on what Denham intends, I was told that they “don’t have anything to add to what [she’s] already said about engaging with companies to help implement privacy by design”.

The recent lack of enforcement action by the ICO against the Royal Free NHS Trust regarding its deal with Google Deepmind raised eyebrows in some circles: if the unlawful processing of 1.6 million health records (by their nature sensitive personal data) doesn’t merit formal enforcement, then does anything?

Was that a form of “sandbox regulation”? Presumably not, as it doesn’t appear that the ICO was aware of the arrangement prior to it taking place, but if, as it seems to me, such regulation may involve a light-touch approach where innovation is involved, I really hope that the views and wishes of data subjects are not ignored. If organisations are going to play in the sand with our personal data, we should at the very least know about it.

**EDIT: I have had my attention drawn to references to “sandpits” in the Annual Report of the Deepmind Health Independent Review Panel:

We think it would be helpful if there was a space, similar to the ‘sandpits’ established by the Research Councils, which would allow regulators, the Department of Health and tech providers to discuss these issues at an early stage of product development. The protection of data during testing is an issue that should be discussed in a similar collaborative forum. We believe that there must be a mechanism that allows effective testing without compromising confidential patient information.

It would seem a bit of a coincidence that this report should be published around the same time Denham and Hancock were making their speeches – and I would argue that this only bolsters the case for more transparency from the ICO about how this type of collaborative regulation will take place.

And I notice that the Review Panel say nothing about involving data subjects in “product development”. Until “innovators” understand that data subjects are the key stakeholder in this, I don’t hold out much hope for the proper protection of rights.**

The views in this post (and indeed all posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Filed under Data Protection, enforcement, human rights, Information Commissioner