Tag Archives: data protection

May 9, 2023 · 2:30 pm

ICO: powers to enforce over dead people’s information?

The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has announced that it will not be taking action against Lancashire Police in relation to their disclosure of private information during their investigation into the tragic case of Nicola Bulley.

This is unsurprising, and, objectively, reassuring, because if the ICO had brought enforcement proceedings it would almost certainly have been unlawful to do so. In blunt terms, the ICO’s relevant powers are under laws which deal with “personal data” (data relating to a living individual) and when the police disclosed information about Nicola, she was not living.

There is no discretion in these matters, and no grey areas – a dead person (in the UK, at least) does not have data protection rights because information relating to a dead person is, simply, not personal data. Even if the police thought, at the time of the disclosure, that Nicola was alive, it appears that, as a matter of fact, she was not. (I note that the ICO says it will be able to provide further details about its decision following the inquest into Nicola’s death, so it is just possible that there is further information which might elucidate the position.)

Unless the ICO was going to try to take enforcement action in relation to a general policy, or the operation of a general policy, about disclosure of information about missing people (for instance under Article 24 of the UK GDPR), then there was simply no legal power to take action in respect of this specific incident.

That is not to say that the ICO was not entitled to comment on the general issues, or publish the guidance it has published, but it seems to be either an empty statement to say “we don’t consider this case requires enforcement action”, or a statement that reveals a failure to apply core legal principles to the situation.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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March 24, 2023 · 7:37 am

SRA, data protection and the solicitors roll

In August 2022 the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) announced plans to change its rules and reinstate the annual “keeping of the roll” exercise. Until 2014, all solicitors without practising certificates were required to complete an application each year and pay an administration fee if they wished to remain on the roll. This requirement was dispensed with in 2014 in part because the annual process was seen as burdensome for solicitors.

One of the justifications now for reintroducing the keeping of the roll is given by the SRA as

There are also requirements under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2016 [sic] and the seven principles that govern the holding and retention of data. Under GDPR we have responsibility as a data controller to ensure we maintain accurate data relating to individuals and we are processing it fairly and lawfully.

What is slightly odd is that when, in 2014, the SRA proposed to scrap the keeping of the roll, it was not troubled by the observations of the then Information Commissioner about the importance of accuracy and privacy of information. In its reply to the then Commissioner’s consultation response it said that it had “fully considered the issues” and

We consider that the availability of the SRA’s online system, mySRA, to non- practising solicitors as a means of keeping their details up to date, serves to mitigate the possibility of data become inaccurate…To further mitigate the risk of deterioration of the information held on the roll, the SRA can include reminders to keep contact details up to date in standard communications sent to solicitors.

If that was the position in 2014, it is difficult to understand why it is any different today. The data protection principles – including the “accuracy principle” – in the UK GDPR (not in fact the “GDPR 2016” that the SRA refers to) are effectively identical to those in the prior Data Protection Act 1998.

If the SRA was not concerned by data protection considerations in 2014 but is so now, one might argue that it should explain why. The Information Commissioner does not appear to have responded to the consultation this time around, so there is no indication that his views swayed the SRA.

If the SRA was concerned about the risk of administrative fines (potentially larger under the UK GDPR than under the Data Protection Act 1998) it should have reassured itself that any such fines must be proportionate (Article 83(1) UK GDPR) and by the fact that the Commissioner has repeatedly stressed that he is not in the business of handing out fines for minor infringements to otherwise responsible data controllers.

I should emphasise that data protection considerations were not the only ones taken into account by the SRA, and I don’t wish to discuss whether, in the round, the decision to reintroduce the keeping of the roll was correct or not (Joshua Rozenberg has written on this, and the effect on him). But I do feel that the arguments around data protection show a confused approach to that particular issue.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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March 12, 2023 · 12:49 pm

Where’s the Tories’ privacy notice? (just don’t mention the footballer)

The Conservative Party, no doubt scrabbling to gather perceived support for its contentious immigration policies and measures is running a web and social media campaign. The web page encourages those visiting it to “back our plan and send a message” to other parties:

Further down the page visitors are invited to “send Labour a message”

Clicking on either of the red buttons in those screenshots results in a pop-up form, on which one can say whether or not one supports the Tory plans (in the screenshot below, I’ve selected “no”)

One is then required to give one’s name, email address and postcode, and there is a tick box against text saying “I agree to the Conservative Party, and the wider Conservative Party, using the information I provide to keep me updated via email about the Party’s campaigns and opportunities to get involved”

There are two things to note.

First, the form appears to submit whether one ticks the “I agree” box or not.

Second, and in any case, none of the links to “how we use your data”, or the “privacy policy”, or the “terms and conditions” works.

So anyone submitting their special category data (information about one’s views on a political party’s policies on immigration is personal data revealing political opinions, and so Article 9 UK GDPR applies) has no idea whatsoever how it will subsequently be processed by the Tories.

I suppose there is an argument that anyone who happens upon this page, and chooses to submit the form, has a good idea what is going on (although that is by no means certain, and people could quite plausibly think that it provides an opportunity to provide views contrary to the Tories’). In any event, it would seem potentially to meet to definition of “plugging” (political lobbying under the guide of research) which ICO deals with in its direct marketing guidance.

Also in any event, the absence of any workable links to privacy notice information means, unavoidably, that the lawfulness of any subsequent processing is vitiated.

It’s the sort of thing I would hope the ICO is alive to (I’ve seen people on social media saying they have complained to ICO). But I won’t hold my breath on that – many years ago I wrote about how such data abuse was rife across the political spectrum – but little if anything has changed.

And finally, the most remarkable thing of all is that I’ve written a whole post on what is a pressing and high-profile issue without once mentioning Gary Lineker.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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February 28, 2023 · 8:29 pm

FOI embarrassment

At a recent awards event, recognising high-performing Freedom of Information officers and teams (fantastic idea by the organisers/sponsors, by the way*) I gave a brief talk where I stressed that it was important to recognise how much FOI has achieved in its 23 (or 18**) years, and to remember that every day thousands of disclosures are made by thousands of public authorities. It’s very easy to snipe at bad practice, and I often do, but if we don’t acknowledge the benefits, the real opponents of FOI might start arguing for its repeal.

So. Celebrate success. Accentuate the positive. Eliminate the negative.

However.

Then you see a decision notice from the Information Commissioner (ICO), in which a large London council had refused to disclose, under FOI, information on how many enquiries (MEQs) each of its councillors*** had submitted to the council on behalf of constituents. The reason for refusal was that this was the personal data of the councillors (well, yes) and that disclosure would infringe those councillors’ rights under the data protection law (hell, no).

This isn’t time for legal analysis. It really is as extraordinary as it sounds.

Thankfully, the ICO had no truck with it (and the notice does have legal analysis).

Frankly, though, the council should be ashamed.

______________________

*I have no personal or professional interest

**The Act commenced in 2000, but the main provisions didn’t commence until 2005

***At the end of the notice there is a big hint as to the role of the person who made the request – see if you can guess

.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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February 22, 2023 · 8:24 am

Monitoring of lawyers by the state

In the Commons on Monday Robert Jenrick, minister for immigration, said, in the context of a debate on the implications of the violent disorder outside a hotel providing refuge for asylum seekers, in Knowsley on 10 February, and in answer to a question about why no “small boats bill” has been introduced into Parliament

this is one of the most litigious areas of public life. It is an area where, I am afraid, human rights lawyers abuse and exploit our laws at times, and where the courts have taken an expansive approach in the past. That is why we must get this right, but we will be bringing forward that legislation very soon

When pressed on his reference to abuse of the law by lawyers, and asked “how many solicitors, advocates and barristers have been reported by the Home Office in the last 12 months to the regulatory authorities”, Mr Jenrick replied

We are monitoring the activities, as it so happens, of a small number of legal practitioners, but it is not appropriate for me to discuss that here.

This is a remarkable statement, both in its lack of detail and in its potential effect. The prospect of the monitoring of lawyers by the state carries chilling implications. It may well be that Mr Jenrick had no intention of making what could be interpreted as an oppressive statement, but words are important, and words said in Parliament carry particular weight.

It may also be that the “monitoring” in question consists of legitimate investigation into potential criminality by that “small number” of lawyers, but if that was the case, why not say so?

But “monitoring”, in itself, must be done in accordance with the law. If it is in the context of a criminal investigation, or surveillance, there are specific laws which may apply.

And to the extent that it involves the processing of personal data of the lawyers in question (which, inevitably, it surely must, when one considers that “processing” means, among other things “collection, recording, organisation, structuring or storage” performed on personal data) the monitoring must comply with applicable data protection laws).

As a fundamental general principle, processing of personal data must be transparent (see Articles 5(1)(a), 13 and 14 UK GDPR, or, for law enforcement processing, section 44 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA), or, for Intelligence Services Processing, section 93 of the DPA.

There are qualifications to and exemptions from this general principle, but, in the absence of circumstances providing such an exemption, a data subject (here, the lawyers who are apparently being monitored) should be made aware of the processing. The information they should receive includes, among other things: the identity and the contact details of the person directing the processing; the legal basis and the purposes of the processing, and; the recipients or categories of recipients of the personal data.

We tend to call the notices we receive under these provisions “privacy notices”. Those of us who have practised data protection law for a long time will remember the term “fair processing notice” which is arguably a better term. Whatever one calls them, though, such notices are a bedrock of the law – without being aware of the processing, and the risks, rules, safeguards and rights in relation to it, data subjects cannot properly exercise their rights.

With all that in mind, has the Home Office – or whoever it is who is directing the monitoring of the “small number of lawyers” – informed them that they are being monitored? If not, why not?

Returning to my earlier comments about the oppressiveness of comments to the effect that, or the giving of a perception that, the coercive powers of the state are being deployed against lawyers by monitoring them, one wonders if the Information Commissioner should take steps to investigate the background to Mr Jenrick’s comments.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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February 11, 2023 · 12:07 pm

SNP MP private email hack

UPDATE 13.02.23: it’s been drawn to my attention that Mr McDonald says that his private account is “not used for constituency or parliamentary business” END UPDATE

It was reported last week that the email account of Stewart McDonald, an SNP MP, had been compromised in what he described as a “sophisticated and targeted spear phishing hack”. The BBC appeared to agree with him, describing it as a “highly targeted and sophisticated attack”.

Maybe it was, although surely MPs are told to be wary of unexpected email attachments, and not to put enter system passwords when asked to in palpably suspicious circumstances (McDonald had attempted to open a document apparently sent by a member of his staff, with a military update on Ukraine, and clicking on it brought up a login page for the email account he was using).

But what I haven’t seen raised much in the media is the fact that the account which was compromised appears to have been McDonald’s private email account, and that the offending attachment was sent (or was spoofed to make it look like it was sent) from his staffer’s private email account. The reporting has referred to “personal” email account, from which it is reasonable to infer that these are not official accounts (such as McDonald’s one given on his parliamentary page).

Only last year the Information Commissioner presented a report to Parliament on the use of private communications channels in government. Although the report was prompted by concerns about the use of such private channels within the Department for Health and Social Care, it made clear that it had general application in relation to the “adopting [of] new ways of working without sufficient consideration of the risks and issues they may present for information management”. The report stresses throughout the importance of “maintaining the security of personal and official information” and the risks that private channels present to such security.

Did Mr McDonald and his staff read it? If not, this tweet he made only a couple of years ago is ironic, to say the least.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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February 4, 2023 · 9:56 am

Facial recognition in the school canteen

A piece I wrote for the Mishcon de Reya website on the ICO’s recent letter to North Ayrshire Council on the use of facial recognition technology in schools:

https://www.mishcon.com/news/ico-takes-action-on-facial-recognition-in-schools

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December 18, 2022 · 8:58 am

Data protection misunderstandings in court

There is something that distinguishes those who have practised data protection law for more than five years and those who have come to it more recently. The former are in possession of a secret. It is this: GDPR did not change the fundamentals of data protection.

Look at the keystones of the law – the data protection principles in Schedule One of the Data Protection Act of 1998 (the prior law) and in Article 5 UK GDPR (the current). They are effectively identical. And in fact, they have barely changed from the principles in the 1984 Data Protection Act, and those in the Council of Europe Data Protection Convention 108 of 1981.

Yet even in the courts one still sees from time to time the misconception that the GDPR rights and obligations were something fundamentally new.

An example is a recent case in the Employment Appeal Tribunal. The details of the case are not important for this post, but what is relevant is that the claimant employee argued that information about his previous employment history at the respondent employer (from 2008-2011) should not have been allowed in evidence. One argument in support of this was that the lengthy retention of this information was in breach of the employer’s data protection obligations (and the claimant had received correspondence from the Information Commissioner’s Office broadly agreeing with this).

But in response to this argument the respondent employer asserted that

Prior to [GDPR coming into effect on 25 May 2018] there was no “right to erase“. Accordingly, the period during which the respondent should arguably have taken steps to delete data was around nine months from this point until 28 February 2019.

This fails to recognise that, even if there was no express right to erasure prior to GDPR (n.b. there was certainly an implied right, as the European Court of Justice found in Google Spain) there was certainly an obligation on a data controller employer not to retain personal data for longer than was necessary (see paragraph 5 Schedule One to the 1998 Act).

The judge, however, accepted the respondent’s argument (although in all fairness to her she does point out that neither party took her to the legislation or the case law):

I accept that the ICO’s reference to retention being likely to breach data protection requirements, was (at its highest) concerned with the nine month period between the GDPR coming into effect and the claimant indicating an intention to commence litigation

That is not what the the quoted correspondence (at paragraph 17) from the ICO said, and it is not a correct statement of the law. If the period of retention of the data was excessive, there is no reason to say it was not in contravention of the prior law, as well as GDPR.

Ultimately, it is doubtful that this would have made much difference. As often in such proceedings, the relevance of the information to the matter was key:

in so far as the Respondent was in breach of data protection law for the nine month period I have referred to, it does not follow from this that the documentation was inadmissible in the [Employment Tribunal] proceedings

But one wonders if the judge might have taken a slightly different view of, instead, she had found that the Respondent was in fact in breach of data protection law for several years (rather than just nine months).

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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November 26, 2022 · 10:59 am

Does DHSC have a compliant ROPA?

Article 30(4) of the UK GDPR requires a controller to make its records of processing activities (ROPA) available to the Information Commissioner (ICO) upon request.

ROPAs are required for most large controllers, and should include at least

  • The name and contact details of the organisation (and where applicable the data protection officer).
  • The purposes of processing.
  • A description of the categories of individuals and categories of personal data.
  • The categories of recipients of personal data.
  • Details of transfers to third countries including documenting the transfer mechanism safeguards in place.
  • Retention schedules.
  • A description of the controller’s technical and organisational security measures.

Ordinarily, in my experience, controllers will maintain a ROPA in one document, or one set of linked documents. This not only enables a controller to comply with Article 30(4), but reflects the fact that a ROPA is not just a compliance obligation, but contributes to and assists the controller in its information governance functions.

This all makes the position of the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) rather odd. Because, in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for disclosure of its ROPA, it stated that the request was “vexatious” on the grounds of the time and costs it would have to incur to respond. This was because, as the DHSC subsequently told the ICO when the latter was asked to issue a FOIA decision notice

We hold a collection of documentation across different formats which, when put together, fulfils our obligation under Article 30 of the GDPR to record and document all of our personal data processing activities…[and]…to locate, retrieve and extract all of this documentation would involve a manual trawl of the whole organisation and each document would then need to be reviewed to check for content such as personal data, commercially sensitive data and any other information that would otherwise not be appropriate to place into the public domain

For this reason, the ICO accepted that compliance with the request would be “grossly oppressive” and this, taken with other factors, meant that the FOIA request was indeed vexatious.

The ICO is tasked with regulating both FOIA and data protection law. The decision notice here notes this, and says

the Commissioner feels duty bound to note that, if the DHSC cannot comply with the request because it would impose a grossly oppressive burden to do so, it is unlikely that the DHSC would be able to provide its ROPA to the Commissioner, which is a requirement under Article 30 of the UK GDPR, without that same burden

There’s a big hint here to DHSC that it should adopt a different approach to its ROPA for the future.

But the decision notice does contain some rather strange wording. In the context of the words quoted just above, the ICO says

This decision notice looks at the DHSC’s compliance with FOIA only and the Commissioner cannot order the DHSC to take any action under any other legislation.

It is true that, under his FOIA powers, the ICO cannot order the DHSC to comply with the UK GDPR, but, quite evidently, under his UK GDPR powers, he certainly can: Article 58(2)(d) specifically empowers him to

order the controller…to bring processing operations into compliance with the provisions of this Regulation, where appropriate, in a specified manner and within a specified period

I am not aware of anything in FOIA, or data protection law (or wider regulatory and public law) that prevents the ICO from taking enforcement action under UK GDPR as a result of findings he has made under FOIA. Indeed, it would be rather strange if anything did prevent him from doing so.

So it does seem that the ICO could order DHSC to get its ROPA in order. Maybe the big hint in the FOIA decision notice will have the desired effect. But regulation by means of big hints is perhaps not entirely in compliance with the requirement on the ICO, deriving from the Regulators’ Code, to ensure that its approach to its regulatory activities is transparent.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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November 2, 2022 · 5:11 pm

ICO threatened Matt Hancock with £17.5m fine (sort of)

It’s well known that, under the UK GDPR, and the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA), the Information Commissioner can fine a controller or a processor a maximum of £17.5m (or 4% of global annual turnover). Less well known (to me at least) is that he can fine any person, including you, or me, or Matt Hancock, the same, even if they are not a controller or processor.

Section 142 of the DPA empowers the Commissioner to serve “Information Notices”. These fall broadly into two types: those served on a controller or processor requiring them to provide information which the Commissioner reasonably requires for the purposes of carrying out his functions under the data protection legislation; and those requiring

any person to provide the Commissioner with information that the Commissioner reasonably requires for the purposes of—

(i)investigating a suspected failure of a type described in section 149(2) or a suspected offence under this Act, or

(ii)determining whether the processing of personal data is carried out by an individual in the course of a purely personal or household activity.

And by section 155(1) of the DPA, the Commissioner may serve a monetary penalty notice (aka “fine”) on any “person” who fails to comply with an Information Notice. That includes you, or me, or Matt Hancock. (Section 157(4) provides that the maximum amount is £17.5m, or 4% of global annual turnover – although I doubt that you, I, or Matt Hancock has an annual global turnover.)

All very interesting and theoretical, you might think. Well, so might Matt Hancock have thought, until an Information Notice (which the Commissioner has recently uploaded to the ICO website) dropped onto his figurative doormat last year. The Notice was in relation to the Commissioner’s investigation of the leaking of CCTV images showing the former Secretary of State for Health and Social Care and his former aide enjoying each other’s company. The investigation – which was into the circumstances of the leak, and not Matt Hancock’s conduct – concluded in April of this year, with the ICO deciding that there was insufficient evidence to justify further action. But the Notice states clearly at paragraph 7 that failure to comply is, indeed, punishable with a fine of up to £17.5m (etc.).

The Matt Hancock Notice admittedly addresses him as if he were a controller (it says the ICO is looking at his compliance with the UK GDPR) although I am not sure that is correct – Matt Hancock will indeed be a controller in respect of his constituency work, and his work as an MP outside ministerial duties, but the normal approach is that a ministerial department will be the relevant controller for personal data processed in the context of that department (thus, the Department for Health and Social Care shows as a controller on the ICO register of fee payers).

Nonetheless, the ICO also issued an Information Notice to Matt Hancock’s former aide (as well as to Helen Whateley MP, the Minister of State), and that one makes no mention of UK GDPR compliance or a suggestion she was a controller, but does also “threaten” a potential £17.5m fine.

Of course, realistically, no one, not even Matt Hancock, was really ever at risk of a huge fine (section 155(3) of the DPA requires the Commissioner to have regard to various factors, including proportionality), but it strikes me as a remarkable state of affairs that you, I or any member of the public caught up in a matter that leads to ICO investigation, and who might have relevant information, is as a matter of law vulnerable to a penalty of £17.5m if they don’t comply with an Information Notice.

Even Matt Hancock.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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