Category Archives: charities

Initially maybe – a subtle but important change to PECR enforcement?

Direct electronic marketing law (the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (PECR)) provides limited exceptions to the duty only to send unsolicited direct marketing to individual subscribers when those recipients have consented. Those exceptions are in regulation 22(3), and since February this year they are available both to those who offer products or services for sale and to charities furthering their charitable purposes. The effect of the exceptions (referred to colloquially as the “soft opt-in”) is that marketing can be sent without consent provided certain requirements are met.

However, the exceptions only apply where the sender of the marketing offered a simple means of refusing marketing at the time the recipient’s details were “initially collected”. The orthodox view is you can’t invite people to update their contact details, and then ask them about and send marketing, when you didn’t offer them an opt-out when you “initially” collected their details. In 2017, Honda were fined £13000 by the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), for sending emails asking about marketing preferences to customers whose preferences had not been recorded when their details were “initially collected”.

As Adrian Beney has pointed out, the Fundraising Regulator’s new guidance on the charitable purposes soft opt-in appears to have ignored the word “initially” in reg 22(3A)(c), when it gives, as an example of lawful use of the soft opt-in, a charity which has “long-standing volunteers” whom it has not previously asked for consent to receive fundraising marketing relating to the charity, but to whom “at the next annual update of volunteer contact details” it offers an opt-out. This is described as “the right approach”.

I was about to reply to Adrian to say this is clearly at odds with the ICO’s own guidance, but I thought I should check first. To my surprise, I see that the ICO has not made this point clear in its own guidance on the charitable purposes soft opt-in. True, in its generic guide to PECR as a whole (not yet updated to reflect the introduction of the charitable purposes soft opt-in) it says that to use the soft opt-in the sender must have offered a simple way to opt out when the recipient’s details were “first collected”. But the (updated) specific “Guidance on direct marketing using electronic mail” does not make this clear, and, notably, has dropped the crucial word “first”. Thus, where it used to say “You must give people a clear opportunity to opt-out of your direct marketing when you first collect their details” (emphasis mine) it now says “You must give people a simple way to opt out of your electronic mail marketing when you collect their contact details”.

Dropping a word in this way has the hallmarks of a deliberate decision. It certainly appears that it might have led the Fundraising Regulator to give guidance that, if followed, would arguably result in marketing behaviour that the ICO would have held to unlawful until recently.

I think it’s incumbent on the ICO to clarify this point. On the face of it, this subtle change could lead some to assume they can now contact existing customers and supporters, for whom they don’t have current marketing preferences on record, ask them to confirm their contact details and ask them if they want to opt out of future marketing. If it transpires that the ICO is now of the view that the word “initially” in regulation 22 can be ignored, that would not be an unreasonable understanding of what might be permitted. But if that is the ICO’s view it will also be incumbent on them to justify what would be a remarkable position for a regulator to take.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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DUAA commencement – what’s hot and what’s not

I’ve written for the Mishcon de Reya website on the commencement on 5 February of the majority of the data protection and eprivacy provisions of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025: 

https://www.mishcon.com/news/data-protection-and-electronic-privacy-reform-whats-hot-and-whats-not

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Filed under charities, Data (Use and Access) Act, Data Protection, Data Protection Act 2018, marketing, PECR, UK GDPR

Can directors and trustees of charities be controllers?

[reposted from LinkedIn]

Savva v Leather Inside Out & Ors [2024] EWHC 2867 (KB), Sam Jacobs of Doughty Street Chambers, instructed by Forsters LLP for the defendants (the applicant in the instant application)

Is it the case that a director or trustee of a charity (which is a controller) cannot be a controller? That, in effect, was one of the grounds of an application by two defendants to strike out and grant summary judgment in a claim arising from alleged failures to comply with subject access requests.

The claim arises from a dispute between the claimant, a former prisoner, employed by a subsidiary of a charity (“Leather Inside Out” – currently in administration), and the charity itself. The claim is advanced against the charity, but also against the charity’s founder and two trustees, who are said on the claim form to be controllers of the claimant’s data, in addition to, or jointly with, the charity.

In a solid judgment, Deputy Master Alleyne refused to accept that such natural persons were not capable of being a controller: the term is given a broad definition in Article 4(7) UK GDPR, and “includes a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body and that there may be joint controllers. On plain reading of the provisions, it is incorrect to suggest that an allegation of joint controllers is, per se, not a legally recognisable claim” (re Southern Pacific Loans applied).

However, on the specific facts of this case, the pleading of the claimant (the respondent to the strike out application) failed “to allege any decisions or acts in respect of personal data which were outside the authority of the trustees as agents for [the charity]…the Respondent’s submissions demonstrated he wrongly conflated the immutable fact that a legal person must have a natural person through whom its decisions are carried into effect, with his case that the natural person must be assuming the defined status of data controller in their personal capacity”. That was not the case here – the founder and the trustees had not acted other than as agents for the charity.

Accordingly, the strike out application succeeded (notably, though, there Deputy Master said he had reached his conclusion
“not without some caution”).

Assuming the claim goes forward to trial, therefore, it can only be advanced against the charity, as sole controller.


The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Filed under charities, controller, Data Protection, judgments, subject access, UK GDPR

Soft opt in marketing for non-profits

Why can’t charities send speculative promotional emails and text messages to customers and enquirers, in circumstances where commercial organisations can? And should the law be changed?

Regulation 22 of the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (PECR) deals with circumstances under which a person can send an unsolicited direct marketing communication by email, or text message.

In simple and general terms, a person cannot send an unsolicited direct marketing email or text message to an individual’s private email account, unless the individual has consented to receive it. “Consent”, here, has the stringent requirements imposed by Article 4(11) and Article 7 of the UK GDPR.

(The actual law is more complex – it talks of an “individual subscriber”. This is the person who is a party to a contract with a provider of public electronic communications (for which, read “email” and “text message”) services for the supply of such services. So, if you have signed up for, say, a gmail account, you have a contract with Google, and you are – if you are an individual – an individual subscriber.)

The exception to the requirement to have the recipient’s consent is at regulation 22(3) of PECR, which says that the sender of the marketing communication does not need the prior consent of the recipient where the sender: obtained the contact details of the recipient of that electronic mail in the course of the sale or negotiations for the sale of a product or service to that recipient; the direct marketing is in respect of the sender’s similar products and services only; and the recipient has been given a simple means of refusing the use of their contact details for the purposes of such direct marketing, at the time that the details were initially collected, and at the time of each subsequent communication.

This exception to the general “consent required” rule has long (and probably unhelpfully) been known as the “soft opt in”.

The notable requirement for the soft opt in is, though, that the recipient’s contact details must have been collected in the course of the sale or negotiations for the sale of a product or service.

There are various types of non-profit organisation which may well correspond with, and wish to send promotional emails and text messages to individuals, but which don’t as a rule sell products or services. Perhaps the most obvious of these are charities, but political parties also fall into the type.

The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has long held that promotional communications sent by such non-profits do constitute “marketing” (and the Information Tribunal upheld this approach as far back as in 2006, when the SNP appealed enforcement action by the ICO). (I happen to think that there’s still an interesting argument to be had about what “marketing” means in the PECR and data protection scheme, and at one end of that argument would be a submission that it implies a commercial relationship between the parties. However, no one has yet taken the issue – as far as I’m aware – to an appellate court.)

But the combined effect of regulation 22(3) and the interpretation of “marketing” as covering promotional emails and text messages by charities, means that those charities (and political parties etc.) can’t send soft opt in communications.

The Data Protection and Digital Information Bill, which tripped and fell yards from the finishing line, when Mr Sunak, in a strategic master stroke, called the general election early, proposed, in clause 115, to extend the soft opt in where the direct marketing was “solely for the purpose of furthering a charitable, political or other non-commercial objective” of the sender.

Will the new Labour administration’s proposed Digital Information and Smart Data Bill revive the clause? The government’s background paper on the legislative agenda in the King’s Speech doesn’t refer to it, but that may be because it’s seen as a relatively minor issue. But, in fact, for many charities, the issue carries very significant implications for their operations and their ability effectively to fundraise.

It should be revived, and it should be enacted.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Filed under charities, Data Protection Bill, Information Commissioner, marketing, PECR, political parties