Tag Archives: defamation

Defamation rules are applied to UK GDPR claim

An interesting recent judgment in the High Court considers the extent to which rules in defamation law might also apply to data protection claims.

In July 2024 His Honour Judge Lewis struck out a claim in defamation brought by Dale Vince against Associated Newspapers. The claim arose from a publication in the Daily Mail (and through the Mail+ app). The article reported that the Labour Party had returned a £100,000 donation made by another person, who was said to be “a high-flying City financier accused of sex harassment”, but also said that the claimant had donated £1.5m to the Labour Party, but then caused the Party embarrassment by joining an “eco-protest” in London, which had blocked traffic around Parliament Square. The article had the headline “Labour repays £100,000 to ‘sex harassment’ donor”, followed by eleven paragraphs of text, two photographs of the claimant and the caption “Road blockers: Dale Vince in London yesterday, and circled as he holds up traffic with Just Stop Oil”.

The strike-out succeeded on the basis that a claim in libel “may not be founded on a headline, or on headlines plus photographs and captions, in isolation from the related text, and it is impermissible to carve the readership into different groups, those who read only headlines (or headlines and captions) and those who read the whole article”, following the rule(s) in Charleston v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1995] 2 AC 65 (the wording quoted is from the defendant’s strike-out application). When the full article was read, as the claimant conceded, the ordinary reader would appreciate very quickly that he was not the person being accused of sexual harassment.

A subsequent claim by Mr Vince, in data protection, under the UK GDPR, has now also been struck out (Vince v Associated Newspapers  [2025] EWHC 1411 (KB)). This time, the strike out succeeded on the basis that, although the UK GDPR claim was issued (although not served) prior to the handing down of judgment in the defamation claim, Mr Vince not only could, but should have brought it earlier:

There was every reason why the UKGDPR and defamation claims should have been brought in the same proceedings. Both claims arose out of the same event – the publication of the article in Mail+ and the Daily Mail. Both claims rely on the same factual circumstances, namely the juxtaposition of the headline, photographs and caption, and the contention that the combination of the headline and the photograph created the misleading impression that Mr Vince had been accused of sexual harassment. In one claim this was said to be defamatory, in the other the misleading impression created was said to comprise unfair processing of personal data

This new claim was, said Mr Justice Swift, an abuse of process – a course which would serve only “to use the court’s process in a way that is unnecessary and is oppressive to Associated Newspapers”.

Additionally, the judge would have granted Associated Newspapers’ application for summary judgment, on the grounds that the rule in Charleston would have applied to the data protection claim as it had to the defamation claim:

in the context of this claim where the processing relied on takes the form of publication, the unfairness relied on is that a headline and photographs gave a misleading impression, and the primary harmed caused is said to be reputational damage, the law would be incoherent if the fairness of the processing was assessed other than by considering the entirety of what was published

This last point, although, strictly, obiter, is an important one: where a claim of unfair processing, by way of publication of personal data, is brought in data protection, the courts are likely to demand that the entirety of what was published be considered, and not just personal data (or parts of personal data) in isolation.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Filed under Data Protection, defamation, fairness, judgments, UK GDPR

Data protection v Defamation

[Sometimes I will upload posts I make on LinkedIn to this blog, because they’re easier to archive here: however they’re a bit more “conversational” than usual]

Can (or in what circumstances can) a data protection claim be brought on the basis that processing involves harm to reputation of a sort which, more orthodoxically*, would be brought in defamation?

His Honour Justice Parkes has refused an application by Dow Jones to strike out a data protection erasure claim (with an associated compensation claim) on the grounds that in reality it is a “statute-barred defamation complaint dressed up as a claim in data protection, and brought in data protection to avoid the rules which apply to defamation claims” (the application was also on Jameel grounds).

The judge says he “cannot see how [the claimants] can be summarily denied access to the court to make [their] case, employing a cause of action which is legitimately open to them… simply because in the past they have repeatedly threatened to claim in defamation, or because the claim is heavily based (as it is) on considerations of harm to reputation, or because, had they brought the claim in defamation, it would have faced very difficult obstacles”.

HHJ Parkes notably (ie this needs to go to trial) says that “the state of the law on the recoverability of damages for injury to reputation in non-defamation claims is uncertain and in flux” and that it is “unsuitable for determination on a summary application and probably requires the attention of an appellate court”.

It will be very interesting if this now makes it to trial. But never hold your breath on that folks.

[*yes, I did intend to coin the most awkward adverb possible]

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Filed under Data Protection, defamation, erasure, journalism, judgments, Uncategorized

Unintended data protection consequences of Defamation Act and ICO proposals?

Might changes to defamation law, and to the Information Commissioner’s practices, lead to an increase in court claims about accuracy of personal data?

A statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant

This is the bold subsection (1) to section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013, which was commenced in England and Wales on 1 January 2014. This – in part the culmination of a strong campaign – is a potentially significant change to domestic libel law, meaning that (in the words of the explanatory notes to the Act)

the bar [is raised] for bringing a claim so that only cases involving serious harm to the claimant’s reputation can be brought

But often where a bar is raised in one place, a gap will be found in another. I wonder if, along with another development -namely, the Information Commissioner’s proposals to change its approach to regulation of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) – it might lead to an increase in DPA claims.

11KBW’s Robin Hopkins wrote an important article last year, whose title helpfully summarises its argument: The Data Protection Act in defamation cases: increasingly relevant, potentially primary? In it, he identified a possible trend, citing two cases in particular as illustration – The Law Society and others v Rick Kordowski [2011] EWHC 3185 (QB) and Desmond v Foreman, & Ors [2012] EWHC 1900 (QB), of

The Data Protection Act 1998…increasingly being deployed as part of a claimant’s arsenal in defamation claims […] in some circumstances, the DPA may appropriately play the lead role rather than a supporting one in a complaint about unjustifiable and damaging communications about individuals

There are a number of potential claims which an aggrieved individual can make using the DPA. For our purposes here, though, the relevant provisions are those at section 14, dealing with inaccuracy

If a court is satisfied on the application of a data subject that personal data of which the applicant is the subject are inaccurate, the court may order the data controller to rectify, block, erase or destroy those data and any other personal data in respect of which he is the data controller and which contain an expression of opinion which appears to the court to be based on the inaccurate data

Clearly, inaccuracy – normally in the form of an untruth – is an important part of a defamation claim. If, now, those claims formerly made in defamation which were not worth the wick, let alone the candle are (statutorily) barred by virtue of section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013, will persistent claimants seek another route? Inaccuracy of personal data is a prima facie contravention of the fourth data protection principle in Schedule One of the DPA, and section 14 is a legitimate and specific legal route by which a person may have that inaccuracy corrected.

It should be noted, though, that the court does retain discretion (n.b use of “may” in section 14) as to whether to order rectification etc. An alternative route has traditionally been, of course, by means of making a request for assessment, under section 42 of the DPA, to the Information Commissioner (IC), as to whether processing of one’s personal data has been or is being carried out in compliance with the DPA. Upon receipt of a valid request of this type, the IC is required (“shall make…”) to make an assessment (although he retains discretion as to what is an appropriate manner for it to be made). I say “traditionally” because, as David Erdos argued in a guest post on this blog recently, the IC, in a consultation on a future approach to dealing with DPA complaints and concerns

proposes to decide on its own account whether or not to assess the merits of a concern validly sent to it for assessment under the Data Protection framework

but, as David, notes, this proposal does not appear to be in accordance with the IC’s legal obligation to make an assessment in relevant circumstances.

Nonetheless, and to the extent that such a proposal (or a tweaking of it) might be held to be lawful, it certainly seems to signal a desire on the IC’s part to  (in Tim Turner’s words)

start ignoring more individual complaints, and concentrate on what it considers to be strategic priorities

If that is so, then might complainants who wish to challenge the accuracy of their personal data, more readily look to bring section 14 claims against the data controller? Might the IC be shifting its burden not only on to data controllers themselves, but also on to the already overloaded justice system?

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Filed under Data Protection, defamation, Information Commissioner