Category Archives: monetary penalty notice

September 29, 2013 · 5:56 pm

A million data breaches?

Is it realistic for the ICO to expect all SMEs to encrypt hardware? And if those SMEs don’t, is it realistic to expect the ICO to enforce against what must be mass non-compliance?

Accurate figures for annual thefts and losses of laptops in the UK are not easy to come by – perhaps the most commonly-cited figure is the estimated 1 million from Sony’s Vaio Business Report 2013. On any analysis, though, it’s a relatively common occurrence.

A large proportion of these will be laptops containing personal data of people other than the owner of the device. And in many cases the device, or part of it, will be used for business purposes, often by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Personal data processed solely for domestic purposes is outwith the obligations of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA), but any personal data processed for business purposes is caught by the Act, and the person or business processing that data is likely to be a data controller.

As data controller, they will have an obligation inter alia to take “Appropriate technical and organisational measures …against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data” (Principle 7 of Schedule One, DPA). A serious contravention of this obligation, of a sort likely to cause serious damage or serious distress, can lead to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) serving the data controller with a Monetary Penalty Notice (MPN), under section 55A, to a maximum of £500,000.

And so it was this week that the ICO served Jala Transport Ltd, an oddly-named loans company, with an MPN of £5000 after

a hard drive containing financial details relating to all of the sole proprietor’s approximately 250 customers…[was stolen] from the business owner’s car while it was stationary at a set of traffic lights in London

The hard drive was in a case, with documents and some cash, and has still not been recovered.

Despite one’s possible distaste for the nature of the business involved (it may be difficult to muster much sympathy for a loans company), this case raises some interesting points, specifically for small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) but also in general.

The MPN itself reveals that the business did not have a backup of the hard drive. This is a ridiculous oversight, when secure storage is simple, and cheap. But

it was taken home at the end of each working day for business continuity purposes and to reduce the risk of damage or theft

However, by not

closing the car window and placing the briefcase in the boot of his car or out of sight

this unsuccessful but probably well-meaning attempt at data security -and a business continuity plan – became an aggravating factor.

However, what really did for the proprietor was, “crucially”, that although the laptop was password-protected, it was not encrypted, and this led the ICO to repeat previous warnings about the need for encryption in these circumstances

We have continued to warn organisations of all sizes that they must encrypt any personal data stored on portable devices, where the loss of the information could cause clear damage and distress to the customers affected…if the hard drive had been encrypted the business owner would not have left all of their customers open to the threat of identity theft and would not be facing a £5,000 penalty following a serious breach of the Data Protection Act

Several questions are raised by this case, and this approach by the ICO. Firstly, encryption, for individual devices, is not necessarily straight-forward, and carries its own risks. This is not to say that attempts should not be made at either full disk encryption or file/folder encryption, but not all SMEs necessarily have the time or expertise to explore this effectively. Secondly, one notes that one of the reasons the MPN was imposed was because the ICO felt that the serious contravention of the DPA was of a sort likely to lead to serious damage in the form of identity theft. It was a very similar argument that the Information Tribunal recently refused to accept as being a likely consequence of another serious contravention, when it upheld Scottish Borders Council’s recent MPN appeal. £5000 is not a huge amount, and the time and expense of pursuing an appeal might be too much, but it will be interesting to see if one is lodged.

Finally – following on from the point that encryption of single standalone devices isn’t necessarily straightforward – one has to wonder how many of those estimated one million lost and stolen laptops were encrypted, and, of those that weren’t, how many contained personal data which required the relevant data controller to observe the security obligations of the DPA. Jala Transport appears to have taken the admirable, but perhaps ill-conceived, decision to report the theft to the ICO itself (and may now be regretting that decision).

If all the data controllers of those thousands and thousands of laptops lost or stolen annually reported the loss to the ICO, how many would have to own up to lack of encryption, and be liable to a similar or possibly larger MPN? And could the ICO possibly cope with the workload?

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September 28, 2013 · 8:44 am

It’s our Right to Know, Mr ICO

On 29 August the Information Commisioner’s Office (ICO) served a monetary penalty notice (MPN) of £100,000 on Aberdeen City Council. MPNs can be served on a data controller under section 55A of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) for a serious contravention of the Act of a sort likely to cause serious damage or serious distress. In this instance, the ICO explained

sensitive information relating to social services involvement with several individuals [was] published online. The information included details relating to the care of vulnerable children.

The circumstances under which this happened were

a council employee accessed documents, including meeting minutes and detailed reports, from her home computer. A file transfer program installed on the machine automatically uploaded the documents to a website

Many people in the field of information rights have concerns that there is a significant lack of understanding on the part of many about the risk of inadvertently disclosing personal data on the web. In view of this, I though I would simply ask the ICO, and the Council, what website was involved, in order to inform my understanding. So I tweeted

What “website” were the files uploaded to?

I reminded the ICO and the Council on several occasions about this, and pointed out it was a valid request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (FOI(S)A), even though I had really only wanted a quick factual reply. The Council have asked me to contact them separately to make the FOI(S)A request, and I’m aware the Scottish Information Commissioner takes a different view on tweeted requests to her counterpart for the rest of the UK, so I’ve banged in a request at WhatDoTheyKnow. The ICO, by contrats, did treat my tweet as a valid request (although I got no acknowledgment of this, contrary to their good practice guidance) and responded yesterday on the twentieth working day, with a link to their disclosure log

Those who know me will be unsurprised to know that I don’t accept the refusal, and also unsurprised to know that, on International Right to Know Day 2013 I’ve submitted a crashingly pompous request for ICO to conduct an internal review. Here it follows, in all said crashing pomposity:

Please review your refusal to disclose information.

On 29 August you served a Monetary Penalty Notice on Aberdeen City Council

“after a council employee accessed documents, including meeting minutes and detailed reports, from her home computer. A file transfer program installed on the machine automatically uploaded the documents to a website, publishing sensitive information about several vulnerable children and their families, including details of alleged criminal offences”

I asked, on 30 August, “What ‘website’ were the files uploaded to?”

You have refused to disclose, claiming the exemption at section 44 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, which provides an exemption “if disclosure [of the information] (otherwise than under this Act) by the public authority holding it…is prohibited by or under any enactment”. You say disclosure is prohibited, because “the information was provided to the ICO in confidence as part of our regulatory activities” and that the provisions of section 59(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998 forbid disclosure. Section 59(1) says

“No person who is or has been the Commissioner, a member of the Commissioner’s staff or an agent of the Commissioner shall disclose any information which—

(a)has been obtained by, or furnished to, the Commissioner under or for the purposes of the information Acts [of which FOIA is one],

(b)relates to an identified or identifiable individual or business, and

(c)is not at the time of the disclosure, and has not previously been, available to the public from other sources

unless the disclosure is made with lawful authority”

I am happy to concede that a) and b) are met here, but not c). This is because section 59(2) explains what “with lawful authority” means. Firstly, and largely as an aside, section 59(2)(a) says that a disclosure is made with lawful authority if

“the disclosure is made with the consent of the individual or of the person for the time being carrying on the business”

I am surprised you do not feel that, in your role as a public authority but also as the regulator for Freedom of Information, it would be prudent and transparent simply to ask the Council whether it consents. Nonetheless, on a strict reading of the law, I concede that you do not have an obligation to do so.

Secondly (and I note you do not even address this important provision), section 59(2)(e) says that disclosure is made with lawful authority if

“having regard to the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of any person, the disclosure is necessary in the public interest”

I would argue that analysis of whether this provision permits disclosure requires a two-fold test. Firstly, is disclosure necessary in the public interest? Secondly, if it is, do the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of any person militate against this public-interest disclosure?

On the first point, I am not aware of any direct authority on what “necessary” means in section 59(2)(e) of DPA, but I would argue that it imports the meaning adopted by leading European authorities. Thus, as per the high Court in Corporate Officer of the House of Commons v The Information Commissioner & Ors [2008] EWHC 1084 “‘necessary”…should reflect the meaning attributed to it by the European Court of Human Rights when justifying an interference with a recognised right, namely that there should be a pressing social need and that the interference was both proportionate as to means and fairly balanced as to ends”. It is my view that there is a pressing social need to recognise the risks of indavertent uploading to the internet, by public authorities and others, of sensitive personal data, especially when this is by automatic means. Other examples of recent incidents and enforcement action illustrate this. For instance, as your office is aware, there have been reports that a regional Citizens’ Advice Bureau has indavertently made available on the internet very large amounts of such data, probably because of a lack of technical knowledge or security which resulted in automatic caching by Google of numerous files https://informationrightsandwrongs.com/2013/09/24/citizens-advice-bureaucracy/. Also for instance, as you are aware, there have been many many examples of indavertent internet publishing of personal data in hidden cells in spreadsheets http://www.ico.org.uk/news/blog/2013/the-risk-of-revealing-too-much. There is a clear lack of public understanding of the risks of such indavertent disclosures, with a consequent risk to the privacy of individuals’ often highly sensitive personal data. Any information which the regulator of the DPA can disclose which informs and improves public understanding of these risks serves a pressing social need and makes the disclosure “necessary”.

On the second point, I simply fail to see what rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of any person can be engaged, let alone suffer a detriment by disclosing what public website the Council employee uploaded this to. If there are any, it would be helpful if your response to this Internal Review could address this. It may be that you would point to the information having been provided to you in confidence, but I similarly fail to see how that can be: was this an express obligation of confidence, or have you inferred it? In either case, I would question (per one the elements of the classic formulation for a cause of action in breach of confidence given by Megarry J in Coco v A.N.Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] R.P.C. 41) whether the information even has the necessary quality of confidence (this was a public website after all).

I hope you can reconsider your decision.

best wishes

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August 23, 2013 · 6:56 am

Pivot tables and databreaches

About a year ago I first became aware of reports of disturbing inadvertent disclosures of personal data (often highly sensitive) by public authorities who had intended only to disclose anonymous and/or aggregate data. These incidents were occurring both in the context of disclosures under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and in the context of proactive disclosure of datasets. Mostly they were when what had been disclosed was not just raw data, but the spreadsheet in which the data was presented. Spreadsheet software is often very powerful, and not all users necessarily understand its capabilities (I don’t think I do). By use of pivot tables data can be sorted, summarised etc, but also, from the uninitiated or unwary, hidden. If the person who created or maintained a spreadsheet containing a pivot table is not involved in the act of publicly disclosing it it is possible that an apparently innocuous disclosure will contain hidden personal data.

Clearly such errors are likely to constitute breaches – sometimes very serious breaches – of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) Those of us who were aware of a number of these inadvertent breaches were also aware that, if public authorities were not alerted to the risk a) the practice would continue and b) potentially large numbers of “disclosive” datasets would remain out in the open (in disclosure logs, on WhatDoTheyKnow, in open data sets etc). But we were also aware that, if the situation was not managed well and quietly, with authorities given the opportunity to correct/withdraw errors, inquisitive or even malicious sorts might go trawling open datasets for disclosures which could potentially be very damaging and distressing to data subjects.

It was with some relief, therefore that, following an earlier announcement by WhatDoTheyKnow, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) finally gave a warning, and good guidance, on 28 June (although this relief was tempered by finding out, via Tim Turner, that the ICO had known about, and apparently done nothing about, the problem for three years). At the same time the ICO announced that it was “actively considering a number of enforcement cases on this issue”.

It appears that, according to an announcement on its own website, Islington Council is the first recipient of this enforcement. The Council says it has

accepted a £70,000 fine from the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) after a mistake led to personal data being released

after it

responded to a Freedom of Information (FOI) request asking for information including the ethnicity and gender of people the council had rehoused. The response, in the form of Excel spreadsheet tables, included personal information concealed behind the summary tables

Fair play to Islington for acknowledging this and agreeing immediately to pay the monetary penalty notice. And if some of the other reported breaches I heard about were as bad as they sounded £70,000 will be at the lower end of the scale.

(thanks to @owenboswarva on twitter for flagging this up)

UPDATE:

The ICO has now posted details of the MPN, and this clarifies that the disclosure was made on WhatDoTheyKnow and was only identifed when one of their site administrators noticed it.

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August 21, 2013 · 3:30 pm

Monetary penalties – focus on the breach, not the incident

The Information Tribunal’s judgment in the successful appeal by Scottish Borders Council shows that the ICO needs to focus on the contravention itself, not an incident which might arise from it

looking at the facts of the case, what did happen was in our view a surprising outcome, not a likely one

Sections 55A-E of the Data Protection 1998 (DPA), inserted by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, provide for the Information Commissioner (IC) to serve a data controller with a monetary penalty notice (MPN) to a maximum of £500,000 if

  • he is satisfied that there has been a serious contravention of the controller’s obligations to comply with the data protection principles in Schedule One of the DPA, and
  • the contravention was of a kind likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress, and
  • the contravention was either deliberate or the controller either knew or ought to have known that there was a risk that the contravention of its occurring and that it would be of a kind likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress, but failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the contravention.

In its judgment, handed down today, on what is effectively* a successful appeal by Scottish Borders Council, the First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights) (“FTT”) has given guidance on, what is required in order for the IC to be satisfied that a serious contravention was likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress. In particular, the FTT has clarified that, where the DPA talks about a “serious contravention”, the IC must focus on that, and not on any incident which might follow.

The Monetary Penalty Notice

The events giving rise to the original MPN (still currently on the IC’s website) are laid out by the FTT in the first two paragraphs of the judgment

Outside Tesco in South Queensferry there are some bins for recycling waste paper. They are of the “post box” type. On 10 September 2011 a member of the public found that one of the bins was overflowing. The material at the top, easily accessible, consisted of files containing pension records kept by a local authority (“Scottish Borders”). It turned out that a data processing company had transferred the information from hard copy files to CDs at Scottish Borders’ request. The data processor had then disposed of about 1,600 manual files in the post box bins at Tesco and at another supermarket in the town.

The police took into their possession all those files which they could reach. They then secured the bins and, with the cooperation of Scottish Borders, it was ascertained that the files concerned had now either been pulped without manual intervention or were now back in the safe keeping of the council.

The IC imposed an MPN of £250,000, finding that there had been a serious contravention of the obligation to comply with the seventh data protection principle (DPP7) which states that

Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data.

and that, where, as here, processing of personal data is carried out by a data processor on behalf of a data controller, the latter must choose as the former one who provides sufficient guarantees in respect of its data security measures, and ensure that such processing is carried out under a suitable written contract (I paraphrase).

The contravention here was the failure by the Council to ensure that it engaged an appropriate data processor (to dispose of the pensions records) in an appropriate way (by means of an adequate contract, properly monitored and adequately evidenced in writing).

The IC said that contravention was likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress (query, which?) to those whose confidential data was seen by a member of the public and that

If the data has been disclosed to untrustworthy third parties then it is likely that the contravention would cause further distress and also substantial damage to the data subjects such as exposing them to identity fraud and possible financial loss

Arguments and findings

The FTT found that there was a contravention. The Council had a long-standing (some 25-30 years) agreement with the data processor but it appears that the contractual arrangement was largely based on informal agreements and assurances. Although it was to an extent evidence in writing, this was still inadequate. Accordingly

the arrangements made by Scottish Borders for processing pension records in July and August 2011 were in contravention of the DPA

Further, the FTT was satisfied that the contravention was serious

the duties in relation to data processing contracts in paras 11 and 12 of schedule 1 are at the heart of the system for protecting personal data under DPA. It is fundamental that the data controller cannot be allowed to contract out its responsibilities [and] the contravention was not an isolated human error. It was systemic

However, counsel for the IC, the redoubtable Robin Hopkins, reminded the FTT that they must focus on the contravention which gave rise to the MPN. In this case, this was distinguishable from the events described in the first two paragraphs of the judgment: the contravention was the breach of DPP7, not the discovery of the data. On this basis, the FTT did not accept that the contravention had been of a kind likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress. Evidence was taken from David Smith, Deputy IC, and the IC developed an argument focusing on the risks of identity theft, but the FTT seems to have felt that the evidence was either unconvincing (regarding the likelihood of identity theft) or still focused wrongly on what it calls the “trigger point” (the disposal/finding of the files in the bin) rather than the contravention itself. As to the latter

it seems to us that the fact that the data processor was a specialist contractor with a history of 25-30 years of dealings with Scottish Borders carries weight. He was no fly by night. The council had good reason to trust the company.

And, therefore

Focussing on the contravention we have been unable to construct a likely chain of events which would lead to substantial damage or substantial distress. What did happen was of course startling enough. Again, though, looking at the facts of the case, what did happen was in our view a surprising outcome, not a likely one.

This illustrates a fundamental point, but one, it seems, of great significance. It will, no doubt, be seized upon eagerly by any data controller in receipt of a notice of intent to serve an MPN. (It was also, I should acknowledge, anticipated by observations by Tim Turner and Andrew Walsh, both former ICO employees). However, the FTT do stress that although this case did not involve a contravention of a kind likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress

No doubt some breaches of the seventh DPP in respect of some data might be of such a kind

What now?

I said earlier this was “effectively a successful appeal”. It was in fact an appeal on a preliminary issue (on the liability of the Council to pay an MPN) and under the Data Protection (Monetary Penalties) Order 2010 the FTT may either allow the appeal or substitute such other notice or decision which could have been served or made by the IC. The FTT’s concerns about the Council’s procedures in relation to data processing contracts were “too serious” for them simply to allow the appeal, and they are – pending discussions between the IC and the Council – considering whether to issue an enforcement notice.

Notwithstanding the outcome of those discussions, this is an important judgment to be read alongside the unsuccessful MPN appeal by the Central London Community Healthcare NHS Trust. Until an MPN case gets appealed further we will not have binding authority, but the lines are perhaps becoming a bit clearer for data controllers, and, indeed for the ICO.

There were some interesting comments and observations by the FTT on “other issues canvassed in the course of [the] appeal but which it has not been necessary to resolve”. I hope to post a follow-up about these in due course.

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August 14, 2013 · 4:28 pm

Take the train(ing)

IG policies are essential, but not much use if you don’t comply with them

In NHS and Social Care settings a standard requirement is that all staff are trained in information governance (a large component of which is data protection): “Information Governance awareness and mandatory training procedures are in place and all staff are appropriately trained” (IG Toolkit v11) and “Ensure all staff are trained, updated and aware of their responsibilities” (Local Government Data Handling Guidelines). If an organisation suffers a serious breach of data security, and the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) investigates, one of the first things they will look at is whether staff were appropriately trained. If they weren’t, enforcement action, possibly in the form of a monetary penalty notice, is highly likely.

It is vital, therefore, that all organisations have a policy that all relevant staff are trained (and in some organisations – like the NHS and local authorities – that will normally mean all staff).

But, policies only work if they are implemented, enforced and monitored. The ICO has recently published an Undertaking (the “last chance saloon” before formal enforcement action) signed by the Northern Health and Social Care Trust. This arose following an incident which

involved confidential service user information being faxed from a ward in Antrim Hospital to a local business in error. The information was intended for the Trust’s Community Rehabilitation Team. The referral form contained sensitive clinical data

Although the Trust had a “fax policy” (good) it wasn’t complied with (bad) but also 

The Commissioner’s investigation into the Trust revealed that despite the Trust having introduced what should have been mandatory Information Governance training for all staff, the majority of staff involved in these incidents had not received this training. This highlighted a potentially serious failing in respect of staff awareness of Information Governance policies. In particular, the failure to monitor and enforce staff completion of training was a concern.

This failure constituted a breach of the seventh data protection principle (“Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data”). It is highly likely that, if training requirements had been complied with, no action would have been (or would have been able to be) taken, because there would have been no breach.

Put simply, if a data controller can show it has complied with the seventh data protection principle, and there is an accidental data security breach – however horrendous – then (providing there are no breaches of other principles) no sanctions will arise.

It’s in every data controller’s interests not only to require appropriate data protection training for staff, but also to ensure that it has been taken.

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July 30, 2013 · 5:22 pm

It’s still not fine

Last week I blogged about enforcement notices served on three Midlands police forces by the Information Commissioner (IC). I was surprised that the circumstances hadn’t merited stronger sanctions, in the form of monetary penalty notices (MPNs), and I tweeted to ask why.

As you can perhaps see, the IC’s office has kindly replied to my tweet. I had asked

I would really like to know why the IC did not see fit to issue Monetary Penalty Notices. Can you advise?

and their reply says

enforcement notices best means of improving compliance. Considered details of the case inc limited involvement of each force

I have to say I think this is a questionable response (although I take the point that a 140-character limit is restrictive).

Firstly, enforcement activities are not mutually exclusive – it is not uncommon for an enforcement notice and an MPN to be served in tandem on a data controller. thus, as recently as June this year, Glasgow City Council was served an MPN of £150,000 by the IC following the loss of, er, unencrypted laptops, and at the same time was served an enforcement notice requiring certain corrective actions to be undertaken.

Secondly, and I may be misinterpreting, but the reply seems to say that the “limited involvement of each force” was a determining factor in a decision not to serve an MPN. However, there were three data controllers involved. If each of them had a “limited” involvement, one is led to ask “wasn’t that the main problem?”. Derbyshire and Leicestershire both “did not carry out a risk assessment before they joined [the collaboration unit]…relying on the security measures taken by Nottinghamshire“, but those security measures were inadequate (lack of encryption, laptops not physically secured). Meanwhile, none of the forces properly monitored its officers while they were seconded.

It seems to me that the limited involvement of each of the forces might, instead of excusing it, have in fact been the key factor why the security breach happened.

Principle seven of the first schedule to the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) requires that

Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data

Many many public (and private) sector data controllers are undertaking collaborative and partnership working, or are taking steps to do so. All responsible organisations are very aware, where they continue, either jointly or in common with other organisations, to determine the purposes for which and the manner in which any personal data are, or are to be, processed, that they remain a data controller, with the consequent responsibilities and liabilities. They are very aware of the IC’s Data Sharing Code of Practice.

And they are very aware that, if things go wrong with data-sharing, it will not normally be sufficient to point at a partner, and say “it was their fault”, or, even less, for all partners to shrug their shoulders and say, “that wasn’t our responsibility”.

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July 27, 2013 · 8:57 am

Back to Blacklists

Could action taken by the ICO in 2009 still have a part to play if construction industry blacklisting has continued? (acknowledgement: Tim Turner made some of these points back in January this year)

In 2009 the Information Commissioner prosecuted Ian Kerr, the then chief officer of a body called the Consulting Association. The Consulting Association had been holding a blacklist of people within the construction industry seen as “troublemakers” (a blacklist inherited from the Economic League, as detailed in Tim Turner’s superb post on the subject) and making this information available to clients on payment of a fee. The fall-out from this continues to this day, with, on the one hand civil claims being pursued, for what I understand to be common law “unlawful means conspiracy” and defamation, and on the other hand, the reports that the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has been asked by Business Secretary, Vince Cable, to investigate allegations that the practice has continued to this day, on major construction projects like the Olympic Park and Crossrail (by the way, the extraordinary testimony of Gail Cartmail of Unite, in that last link, is essential reading).

The ICO’s prosecution of Kerr was for the relatively minor (and relatively rarely enforced) offence under the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) of failing to register with the ICO for his processing of personal data. No other sanction was, apparently, open to the ICO at the time. This was because the current regime of civil Monetary Penalty Notices (MPNs) for serious contraventions of the DPA had not then commenced.

As Chris Pounder pointed out at the time, there is even a query, applying the strict definitions of “data” in section 1(1), whether a blacklist held solely on paper, and arranged in, say, date order (rather than by reference to individuals), is even caught by the DPA. If not, then enforcement by the ICO would not be possible. This is because “data” broadly applies only to electronically-processed information or information held as part of a filing system structured by reference to individuals or criteria relating to individuals. One hopes that any alleged blacklisters haven’t made a habit of reading Chris’s blog and subsequently exploited a loophole that remains open.

Putting to one side this “loophole” point, it is likely that any processing of personal data which unfairly and unlawfully deprived someone of employment would constitute a serious contravention of the DPA, probably causing substantial damage and distress, and thus potentially attracting an MPN. An MPN is a relatively powerful weapon in the ICO’s armoury, and in my opinion one that has been used well to drive up data protection standards and drive home the importance of data security. Whether a huge construction firm would notice a (maximum) £500,000 penalty is another matter.

And, of course, none of the money paid under an MPN goes to the victim of a serious DPA contravention (it goes to the government consolidated fund). However, it is open to a data subject in such circumstances to bring a claim in the county court under section 13 of the DPA. Compensation is available if specific damage can be shown, and, if damage can be shown, further compensation for distress can follow. It is not clear to me whether the current claims from the 2009 events contain DPA claims, but the fact that they are being reported primarily as claims for tortious conspiracy suggests that even if so, they are subsidiary to the latter.

However, there is one further sanction which Tim Turner alludes to, which might possibly be in play. When the ICO prosecuted Kerr it also took steps to close down the practice, by issuing DPA enforcement notices against fourteen construction companies who had been proved to have used the list or supplied information: Balfour Beatty Civil Engineering Limited; Balfour Beatty Construction Northern Limited; Balfour Beatty Construction Scottish & Southern Limited; Balfour Beatty Engineering Services (HY) Limited; Balfour Beatty Engineering Services Limited; Balfour Beatty Infrastructure Services limited; CB&I UK Limited; Emcor Engineering Services Limited; Emcor Rail Limited; Kier Limited; NG Bailey Limited; Shepherd Engineering Services Limited; SIAS Building Services Limited; Whessoe Oil & Gas Limited. An example of one of the enforcement notices is archived here. It required the company broadly to

Refrain from using, disclosing or otherwise processing any personal data obtained from Mr Kerr

but also to

Ensure that if any personal data relating to recruitment is obtained from a source other than the data subject, the data subject is, in so far as is practicable, provided with the information specified in paragraph 2(3) at Part II of Schedule 1 to the [DPA] in accordance with the First Data Protection Principle.

Ensure that if any personal data relating to recruitment is disclosed to a third party for use in connection with the recruitment of workers, the data subject is, in so far as is practicable, provided with the information specified in paragraph 2(3) at Part II of Schedule 1 to the [DPA] in accordance with the First Data Protection Principle.

The notices do not appear to have been effective only for a fixed period, so one is to assume that they remain effective*. If any of the firms upon which they were served have sinced breached the terms of the notice they could potentially have committed an offence under section 47(1) of the DPA. That offence is triable either-way, and anyone found guilty is liable on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding £5000, or on conviction on indictment, to an unlimited fine. And, by section 61 of the DPA, where, as here, the notices were served on bodies corporate, the bodies’ directors and some other officers can also be guilty of the offence of failing to comply with an enforcement notice if the offence is proved to have been committed with their consent or connivance or to be attributable to their neglect.

One wonders if the ICO’s 2009 enforcement proceedings may still have some part to play.

UPDATE: 15 August 2013

*The ICO has confirmed to me that they have no record of any of the Enforcement Notices being cancelled or varied, nor of any applications to cancel or vary being received. The ICO considers that the Enforcement Notices are still effective.

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July 26, 2013 · 6:49 pm

It’s not fine.

About the rather odd Friday afternoon news that the ICO has served enforcement notices, not monetary penalties, on three police forces

In February 2011 the Information Commissioner (IC) served civil Monetary Penalty Notices (MPNs) under section 55A-E of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) on Ealing and Hounslow Councils (£80,000 and £70,000 respectively), after two unencrypted laptops containing sensitive personal data of approximately 1700 individuals were stolen. The Councils had a joint working arrangement whereby Ealing would provide an out-of-hours service on behalf of both councils. The MPNs were fair enough – the IC and others had been saying for some time that encryption of hardware was a necessary data security measure, and even though Ealing Council had a policy on this, it issued the laptops to an employee in breach of it. Hounslow took the hit because they didn’t have a written contract in place to describe and prescribe the collaborative working arrangements it had entered into with Ealing.

One might have wondered, more than two years further on, what size of monetary penalty a data controller would receive if it had also entered into a joint working arrangement in the absence of a written contract, but had failed to carry out a risk assessment, simply relying on what turned out to have been inadequate security measures taken by one of parties, and several unencrypted laptops containing the sensitive personal data of approximately 4500 individuals were stolen.

The answer (unless MPNs are to follow) based on the IC’s news release and blog today about three police forces, appears to be that no MPNs of any size will be served. Rather, enforcement notices have been issued, requiring the police forces to appoint Senior Risk Information Owners (you mean they haven’t got them already?), encrypt all portable devices (you mean they don’t already?), ensure appropriate security measures are taken to protect personal data (you mean they aren’t already?), and ensure officers have received training on the security requirements of the DPA (you mean…etc, etc, etc).

Don’t get me wrong, enforcement notices are an important part of the IC’s regulatory weaponry (I just wish he’d use them on FOI miscreants) but they are a step down from MPNs, and they don’t really serve as a punishment for serious contraventions of the DPA, but merely act as a warning.

Clearly, considerable discretion is conferred on the IC as to what sort of enforcement action is appropriate, but, on the facts, and on comparison with previous MPNs, it is very hard to avoid the conclusion that: the contraventions of the DPA were serious; they were likely to cause damage or distress which was significant; and the police forces knew or ought to have known that there was a risk that a contravention of this kind would occur but failed to take reasonable steps to prevent it. In those circumstances, the relevant conditions for an MPN exist, and I struggle to understand why none transpired.

I do note that the laptop thefts were in August 2010, but this was after DPA provisions conferring the power on the IC to serve MPNs were commenced. I also note that the data subjects appear to have been criminals, but information about criminality is sensitive personal data under the DPA and accorded a higher level of protection.

I’ve asked the ICO on twitter if they can tell me why MPNs were not served. I don’t really expect an answer – it’s a thorny question, and probably doesn’t qualify as an FOI request, but I am, genuinely, interested to know. If anyone has any ideas, I’d like to hear them.

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July 13, 2013 · 9:17 am

Sony and confidentiality of proceedings

Why I think Sony are wrong to claim they withdrew their databreach fine appeal because of concerns about disclosing sensitive information

So, Sony have withdrawn their appeal of the £250,000 Monetary Penalty Notice served on them by the Information Commissioner (ICO), following the 2011 hack of the Playstation Network which exposed the details of millions of subcribers. I blogged at the time

my suspicious nature makes me wonder if they will ultimately pursue the appeal. Although it will cost them nothing, this isn’t about cost, but reputation, and do Sony really want to risk another day of bad headlines about their data security, in the event that they lose the appeal?

Whether the fear of further publicity was a factor in the withdrawal is impossible to say, but Sony’s public statements about the withdrawal hark back to another point I noted at the time. The ICO’s notice was heavily redacted,  clearly to avoid disclosing commercially confidential or sensitive aspects of Sony’s network security, in line with ICO commitment to do so (7.3 in his Monetary Penalty Guidance). However Sony, in withdrawing their appeal to the First-tier Tribunal, now say

After careful consideration we are withdrawing our appeal. This decision reflects our commitment to protect the confidentiality of our network security from disclosures in the course of the proceeding. We continue to disagree with the decision on the merits

This rather disingenuously overlooks the fact that the Rules which govern tribunal proceedings expressly allow for parts of the hearing to be in private (Rule 35.2 of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009). So, while they are entitled to continue to disagree with the decision on the merits (reminds me of the cricket umpire who, when confronted with a batsman saying “That wasn’t out!” replied “Oh no? Let’s see what the newspapers say in the morning”) everyone else can be satisfied that Sony were correctly served a £250,000 Monetary Penalty Notice for a serious contravention of the Data Protection Act 1998, and that they chose not to pursue their right of appeal. And they’ve missed their chance for a 20% early payment discount (although that’s hardly going to worry their financial backers).

It’s a victory for the ICO, as well: he is often criticised for failing to take on the big private sector tech and social media companies. In this case, he did, and he won.

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July 10, 2013 · 5:48 pm

Substantial distress or just a nuisance?

Can a large number of nuisance calls to a large number of people, none of whom inidividually suffers substantial distress, still equate to cumulative substantial distress, for the purposes of the PECR (and the DPA)?

I blogged recently in praise of the enforcement action taken by the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) against nuisance-caller companies, and I see that a further penalty notice has been served this week, on a “marketing company”. With considerable reluctance, though, I am drawn to a view that the ICO might be taking a flawed, or at least questionable approach to the enforcement. I say “reluctance” because I think the problem of nuisance calls is one that calls out for strong enforcement powers and the will to exercise those powers (I also think it’s a problem, by the way, that the BBC should, without apparent comment, continue to broadcast a programme which provides a platform for two companies who have received penalties totalling £225,000 for engaging in the practice).

The enforcement action is taken under the ICO’s powers conferred the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (PECR), as amended by the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) (Amendment) Regulations 2011. The latter imported into the former the powers conferred on the ICO by the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) to serve, in appropriate circumstances, a civil monetary penalty notice (MPN) on a data controller where

there has been a serious contravention of section 4(4) by the data controller,

(b)the contravention was of a kind likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress, and

(c)subsection (2) or (3) applies.

(2)This subsection applies if the contravention was deliberate.

(3)This subsection applies if the data controller—

(a)knew or ought to have known —

(i)that there was a risk that the contravention would occur, and

(ii)that such a contravention would be of a kind likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress, but

(b)failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the contravention.

(emphasis added)

What all this means, effectively, is that the ICO has two powers available to serve an MPN (to a maximum of £500,000): firstly, for a qualifying breach of the DPA, secondly for a qualifying breach of the PECR. He has exercised the former several times over the last three years, but has only exercised the latter more recently (the first time was in November last year). MPNs under the DPA have been for egregious breaches (e.g. highly sensitive information faxed numerous times to the wrong recipients, loss of unencrypted memory stick with details of people linked to serious crimes). In these circumstances it has not been difficult for the ICO to be satisfied that

such a contravention would be of a kind likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress

However, what about when hundreds of nuisance calls have been made to hundreds of individuals? It is surely in the nature of nuisance calling that it is rarely (although not never) going to cause an individual substantial distress. The ICO says, in what appears effectively to be standard wording in PECR MPNs

The Commissioner is satisfied that the contravention is of a kind likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress as required by section 55 (1) (b) because of the large numbers of individuals who complained about these unsolicited calls and the nature of some of the complaints they gave rise to…Although the distress in every individual complainant’s case may not always have been substantial, the cumulative amount of distress suffered by the large numbers of individuals affected, coupled with the distress suffered by some individuals, with some receiving multiple calls, means that overall the level was substantial.

In adopting this “cumulative distress” approach the ICO refers to his own guidance about the issuing of monetary penalties issued under section 55C (1) of the DPA. This guidance (which applies to PECR as well as DPA) says

The Commissioner does…consider that if damage or distress that is less than considerable in each individual case is suffered by a large number of individuals the totality of the damage or distress can nevertheless be substantial.

As far as I am aware this approach has only been used in when issuing PECR MPNs, not DPA ones. But is it the correct approach? I’m not so sure. The law requires the contravention (of the PECR or DPA) to have been of a kind likely to cause “substantial distress”, not “substantial instances of distress” and one could argue that, if the latter is what Parliament intended, Parliament would have said that (although, as is often the case, one can turn that around and say, if Parliament had not intended the ICO to cumulate instances of distress it would have restrained him from so doing). To me, though, the ICO’s approach seems wrong. But when I put the scenario to two lawyers, they agreed with the ICO, and to two lay-people, they agreed with me. I’m not sure what the lesson to be drawn there is.

I suspect this will be tested, and I note that Christopher Niebel’s appeal of his PECR MPN is listed for a five-day hearing before the First-tier Tribunal in October. And Sony’s appeal of their DPA MPN is listed for a four-day hearing before the First-tier Tribunal in November. Although the “cumulative distress” approach was not explicitly cited by the ICO in Sony’s MPN, one could argue that finding out that a data controller has lost one’s name, address, email address, date of birth and account password is unlikely to be capable of causing individual substantial distress.

I should stress that I think there should be sanctions for organisations which commit serious contraventions affecting large numbers of people, even where individual distress is not subtantial. I think that nuisance caller companies are, er, a nuisance, and deserve to be targetted robustly by a regulator. And I actually hope I’m wrong on the meaning of “substantial distress”.

Postscript:

Very interestingly (well I think so) there are reports that the government is considering proposing legislative changes to alter the threshold whereby substantial damage or substantial threat must be demonstrated. Whether this is simply to bring larger numbers of nuisance-calling companies into the ICO’s sights, or whether it is to address perceived weaknesses in current legislation remains to be seen (it might be both, of course).

Postscript 2:

Recently-published minutes from the ICO’s Management Board of 22 July support my view. They say

Civil monetary penalties for offences under PECR were discussed further. There are concerns about the requirement to show substantial damage and distress when what was happening was minor inconvenience to many people; ie in receiving spam texts.

Niebel’s appeal is happening this week (Sony dropped theirs). We will know soon whether the laudable attempts by the ICO to punish nuisance calling will be defeated by what was perhaps inadequate legislative drafting.

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