My colleagues, partners Adam Rose and Ashley Winton, discuss the new European Commission Standard Contractual Clauses announced on 4 June 2021. I honestly can’t think of two better people to discuss what they mean.
Category Archives: data sharing
In which I finally receive a reply to my complaint about ICO’s Facebook page.
The issue of the transfer of personal data to the US has been the subject of much debate and much litigation. In 2015 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) struck down one of the then key legal mechanisms (“Safe Harbor”) for doing so. And in 2020 the CJEU did so with its successor, “Privacy Shield”. Both cases were initiated by complaints by lawyer and activist Max Schrems, and focused on the transfer of data from the EU to the US by Facebook.
Put simply, European data protection law, in the form of the GDPR and (as we must now talk about the UK in separate terms) UK data protection law, in the form of UKGDPR, outlaw the transfer of personal data to the US (or any other third country), unless the level of protection the data would receive in the EU, or the UK, is “not undermined” (see Chapter V of and recital 101 of GDPR/UKGDPR).
In “Schrems II” – the 2020 case – the CJEU not only struck down Privacy Shield – it effectively also laid down rules which needed to be followed if the alternative mechanisms, for instance using “standard contractual clauses” were to be used for transfers of personal data. Following the judgment, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) issued guidance in the form of FAQs, which recommended an “assessment, taking into account the circumstances of the transfers, and supplementary measures you could put in place”. The EDPB guidance was subsequently endorsed by the UK’s own Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)
The EDPB has recommended that you must conduct a risk assessment as to whether SCCs provide enough protection within the local legal framework, whether the transfer is to the US or elsewhere
What struck me as odd in all this is that the ICO themselves have a Facebook page. Given that Facebook’s own data governance arrangements involve the transfer of EU and UK users’ data to the US, and given that ICO don’t just operate their page as a newsletter, but actively encourage users to comment and interact on their page, it seemed to me that ICO were enabling the transfer of personal data by Facebook to the US. But even further than that, another CJEU judgment has previously made clear that operators of corporate Facebook pages may well function as a controller under the GDPR/UKGDPR, where they set parameters on the page. The Wirtschaftsakademie case held that – in the case of someone operating a “fan page”
While the mere fact of making use of a social network such as Facebook does not make a Facebook user a controller jointly responsible for the processing of personal data by that network, it must be stated, on the other hand, that the administrator of a fan page hosted on Facebook, by creating such a page, gives Facebook the opportunity to place cookies on the computer or other device of a person visiting its fan page, whether or not that person has a Facebook account.
By extension, it seemed to me, the ICO were in this position with their page.
So I put the point to them. After four months, and some chasing, I received a reply which not only confirmed my understanding that they are, and accept that they are, a controller, but that, nearly a year on from the Schrems II decision, they have not finished reviewing their position and have not updated their privacy notice to reflect their controller status in respect of their Facebook processing. (They also say that their legal basis for processing is “Article 6 (1) (e) of UK GDPR, public task” because “as a regulator we have a responsibility to promote good practice and engage with the public at large about data protection issues via commonly used platforms”, but I’d observe that they fail to give any attention to the proportionality test that reliance on this condition requires, and fail to point to the justification in domestic law, as required by Article 6.)
What the ICO response doesn’t do is actually respond to me as a data subject in respect of my complaint nor explain how they are complying with the international data transfer provisions of Chapter V of the GDPR/UKGDPR, and whether they have conducted any sort of transfer impact assessment (one presumes not).
As I said in my original complaint to ICO, I am aware that I might be seen as being mischievous, and I’m also aware I might be seen as having walked ICO into a trap. Maybe I am, and maybe I have, but there’s also a very serious point to be made. The cost to UK business of the Schrems II decision has been enormous, in terms of the legal advice sought, the internal governance reviews and risk assessments undertaken, and the negotiating or novation of contracts. At the same time the business and legal uncertainty is significant, with many wondering about their exposure to legal claims but also (and especially) to regulatory enforcement. If, though, the regulator is not complying with the relevant law, ten months on from the judgment (and five months on from my raising it with them as a concern) then what are controllers meant to do? And where do they turn to for guidance on the regulatory approach?
THE ICO RESPONSE
Firstly, it may be helpful to explain that following the findings of the CJEU in Wirtschaftsakademie, we started a review of the transparency information we provide to visitors of the page. The review was delayed when Schrems11 decision was issued as we needed to consider the impact of the judgement on any transfer element to the US.
We agree that as the Facebook page administrator, we are processing personal data of the visitors of our page and therefore we are controllers for this information. We process the names of the users as they appear on their Facebook profiles and any personal data they may share through their comments on our posts or via messages to us. We process this information in reliance on Article 6 (1) (e) of UK GDPR, public task. We consider that, as a regulator we have a responsibility to promote good practice and engage with the public at large about data protection issues via commonly used platforms.
For the cookies and similar technologies, Facebook is responsible for setting the cookies, when you visit our Facebook page.
We also receive anonymous information from Facebook in the form of aggregate statistics of all those who visit our page, regardless of whether they have a Facebook account or not. In line with the findings of the CJEU in Wirtschaftsakademie we are joint controllers with Facebook for this information. We process this information under Article 6 (1) (e) as well. The Insights include information on page viewings, likes, sharing of posts, age range, the device used and how it was accessed and breakdown of demographics. All Insights are received from Facebook by the ICO in aggregate format. Our PN will updated shortly to reflect the above information.
Like other regulators, the ICO is currently reviewing its position on international transfers following the judgment in Schrems II. As part of that review, it will, amongst other things, consider the questions that you have raised about the ICO’s use of Facebook. The ICO intends to publish its guidance on how UK organisations should address the question of international transfers, in due course, and will act in accordance with its guidance. That work is still in progress, and it will be published in due course.
The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.
“Uber gives police private data on drivers and passengers” announces The Times(£) this morning.
In this post, much to my surprise (I have never taken an Uber, and don’t intend to – I don’t like their business model), I come to the defence of Uber.
A closer read of the Times piece reveals that what is being referred to, in documents filed with the High Court, in proceedings regarding TfL’s refusal to renew Uber’s licence, is requests to Uber from the police to disclose personal data for the purposes of the prevention and detection of crime or the apprehension or prosecution of offenders.
Such requests are commonly made to thousands of public authorities and private companies. They used to be known in data protection and police circles as “section 29 requests”, after the relevant section of the now-repealed Data Protection Act 1998. The term was a bit misleading: section 29, now replaced effectively by paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act 2018, has the effect of disapplying the provisions of data protection law which would otherwise prevent the disclosure of personal data to the police (or others), and where not disclosing would be likely to prejudice the purposes of the prevention and detection of crime or the apprehension or prosecution of offenders. This is a necessary provision of data protection law, and provided that (as with all provisions) it is applied correctly and proportionately, it works very well: it gives controller the power to disclose personal data to the police where it is necessary for criminal justice.
If Uber are dealing with police requests appropriately, it is for the public good that personal data which assists the police to investigate drug transporting and human trafficking is made available to them.
In fact, I strongly suspect that The Times will receive such requests from the police. When the requests are related to the paper’s journalistic activities they are probably, and probably rightfully, refused, but they may well get requests in respect of their employees’ data, and I would be very surprised if they don’t sometimes – as a responsible company – comply with these.
Transport for London certainly receives such requests. Indeed, as a public authority, under its transparency measures, it has habitually made statistics on this public. The most recent publication I can find shows that 2012 to 2017 TfL received an average of approximately 10,000 requests each year.
Will The Times now report that TfL is handing over to the police thousands of pieces of intelligence on members of the public each year?
Data protection law doesn’t prevent disclosure of personal data where not doing would be likely to prejudice criminal justice purposes
Theft of a bicycle may not be the most serious crime ever. However, crime it is, and any omission by a person which is likely to prejudice the detection of that crime or the apprehension or prosecution of the thief is, in societal terms, to be deplored. This is why, when the omission in question would be a failure by a data controller to disclose personal data to the police which would be likely to assist in the detection of the crime or the apprehension or prosecution of the thief, the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) provides an exemption to the general presumption in the Act against disclosure, which authorises such disclosure.
Section 29 of the DPA is often misunderstood. It is quite common, particularly in certain sectors (social services, housing etc.) for data controllers to be contacted by the police, or other bodies with powers to investigate crime, asking for disclosure of information about people whose personal data the data controller holds. Data protection officers will often talk of a “section 29 request”, but this is really just shorthand for saying “the police etc. have requested disclosure of personal data from this data controller and the section of the DPA which is engaged and under whose provisions we would be authorised to disclose would be section 29”.
With this in mind it is surprising to read in The Daily Record that police are unable to trace a person who had the gall to post an advert on the classified ad site Gumtree purporting to offer for sale a bike stolen from outside a gym in Edinburgh. According to the article police have told the owner of the bike, who spotted the advert, that
…officers could not act because of data protection laws…Due to data protection laws, a warrant must be applied for before police can access personal information held by the site.
The reference to a warrant, however, is surely excessive. The article also refers to the police “waiting to hear back” from Gumtree. Section 29(3) of the DPA allows Gumtree to disclose the details of the person who placed the advert, by exempting them from the general obligation to comply with the first five data protection principles and sections 10 and 14(1) to (3) (collectively referred to as the non-disclosure principles). Failure to exercise this power by a data controller, or a delay in doing so, in circumstances where such a failure would be likely to prejudice the police’s duties is detrimental to the public interest. One hopes that, if the article is correct, Gumtree will now act in that public interest and disclose the details without delay.
The views in this post (and indeed all posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.
Rather hidden away in the new IIGOP annual report is a worrying and revealing report of a serious data breach involving hospital episode data
In February last year Tim Kelsey, NHS England’s National Director for Patients and Information, and vocal cheerleader for the care.data initiative, assured the public, in an interview on the Radio 4 Today programme, that in the twenty five years that Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) have been shared with other organisations
the management of the hospital episode database…there has never been a single example of that data being compromised, the privacy of patients being compromised…
However, as Sir Nick Partridge’s Review of Data Releases by the NHS Information Centre in June of last year revealed, there had been
lapses in the strict arrangements that were supposed to be in place to ensure that people’s personal data would never be used improperly
As I said at the time
One waits with interest to see whether the [Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)] will take any enforcement action, but I think it’s important that they consider doing so, because, even though Sir Nick makes nine very sensible recommendations to HSCIC, one could be forgiven – having been given clear assurances previously, by the likes of Tim Kelsey and others – for having reservations as to future governance of our confidential medical data
Now, with the launch of the first annual report of the Independent Information Governance Oversight Panel (IIGOP), chaired by Dame Fiona Caldicott and established at the request of the Secretary of State to “advise, challenge and report on the state of information governance across the health and care system in England”, we see further evidence of HES data “being compromised, the privacy of patients being compromised”. The report informs us of an incident whereby
New inspection procedures introduced by the HSCIC had uncovered a number of organisations which were sending HES data and failing to follow data dictionary standards. This meant they were inadvertently enabling personal confidential data to enter the data base. Following an alert to the Information Commissioners’ Office this was understood as a large scale problem, although having a low level potential impact, as the affected data fields were unknown to either senders or receivers of HES data. The relevant organisations were contacted to gain their cooperation in closing the breach, without alerting any unfriendly observer to the location of the confidential details. This was important to preserve the general ignorance of the detail of the breach and continue to protect individuals’ privacy. Trusts and others were encouraged to provide named contacts who would then start cleaning up their data flows to the HSCIC. In order to manage any untoward reporting in the media, trade titles were informed and briefed about the importance of restricting their reporting to avoid any risk of leading people towards this confidential data.
Now this to me seems pretty serious: those organisations who failed to “follow data dictionary standards” by data controller organisations who were sending HES data sounds very likely to be a contravention of the data controllers’ obligation, under section 4(4) of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) to comply with the seventh data protection principle, which requires that they take
Appropriate technical and organisational measures…against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data
Serious contraventions, of a kind likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress, can result in the ICO serving a monetary penalty notice, under section 55A of the DPA, to a maximum of £500,000.
So, what does one make of these incidents? It’s hard to avoid the conclusion that they would be held to be “serious”, and if the data in question had been misused, there would have been the potential for substantial damage and substantial distress – public disclosure of hospital record data could have a multitude of pernicious effects – and this much is evidenced by the fact that (successful) attempts had to be made to avoid the errors coming to light, including asking journalists to avoid reporting. But were they contraventions likely to cause these things? IIGOP suggests that they had a “low level potential impact” because the data was hidden within large amounts of non-offensive data, and I think it is probably the case that the incidents would not be held to have been likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress (in Niebel, the leading case on monetary penalty notices, Wikeley J in the Upper Tribunal accepted that the likely in s55A DPA took the same meaning attributed to it by Munby J, in R (Lord) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  EWHC 2073 (Admin), namely “‘likely’ meant something more than ‘a real risk’, i.e. a significant risk, ‘even if the risk falls short of being more probable than not'”).
But a monetary penalty notice is not the only action open to the ICO. He has the power to serve enforcement notices, under s40 DPA, to require data controllers to do, or refrain from doing, specified actions, or to take informal action such as requiring the signing of undertakings (to similar effect). Given that we have heard about these incidents from IIGOP, and in an annual report, it seems unlikely that any ICO enforcement action will be forthcoming. Perhaps that’s correct as a matter of law and as a matter of the exercise of discretion, but in my view the ICO has not been vocal enough about the profound issues raised by the amalgamation and sharing of health data, and the concerns raised by incidents of potentially inappropriate or excessive processing. Care.data of course remains on the agenda, and the IIGOP report is both revealing and encouragingly critical of what has taken place so far, but one would not want a situation to emerge where the ICO took a back seat and allowed IIGOP (which lacks regulatory and enforcement powers) to deal with the issue.
The views in this post (and indeed all posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.
Does the Partridge Review of NHS transfers of hospital episode patient data point towards one of the biggest DPA breaches ever?
In February this year Tim Kelsey, NHS England’s National Director for Patients and Information, and vocal cheerleader for the care.data initiative, assured the public, in an interview on the Radio 4 Today programme, that in the twenty five years that Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) have been shared with other organisations
the management of the hospital episode database…there has never been a single example of that data being compromised, the privacy of patients being compromised…
When pressed by medConfidential‘s Phil Booth about this, and about risks of reidentification from the datasets, Tim repeated that no patient’s privacy had been compromised.
Some of us doubted this, as news of specific incidents of data loss emerged, and even more so as further news emerged suggesting that there had been transfers (a.k.a. sale) of huge amounts of potentially identifiable patient data to, for instance, the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries. The latter news led me to ask the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) to assess the lawfulness of this processing, an assessment which has not been completed four months later.
However, with the publication on 17 June of Sir Nick Partridge’s Review of Data Releases by the NHS Information Centre one questions the basis for Tim’s assertions. Sir Nick commissioned PwC to analyse a total of 3059 data releases between 2005 and 2013 (when the NHS Information Centre (NHSIC) ceased to exist, and was replaced by the Health and Social Care Information Centre HSCIC). The summary report to the Review says that
It disappoints me to report that the review has discovered lapses in the strict arrangements that were supposed to be in place to ensure that people’s personal data would never be used improperly
and it reveals a series of concerning and serious failures of data governance, including
- lack of detailed records between 1 April 2005 and 31 March 2009
- two cases of data that was apparently released without a proper record remaining of which organisation received the data
- [no] evidence that Northgate [the NHSIC contractor responsible for releases] got permission from the NHS IC before making releases as it was supposed to do
- PwC could not find records to confirm full compliance in about 10% of the sample
Sir Nick observes that
the system did not have the checks and balances needed to ensure that the appropriate authority was always in place before data was released. In many cases the decision making process was unclear and the records of decisions are incomplete.
It also seems clear that the responsibilities of becoming a data controller, something that happens as soon as an organisation receives data under a data sharing agreement, were not always clear to those who received data. The importance of data controllers understanding their responsibilities remains vital to the protection of people’s confidentiality
(This resonates with my concern, in my request to the ICO to assess the transfer of data from HES to the actuarial society, about what the legal basis was for the latter’s processing).
Notably, Sir Nick dispenses with the idea that data such as HES was anonymised:
The data provided to these other organisations under data sharing agreements is not anonymised. Although names and addresses are normally removed, it is possible that the identity of individuals may be deduced if the data is linked to other data
And if it was not anonymised, then the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) is engaged.
All of this indicates a failure to take appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data, which the perspicacious among you will identify as one of the key statutory obligations placed on data controllers by the seventh data protection principle in the DPA.
Sir Nick may say
It is a matter of fact that no individual ever complained that their confidentiality had been breached as a result of data being shared or lost by the NHS IC
but simply because no complaint was made (at the time – complaints certainly have been made since concerns started to be raised) does not mean that the seventh principle was not contravened, in a serious way. And a serious contravention of the DPA of a kind likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress can potentially lead to the ICO serving a monetary penalty notice (MPN) to a maximum of £500,000 (at least for contraventions after April 2010, when the ICO’s powers commenced).
The NHSIC is no more (although as Sir Nick says, HSCIC “inherited many of the NHS IC’s staff and procedures”). But that has not stopped the ICO serving MPNs on successor organisation in circumstances where their predecessors committed the contravention. One waits with interest to see whether the ICO will take any enforcement action, but I think it’s important that they consider doing so, because, even though Sir Nick makes nine very sensible recommendations to HSCIC, one could be forgiven – having been given clear assurances previously, by the likes of Tim Kelsey and others – for having reservations as to future governance of our confidential medical data. I would suggest it is imperative that HSCIC know that their processing of personal data is now subject to close oversight by all relevant regulatory bodies.
I thought I was rather flogging the care.data horse on this blog, so, in the spirit of persistence, I thought why not go and do it somewhere else? The Society of Computers and Law kindly asked me to write a broadly “anti” piece, while asking Martin Hoskins to do a broadly “pro” one. They are here:
I am pleased to announce that Martin and I are still on speaking terms.
The ICO appear to think that GPs who opt patients out of care.data without informing them would be breaching the Data Protection Act. They say it would be unfair processing
In February of this year GP Dr Gordon Gancz was threatened with termination of his contract, because he had indicated he would not allow his patients’ records to be uploaded to the national health database which as planned to be created under the care.data initiative. He was informed that if he didn’t remove information on his website, and if he went on to add “opt-out codes” to patients’ electronic records, he would be in breach of the NHS (GMS contract) Regulations 2004. Although this threatened action was later withdrawn, and care.data put on hold for six months, Dr Gancz might have been further concerned to hear that in the opinion of the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) he would also have been in breach of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA).
A few weeks ago fellow information rights blogger Tim Turner (who has given me permission to use the material) asked NHS England about the basis for Health Services Minister Dan Poulter’s statement in Parliament that
NHS England and the Health and Social Care Information Centre will work with the British Medical Association, the Royal College of General Practitioners, the Information Commissioner’s Office and with the Care Quality Commission to review and work with GP practices that have a high proportion of objections [to care.data] on a case-by-case basis
Tim wanted to know what role the ICO would play. NHS England replied saying, effectively, that they didn’t know, but they did disclose some minutes of a meeting held with the ICO in December 2013. Those minutes indicate that
The ICO had received a number of enquiries regarding bulk objections from practices. Their view was that adding objection codes would constitute processing of data in terms of the Data Protection Act. If objection codes had been added without writing to inform their patients then the ICO’s view was that this would be unfair processing and technically a breach of the Act so action could be taken by the ICO
One must stress that this is not necessarily a complete or accurate respresentation of the ICO’s views. However, what appears to be being said here is that, if GPs took the decision to “opt out” their patients from care.data, without writing to inform them, this would be an act of “processing” according to the definition at section 1(1) of the DPA, and would not be compliant with the GPs’ obligations under the first DPA principle to process personal data fairly.
On a very strict reading of the DPA this may be technically correct – for processing of personal data to be fair data subjects must be informed of the purposes for which the data are being processed, and, strictly, adding a code which would prevent an upload (which would otherwise happen automatically) would be processing of personal data. And, of course, the “fairness” requirement is absent from the proposed care.data upload, because Parliament, in its wisdom, decided to give the NHS the legal power to override it. But “fairness” requires a broad brush, and the ICO’s interpretation here would have the distinctly odd effect of rendering unlawful a decision to maintain the status quo whereby patients’ GP data does not leave the confidential confines of their surgery. It also would have the effect of supporting NHS England’s apparent view that GPs who took such action would be liable to sanctions.
In fairness (geddit???!!) to the ICO, if a patient was opted out who wanted to be included in the care.data upload, then I agree that this would be in breach of the first principle, but it would be very easily rectified, because, as we know, it will be simple to opt-in to care.data from a previous position of “opt-out”, but the converse doesn’t apply – once your data is uploaded it is uploaded in perpetuity (see my last bullet point here).
A number of GPs (and of course, others) have expressed great concern at what care.data means for the confidential relationship between doctor and patient, which is fundamental for the delivery of health care. In light of those concerns, and in the absence of clarity about the secondary uses of patient data under care.data, would it really be “unfair” to patients if GPs didn’t allow the data to be collected? Is that (outwith DPA) fair to GPs?
The Sunday Times reports that a billion patient records have been sold to a marketing consultancy. Is it time for an independent review of these highly questionable data sharing practices?
In 2012, at the behest of the then Secretary of State for Health, Andrew Lansley (driver of the Health and Social Care Act 2012), Dame Fiona Caldicott chaired a review of information governance in the NHS. Her report, which focused on the issue of sharing of information, was published in April 2013. At the time a statement in it, referring to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) stood out to me, and it stands out even more now, but for different reasons. It says
The ICO told the Review Panel that no civil monetary penalties have been served for a breach of the Data Protection Act due to formal data sharing between data controllers in any organisation for any purpose
At the time, I thought “Well duh” – of course the ICO is not going to take enforcement action where there has been a formal data sharing agreement, because, clearly, the parties entering into such an agreement are going to make sure they do so lawfully, and with regard to the ICO guidance on data sharing – lawful and proportionate data sharing is, er, lawful, so the ICO wouldn’t be able to take action.
But now, with the frequent and worrying stories emerging of apparent data sharing arrangements between the NHS Information Centre (NHSIC), and its successor, the Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC), I start to think the ICO’s comments are remarkable for what they might reveal about them looking in the wrong direction, when they should have been paying more attention to the lawfulness of huge scale data sharing arrangements between the NHS and private bodies. And now, The Sunday Times reports that
A BILLION NHS records containing details of patients’ hospital admissions and operations have been sold to a marketing consultancy working for some of the world’s biggest drug companies
I think it is time for a wholesale review, properly funded, by the ICO as independent regulator, of these “formal data sharing” arrangements. They appear to have a questionable legal basis, based to a large extent on questionable assumptions and assurances that pseudonymisation equates to anonymisation (which anyone who looks into will realise is nonsense).
And I think the review should also consider how and why these arrangements appear to have deliberately been taking place behind the backs of the patients whose data has been “shared”.
David Evans is Senior Policy Officer at the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). In an interview with “The Information Daily.com” uploaded on 12 March, he spoke about data sharing in general, and specifically about care.data (elsewhere on this blog passim). There’s a video of his interview, which has a backdrop with adverts for “Boilerhouse Health” and “HCI Daily“, both of which appear to be communications companies offering services to the health sector. David says
care.data…the overall project is very good because it’s all about making better use of information in the health service…what care.data appear to have done is failed to get that message across
Oddly, this view, that if only the people behind care.data had communicated its benefits better it would have sailed through, is very similar to that expressed by Tim Kelsey, NHS National Director for Patients and Information and head cheerleader for care.data. Tim said, for instance, after the announcement of a (further) six-month delay in implementation
We have been told very clearly that patients need more time to learn about the benefits of sharing information and their right to object to their information being shared
Both David and Tim are right that there has been a failure of communication, but I think it is completely wrong to see it merely as a failure to communicate the benefits. Any project involving the wholesale upload of confidential medical records, to be processed and disclosed, at various levels of deidentification, to third parties, is going to involve risk, and will necessitate explanation of and mitigation of that risk. What the public have so far had communicated to them is plenty about the benefits, but very little about the risks, and the organisational and technical measures being taken by the various bodies involved to mitigate or contain that risk. Tim Gough has argued eloquently for a comprehensive and independent Privacy Impact Assessment to be undertaken (while criticising the one that was published in January
To be fair, NHS England did publish a PIA in January 2014, which does appear a little late in the day for a project of this kind. It also glosses over information which is extremely important to address in full detail. Leaving it out makes it look like something is being hidden
As far as I am aware there has been no official response to this (other than a tweet from Geraint Lewis referring us to our well-thumbed copies of the ICO’s nearly-superseded PIA Handbook).
To an extent I can understand Tim Kelsey feeling he and his colleagues need to do more to communicate the benefits of care.data – after all, it’s their job to deliver it. But I do have real concerns that a senior officer at the ICO thinks that public concerns can be allayed through yet more plugging of the benefits, with none of the detailed reassurances and legal and technical justifications whose absence has been so strongly noted.
In passing, I note that, other than a message from their very pleasant Senior Press Officer for my blog, I have had no acknowledgement from the ICO of my request for them to assess the lawfulness of previous health data upload and linking.
The ICO has kindly acknowledged receipt of my request for assessment, saying it has been passed to their health sector team for “further detailed consideration”.