Category Archives: Data Protection Act 2018

Consent is not the only basis

In 2017 I attended a free event run by a “GDPR consultancy”. The presenter confidently told us that we were going to have to get consent from customers in order to process their personal data. One attendee said they worked at the DWP, so how were they going to get consent from benefits claimants who didn’t want to disclose their income, to which the presenter rather awkwardly said “I think that’s one you’ll have to discuss with your lawyers”. Another attendee, who was now most irritated that he’d taken time out from work for this, could hold his thoughts in no longer, and rudely announced that this was complete nonsense.

That attendee was the – much ruder in those days – 2017 version of me.

I never imagined (although I probably should have done) that eight years on the same nonsense would still be spouted.

Just as the Data Protection Act 2018 did not implement the GDPR in the UK (despite the embarrassing government page that until recently, despite people raising it countless times, said so) just as the GDPR does not limit its protections to “EU citizens”, so GDPR and the UK GDPR do not require consent for all processing.

Anyone who says so has not applied a smidgeon of thought or research to the question, and is probably taking content from generative AI, which, on the time-honoured principle of garbage-in, garbage-out, has been in part trained on the existing nonsense. To realise why it’s garbage, they should just start with the DWP example above and work outwards from there.

Consent is one of the six lawful bases, any one or more of which can justify processing. No one basis is better than or takes precedence over the other.

To those who know this, I apologise for having to write it down, but I want to have a sign to tap for any time I see someone amplifying the garbage on LinkedIn.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Filed under Data Protection, Data Protection Act 2018, DWP, GDPR, Let's Blame Data Protection, UK GDPR

The Data Protection Act 2018 does not “implement” the GDPR

They are separate instruments and the GDPR, pre-Brexit, did not require implementation – as a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union, it had direct effect.

Since Brexit, by the effect of, among other laws, the European Union (Withdrawal Act) 2018 and the Data Protection, Privacy and Electronic Communications (Amendments Etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, we now have a retained-and-assimilated domestic version of the GDPR, called the UK GDPR.

Most processing of personal data is subject to the UK GDPR. The Data Protection Act 2018 deals with processing that is not subject to it, such as by law enforcement and security service agencies. It also provides some of the conditions and exemptions in relation to processing under the UK GDPR.

[None of this is new, and none of it will be unknown to genuine practitioners in the field, but I’m posting it here as a convenient sign to tap, at appropriate moments.]

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Pacini & Geyer v Dow Jones – at the interface between libel and data protection

[reposted from LinkedIn]

This is an important judgment on preliminary issues (the second preliminary issues judgment in the case – the first was on an unsuccessful strike out application by the defendants) in a data protection claim brought by two businessmen against Dow Jones, in relation to articles in the Wall Street Journal in 2017 and 2018. The claim is for damages and for erasure of personal data which is said to be inaccurate.

It is believed to be the first time in a data protection claim that a court has been required to determine the meaning of personal data as a preliminary issue in an accuracy claim.

Determination of meaning is, of course, something that is common in defamation claims. The judgment is a fascinating, but complex, analysis of the parallels between determining the meaning of personal data in a publication and determining the meaning of allegedly defamatory statements in a publication. Although the judge is wary of importing rules of defamation law, such as the “single meaning rule” and “repetition rule” a key part of the discussion is taken up by them.

The single meaning rule, whereby “the court must identify the single meaning of a publication by reference to the response of the ordinary reader to the entire publication” (NT 1 & NT 2 v Google LLC [2018] EWHC 799 (QB)) is potentially problematic in a data protection claim such as this where the claimants argue that it is not the ordinary reader they are concerned about, but a reader who might be a potential business investor.

Similarly, it is not at all clear that the repetition rule, which broadly seeks to avoid a defamatory loophole by which someone argues “but I’m only reporting what someone else said – their words might be defamatory, but mine merely report the fact that they said them”, should carry over to data protection claims, not least because what will matter in defamation claims is the factual matrix at the time of publication, whereas with data protection claims “a claim for inaccuracy may be made on the basis that personal data are inaccurate at the time of the processing complained of, including because they have become misleading or out of date, regardless of whether they were accurate at the time of original publication. In that event, what matters is the factual matrix at the time when relief is sought” (at 66).

Nonetheless, and in a leap I can’t quite follow on first of the judgment, but which seems to be on the basis that the potential problems raised can be addressed at trial when fairness of processing (rather than accuracy) arises, the judge decides to determine meaning on a single meaning/repetition rule basis (at 82-84).

There’s a huge amount to take in though, and the judgment demands close reading (and re-reading). If a full trial and judgment ensue, the case will probably be a landmark one.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Immunity from suit in data protection (and other) claims

[reposted from LinkedIn]

All too often, in my experience, public authorities might inadvertently disclose confidential information about one person to someone with whom that person is in dispute, or from whom that person is in danger. Typical examples are when a council discloses information about one resident to a neighbour, or when the police disclose information about a vulnerable person to their abusive partner.

This can also happen during the process of court proceedings.

There is a long-standing – and complex – common law concept of “immunity from suit”, which, in the very simplest and most general of terms, will prevent someone from being sued for something they say in court.

This judgment involves a fascinating, but headache-inducing, analysis of the different types of immunity from suit – witness immunity at court, advocate’s immunity at court, witness immunity before court, advocate’s immunity before court and legal proceedings immunity before court (which may apply to lawyers, police officers or administrative staff preparing a case for trial).

The background facts are grim: a woman fleeing from domestic violence was forced to flee from safe homes because twice her addresses were inadvertently disclosed (or at least indicated) to the perpetrator, against whom criminal proceedings were being brought – once by the police and once by the CPS.

The woman brought claims against both public authorities under the Human Rights Act 1998, the Data Protection Act 2018 and in misuse of private information. However, the defendants initially succeeded in striking the claims out/getting summary judgment (one part of the claim against the police was permitted to continue).

Mr Justice Richie upheld the appeal against the strike out/summary judgment, with rather a tour de force run through of the history and authorities on immunity (para 66 begins with the words “I start 439 years ago”).

In very short summary, he held that strike out/summary judgment had been inappropriate, because “the movement in the last 25 years in the appellate case law has been away from absolutism, towards careful consideration of whether the facts of each case actually do fit with the claimed ‘immunity’ by reference to whether the long-established justifications for the immunity apply” (at 106). In the examples here, it was at least arguable that immunity was being claimed not over evidence in the case, but “extraneous or peripheral or administrative matters”. The judge should have applied a balancing exercise to the facts to decide whether immunity applied: she had failed to do so, and had not been entitled to determine that there was no arguable claim

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Filed under compensation, damages, Data Protection Act 2018, human rights, judgments, LinkedIn Post, litigation, misuse of private information, police

Subject access: recipients, and motive

A very significant subject access judgment has been handed down in the High Court. Key rulings have been made to the effect that 1) requesters are entitled, in principle, to be informed of the identities of the recipients of their personal data (not just the categories of recipient), and 2) the subject access regime has a “specific and limited purpose, which is to enable a person to check whether a data controller’s processing of his or her personal data unlawfully infringes privacy rights and, if so, to take such steps as the data protection law provides.

The underlying details of the case are interesting and alarming in themselves. A director of a gardening company (Mr Cameron) had covertly recorded threatening calls made by a wealthy homeowner working in the property investment industry (Mr Harrison) with whom the company was coming into dispute, and subsequently circulated the recordings to a limited number of unnamed family members and others.

The recordings found their way to a wider circle of people, including some of Mr Harrison’s peers and competitors in the property investment sector. Mr Harrison contended that the circulation of the recordings had caused his own company to lose out on a significant property acquisition. Accordingly, he made subject access requests, under Article 15 of the UK GDPR both to and Cameron and to Mr Cameron’s company (“ACL”). Those requests were rejected on the grounds that i) Mr Cameron, when circulating the recordings, was processing Mr Harrison’s personal data in a “purely personal and household” context, and so the processing was out of scope of the UK GDPR, ii) Mr Cameron was not personally a controller under the UK GDPR, iii) ACL could rely on the exemption to disclosure where it would involve disclosing information relating to another individual who did not consent to disclosure, and where – in the absence of such consent – it was not reasonable in the circumstances to disclose (see Article 15(4) UK GDPR and paragraph 16 of Schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act 2018).

In a lengthy judgment (dealing mostly with the facts and evidence) Mrs Justice Steyn held that Mr Cameron’s processing was not for purely personal and household reasons: he was clearly acting as a director of ACL in making the recordings and circulating them. However, she agreed that he was not a controller – he was acting in his capacity as a director, and – following Ittihadieh and In re Southern Pacific Loans – a director processing data in the course of their duties for their company is not a controller; the company is.

A crucial part of the judgment, in terms of wider relevance, is on the interpretation of Article 15(1)(c) of the UK GDPR. This provides that a data subject should be given information on “the recipients or categories of recipient” to whom personal data have been or will be disclosed. Many practitioners, and lawyers, have taken this be an option available to the controller (i.e. the controller can decide whether to provide information on the specific recipient or just on categories thereof). Not so, said Steyn J, agreeing with the CJEU in the Austrian Post case (which, as a post-Brexit case, wasn’t binding on her, but to which she could have regard, so far as it was relevant to the issues (see section 6(2) of the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018)): the choice lies with the data subject, and, if the data subject chooses to receive information on individual recipients, he or she is entitled, in principle, to that information (unless it would be impossible or manifestly excessive to do so).

Notwithstanding this, Mr Harrison was not entitled in this case to have the identities. Mr Harrison had previously sent subject access requests individually to at least 23 employees of ACL and ACL, and he had an intention to pursue further legal options other than under the UK GDPR, if he was to identify potential claimants. ACL believed that disclosing identities of recipients of the recordings would put them at “significant risk of being the object of intimidating, harassing and hostile legal correspondence and litigation”. The judge agreed that it was “not unreasonable for the Defendants to give significant weight to [Mr Harrison’s] sustained and menacing behaviour in considering whether to protect or disclose the identities of friends, colleagues and family members”. The fact that “hostile litigation”, against the third parties to whom the recordings were disclosed, was being contemplated was a relevant factor to take into account when balancing their interests with Mr Harrison’s access rights, under paragraph 16 of Schedule 2. The judge held that

[Although there] is no general principle that the interests of the request should be treated as devalued by reason of a motive to obtain information to assist the requester in litigation…as Farbey J observed in X v Transcription Agency…the SAR regime “has a specific and limited purpose, which is to enable a person to check whether a data controller’s processing of his or her ‘personal data’ unlawfully infringes privacy rights and, if so, to take such steps as the DPA 2018 provides“…[and so] it was reasonable for the Defendants to give weight to their desire to protect family, friends and colleagues from hostile litigation going beyond the exercise of rights under the UK GDPR and the DPA 2018

So, the perennial question of the extent to which a requester’s motive is relevant when responding to a subject access request rears its head again. Steyn J’s analysis is compelling, and so it certainly appears that – at the very least when it comes to the balancing test implied by paragraph 16 of Schedule 2 – the motive is capable of being taken into account.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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How far can a legal fiction go?

When the Information Commissioner, as a public authority subject to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA), is required to consider, as regulator, his own handling of a FOIA request, he enters into a legal fiction, whereby he separates himself into two, along these lines (taken from a decision notice):

This decision notice concerns a complaint made against the Information Commissioner (‘the Commissioner’). The Commissioner is both the regulator of FOIA and a public authority subject to FOIA. He’s therefore under a duty as regulator to make a formal determination of a complaint made against him as a public authority…In this notice the term ‘ICO’ is used to denote the ICO dealing with the request, and the term ‘Commissioner’ denotes the ICO dealing with the complaint.

It’s a legal fiction because the Information Commissioner is a corporation sole: every single function he has vests in him (and he has powers of delegation).

With this in mind, it is interesting to consider section 132(1) of the Data Protection Act 2018. This provides that

A person who is or has been the Commissioner, or a member of the Commissioner’s staff or an agent of the Commissioner, must not disclose information which— (a) has been obtained by, or provided to, the Commissioner in the course of, or for the purposes of, the discharging of the Commissioner’s functions, (b) relates to an identified or identifiable individual or business, and (c) is not available to the public from other sources at the time of the disclosure and has not previously been available to the public from other sources. (Unless the disclosure is made with lawful authority.)

When partaking in the legal fiction described above, can it be said that the Commissioner, or the Commissioner’s staff, have obtained, or been provided with, information, when the Commissioner is the person who holds the information? I think not. And if I’m right, that should mean that the Commissioner cannot rely on the exemption at section 44 of FOIA, on the grounds that there is a statutory bar on disclosure. But that’s what he does in response to this recent FOIA request. It will be interesting if the applicant asks for a decision notice.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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How did George Galloway come to send different canvassing info to different electors?

As electors went to the polls in the Rochdale by-election on 29 February, a few posts were made on social media showing the disparity between letters sent to different electors by candidate George Galloway. An example is here

On the face of it, Galloway appears to have hoped to persuade Muslim voters to vote for him based on his views on a topic or topics he felt would appeal to them, and others to vote for him based on his views on different topics.

It should be stressed that there is nothing at all wrong that in principle.

What interests me is how Galloway identified which elector to send which letter to.

It is quite possible that a candidate might identify specific roads which were likely to contain properties with Muslim residents. And that, also would not be wrong.

But an alternative possibility is that a candidate with access to the full electoral register, might seek to identify individual electors, and infer their ethnicity and religion from their name. A candidate who did this would be processing special categories of personal data, and (to the extent any form of automated processing was involved) profiling them on that basis.

Article 9(1) of the UK GDPR introduces a general prohibition on the processing of special categories of personal data, which can only be set aside if one of the conditions in Article 9(2) is met. None of these immediately would seem available to a candidate who processes religious and/or ethnic origin data for the purposes of sending targeted electoral post. Article 9(2)(g) provides a condition for processing necessary for reasons of substantial public interest, and Schedule One to the Data Protection Act 2018 gives specific examples, but, again, none of these would seem to be available: paragraph 22 of the Schedule permits such processing by a candidate where it is of “personal data revealing political opinions”, but there is no similar condition dealing with religious or ethnic origin personal data.

If such processing took place in contravention of the prohibition in Article 9, it would be likely to be a serious infringement of a candidate’s obligations under the data protection law, potentially attracting regulatory enforcement from the Information Commissioner, and exposure to the risk of complaints or legal claims from electors.

To be clear, I am not saying that I know how Galloway came to send different letters to different electors, and I’m not accusing him of contravening data protection law. But it strikes me as an issue the Information Commissioner might want to look into.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Filed under access to information, Data Protection, Data Protection Act 2018, data sharing, Information Commissioner, political parties, UK GDPR

Arbitrary criminality and data protection

It shouldn’t be too controversial to state that to commit a criminal offence is a serious matter: although there are – obviously – different levels of severity, certain acts or omissions are so injurious to society as a whole that they warrant prosecution.

The majority of infringements of data protection law are not criminal offences, but, rather, contravention of civil law. But there are a few offences in the statutory scheme. Section 132 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) is one such. It says that it is an offence for the Information Commissioner, or a member of his staff, to disclose information

which—

(a)has been obtained by, or provided to, the Commissioner in the course of, or for the purposes of, the discharging of the Commissioner’s functions,

(b)relates to an identified or identifiable individual or business, and

(c)is not available to the public from other sources at the time of the disclosure and has not previously been available to the public from other sources,

However, it will not be an offence if the disclosure is made with “lawful authority”, and a disclosure is made with lawful authority only if and to the extent that

(a)the disclosure was made with the consent of the individual or of the person for the time being carrying on the business,

(b)the information was obtained or provided as described in subsection (1)(a) for the purpose of its being made available to the public (in whatever manner),

(c)the disclosure was made for the purposes of, and is necessary for, the discharge of one or more of the Commissioner’s functions,

(d)the disclosure was made for the purposes of, and is necessary for, the discharge of an EU obligation,

(e)the disclosure was made for the purposes of criminal or civil proceedings, however arising, or

(f)having regard to the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of any person, the disclosure was necessary in the public interest.

This means that, for instance, if an individual or a business has given (willingly or under compulsion) information to the Commissioner for the purposes of a regulatory investigation, and the information is not already public, then the Commissioner must not disclose it, unless he has lawful authority to do so.

Where, also for instance, the Commissioner publishes a legal decision notice, or monetary penalty notice, or the like, this will ordinarily contain information of this kind, but the Commissioner can point to the lawful authority he has under section 132(2)(c) – namely that the disclosure was made for the purposes of, and is necessary for, the discharge of one or more of the Commissioner’s functions. No offence committed.

But section 132 is why the Commissioner’s Office might refuse, under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA), to disclose information it has received from an individual or business. For instance, a notification report a controller has submitted pursuant to its “personal data breach” obligations under Article 33 UK GDPR. Here is an example. The ICO withholds the “breach report” in question, citing the exemption at section 44, because of the offence provisions at section 132 DPA.

Whether this is an over-cautious stance is one thing, but it is understandable.

What puzzles me, though, is the inconsistency, because elsewhere, in very similar circumstances, in response to a FOIA request, the ICO has disclosed a personal data report (albeit with redactions). Here, also.

If the Commissioner’s staff in the first example feel that they would commit an offence by disclosing the report, do the staff dealing with the second or third examples not feel that they would also?

One thing that should certainly not happen is claiming exemptions because it is easier to do so than not. I am not saying that has happened here, but there certainly seems to be inconsistency. And inconsistency, or uncertainty, about whether a regulator and his staff might commit a criminal offence is not a good situation.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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“Text pests” and data protection criminal offences

The modern digital economy allows us to order goods (and have them delivered) with a few taps on our phones. But the infrastructure behind locating, packaging and delivering those goods necessitates that a chain of people have access to the specific of our orders, and, in some cases, our contact details. A consequence of this appears to be an extraordinary prevalence of customers receiving unwanted contact as a result: research commissioned by the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) indicates that 29% of 18-34-year-olds have received unwanted contact after giving their personal details to a business.

It is to the ICO’s credit that it is looking at this issue, and calling for evidence of what it correctly calls this “illegal behaviour”. But I found it surprising that the ICO did not explain, in its communications, that if someone obtains a customer’s contact details from a business, and uses it for personal purposes which are different from (and not approved by) the business, they are very likely to be committing the criminal offence of unlawfully obtaining personal data without the consent of the controller, under section 170(1)(a) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA).

The ICO says it will be contacting

some of the major customer-facing employers in the country to emphasise their legal responsibilities as well as to learn more about what safeguards they have in place

Which is all fine, but maybe a quicker and more effective action would be to remind those employers in turn to make their staff aware that using customer data for such purposes may well see them ending up with a criminal record.

Under section 197 of the DPA prosecutions for section 170 offences can only be brought, in England, Wales and Northern Ireland at least, by the ICO itself (or with the permission of the Director of Public Prosecutions or equivalent). One wonders if the sheer numbers of incidents where customer data is being obtained and misused in this way means that the ICO’s criminal prosecution team simply doesn’t have the capacity to deal with it. If so, maybe Parliament needs to look at giving the CPS a role, or even whether private prosecutions could be allowed.

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Has the Information Commissioner’s Office lost its FOI purposes?

When Parliament passed the Data Protection Act 1984 it created a role of a regulator for that new data protection law. Section 3(1)(a) said that

For the purposes of this Act there shall be…an officer known as the Data Protection Registrar

The office remained in this form until the passing of the Data Protection Act 1998, section 6(1) of which provided that

The office originally established by section 3(1)(a) of the Data Protection Act 1984 as the office of Data Protection Registrar shall continue to exist for the purposes of this Act but shall be known as the office of Data Protection Commissioner

The advent of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 necessitated a change, so as to create a role of regulator for that Act. Paragraph 13(2) of Schedule 2 to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 amended section 6(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998 so it read

For the purposes of this Act and of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 there shall be an officer known as the Information Commissioner

So, at this point, and indeed, until 25 May 2018, there was an Information Commissioner “for the purposes of” the Data Protection Act 1998, and “for the purposes of” the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

25 May 2018 marked, of course the date from which (by effect of its Article 99) Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, or “GDPR“, applied.

Also on 25 May 2018, by effect of the Data Protection Act 2018 (Commencement No. 1 and Transitional and Saving Provisions) Regulations 2018, section 114 of the Data Protection Act 2018 commenced. This provided (and provides)

There is to continue to be an Information Commissioner.

However, paragraph 44 of schedule 19 to the Data Protection Act 2018 (commenced also by effect of the Data Protection Act 2018 (Commencement No. 1 and Transitional and Saving Provisions) Regulations 2018) repealed the “FOIA purpose” provisions of section 6(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998 (which, to recall, said that “for the purposes of…the Freedom of Information Act 2000 there shall be an officer known as the Information Commissioner“). At the same time, paragraph 59 of schedule 19 to the Data Protection Act 2018 repealed section 18(1) (which had provided that “The Data Protection Commissioner shall be known instead as the Information Commissioner“).

So, the Information Commissioner is no longer described, in statute, as an officer which shall be for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

Probably nothing turns on this. Elsewhere in the Freedom of Information Act 2000 it is clear that the Information Commissioner has various functions, powers and duties, which are not removed by the repeal (and subsequent absence of) the “FOIA purpose” provisions. However, the repeal (and absence) do raise some interesting questions. If Parliament thought it right previously to say that, for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 there should have been an Information Commissioner, why does it now think it right not to? No such questions arise when it comes to the data protection laws, because section 114 and schedule 12 of the Data Protection Act 2018, and Articles 57 and 58 of the UK GDPR, clearly define the purposes (for those laws) of the Information Commissioner.

Maybe all of this rather painful crashing through the thickets of the information rights laws is just an excuse for me to build up to a punchline of “what’s the purpose of the Information Commissioner?” But I don’t think that is solely what I’m getting at: the implied uncoupling of the office from its purposes seems odd, and something that could easily have been avoided (or could easily be remedied). If I’m wrong, or am missing something – and I very much invite comment and correction – then I’ll happily withdraw/update this post.

Please note that links to statutes here on the legislation.gov.uk website are generally to versions as they were originally enacted.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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