Category Archives: Directive 95/46/EC

Schrems II – this time it’s serious

As soon as judgment came out, my Mishcon de Reya colleague Adam Rose and I recorded our initial reactions to the CJEU’s decision in Schrems II. Here’s the link to the recording. Excuse my lockdown locks.

Some takeaways

  • The EU-US Privacy Shield arrangement for transferring personal data to the US is declared invalid.
  • Parties using Standard Contractual Clauses to transfer personal data from the EEA to countries outside must not do so if, in their assessment, the recipient country doesn’t provide an adequate level of protection. There must now be serious questions as to whether any transfers to the US can be valid.
  • The Binding Corporate Rules regime used by some of the world’s biggest international groups must now also be open to challenge.
  • Data Protection Authorities (such as the ICO) must intervene to stop transfers under SCCs which are made to countries without an adequate level of protection.
  • Post-Brexit UK may be seen as an attractive place for US companies to base operations, but there may well be further legal challenges to such arrangements.

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The wheels of the Ministry of Justice

do they turn so slowly that they’ll lead to the Lord Chancellor committing a criminal offence?

On 21 December last year, as we were all sweeping up the mince piece crumbs, removing our party hats and switching off the office lights for another year, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) published, with no accompanying publicity whatsoever, an enforcement notice served on the Secretary of State for Justice. The notice drew attention to the fact that in July 2017 the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) had had a backlog of 919 subject access requests from individuals, some of which dated back to 2012. And by November 2017 that had barely improved – to 793 cases dating back to 2014.

I intended to blog about this at the time, but it’s taken me around nine months to retrieve my chin from the floor, such was the force with which it dropped.

Because we should remember that the exercise of the right of subject access is a fundamental aspect of the fundamental right to protection of personal data. Requesting access to one’s data enables one to be aware of, and verify the lawfulness of, the processing. Don’t take my word for it – look at recital 41 of the-then applicable European data protection directive, and recital 63 of the now-applicable General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

And bear in mind that the nature of the MoJ’s work means it often receives subject access requests from prisoners, or others who are going through or have been through the criminal justice system. I imagine that a good many of these horrendously delayed requests were from people with a genuinely-held concern, or grievance, and not just from irritants like me who are interested in data controllers’ compliance.

The notice required MoJ to comply with all the outstanding requests by 31 October 2018. Now, you might raise an eyebrow at the fact that this gave the MoJ an extra eight months to respond to requests which were already incredibly late and which should have been responded to within forty days, but what’s an extra 284 days when things have slipped a little? (*Pseuds’ corner alert* It reminds me of Larkin’s line in The Whitsun Weddings about being so late that he feels: “all sense of being in a hurry gone”).

Maybe one reason the ICO gave MoJ so long to sort things out is that enforcement notices are serious things – a failure to comply is, after all, a criminal offence punishable on indictment by an unlimited fine. So one notes with interest a recent response to a freedom of information request for the regular updates which the notice also required MoJ to provide.

This reveals that by July this year MoJ had whittled down those 793 delayed cases to 285, with none dating back further than 2016. But I’m not going to start hanging out the bunting just yet, because a) more recent cases might well be more complex (because the issues behind them will be likely to be more current, and therefore potentially more complex, and b) because they don’t flaming well deserve any bunting because this was, and remains one of the most egregious and serious compliance failures it’s been my displeasure to have seen.

And what if they don’t clear them all by 31 October? The notice gives no leeway, no get-out – if any of those requests extant at November last year remains unanswered by November this year, the Right Honourable David Gauke MP (the current incumbent of the position of Secretary of State for Justice) will, it appears, have committed a criminal offence.

Will he be prosecuted?

The views in this post (and indeed all posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Filed under access to information, Data Protection, Directive 95/46/EC, GDPR, human rights, Information Commissioner, Ministry of Justice, Uncategorized

Making criminals of us all

The Information Commissioner thinks that countless households operating CCTV systems need to register this, and pay a £35 fee for doing so. If they don’t, they might be committing a crime. The Commissioner is probably mostly correct, but it’s a bit more complex than that, for reasons I’ll explain in this post.

Back in 2014, to the surprise of no one who had thought about the issues, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that use of domestic CCTV to capture footage of identifiable individuals in public areas could not attract the exemption at Article 3(2) of the European data protection directive for processing of personal data

by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity

Any use of CCTV, said the CJEU, for the protection of a house or its occupiers but which also captures people in a public space is thus subject to the remaining provisions of the directive:

the operation of a camera system, as a result of which a video recording of people is stored on a continuous recording device such as a hard disk drive, installed by an individual on his family home for the purposes of protecting the property, health and life of the home owners, but which also monitors a public space, does not amount to the processing of data in the course of a purely personal or household activity, for the purposes of that provision

As some commentators pointed out at the time, the effect of this ruling was potentially to place not just users of domestic CCTV systems under the ambit of data protection law, but also, say, car drivers using dashcams, cyclists using helmetcams, and many other people using image recording devices in public for anything but their own domestic purposes.

Under the directive, and the UK Data Protection Act 1998, any data controller processing personal data without an exemption (such as the one for purely personal or household activity) must register the fact with the relevant supervisory authority, which in the UK is the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). Failure to register in circumstances under which a data controller should register is a criminal offence punishable by a fine. There is a two-tier fee for making an entry in the ICO’s register, set at £35 for most data controllers, and £500 for larger ones.

For some time the ICO has advised corporate data controllers that if they use CCTV on their premises they will need to register:


But I recently noticed that the registration page itself had changed, and that there is now a separate button to register “household CCTV”


If one clicks that button one is taken to a page which informs that, indeed, a £35 fee is payable, and that the information provided will be published online 


There is a link to the ICO’s overarching privacy notice [ed. you’re going to have to tighten that up for GDPR, guys] but the only part of that notice which talks about the registration process relates only to “businesses”


Continuing the household CCTV registration process, one then gets to the main screen, which requires that the responsible person in the household identify themselves as data controller, and give either their household or email address for publication


What this all means is that it is the ICO’s apparent view that if you use CCTV in your household and capture footage outside the boundaries of your property, you are required to register this fact publicly with them, and pay a £35 fee. The clear implication, in fact the clear corollary, is that failure to do so is a criminal offence.

(In passing, there is a problem here: the pages and the process miss the point that for the registration to be required, the footage needs to be capturing images of identifiable individuals, otherwise no personal data is being processed, and data protection law is simply not engaged. What if someone has installed a “nest cam” in a nearby wooded area? Is ICO saying they are committing a criminal offence if they fail to register this? Also, what if the footage does capture identifiable individuals outside the boundaries of a household, but the footage is only taken for household, rather than crime reduction purposes? The logical conclusion of the ICO pages here is that anyone who takes video footage anywhere outside their home must register, which contradicts their guidance elsewhere.)

What I find particularly surprising about all this is that, although fundamentally it is correct as a matter of law (following the Ryneš decision by the CJEU), I have seen no publicity from the ICO about this pretty enormous policy change. Imagine how many households potentially *should* register, and how many won’t? And, therefore, how many the ICO is implying are committing a criminal offence?

And one thing that is really puzzling me is why this change, now? The CJEU ruling was thirty months ago, and in another eleven months, European data protection law will change, removing – in the UK also – the requirement to register in these circumstances. If it was so important for the ICO to effect these changes before then, why keep it quiet?

The views in this post (and indeed all posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Why what Which did wears my patience thin

Pre-ticked consent boxes and unsolicited emails from the Consumers’ Association

Which?, the brand name of the Consumers’ Association, publishes a monthly magazine. In an era of social media, and online reviews, its mix of consumer news and product ratings might seem rather old-fashioned, but it is still (according to its own figures1) Britain’s best-selling monthly magazine. Its rigidly paywalled website means that one must generally subscribe to get at the magazine’s contents. That’s fair enough (although after my grandmother died several years ago, we found piles of unread, unopened even, copies of Which? She had apparently signed up to a regular Direct Debit payment, probably to receive a “free gift”, and had never cancelled it: so one might draw one’s own conclusion about how many of Which?’s readers are regular subscribers for similar reasons).

In line with its general “locked-down” approach, Which?’s recent report into the sale of personal data was, except for snippets, not easy to access, but it got a fair bit of media coverage. Intrigued, I bit: I subscribed to the magazine. This post is not about the report, however, although the contents of the report drive the irony of what happened next.

As I went through the online sign-up process, I arrived at that familiar type of page where the subject of future marketing is broached. Which? had headlined their report “How your data could end up in the hands of scammers” so it struck me as amusing, but also irritating, that the marketing options section of the sign-in process came with a pre-ticked box:

img_0770

As guidance from the Information Commissioner’s Office makes clear, pre-ticked boxes are not a good way to get consent from someone to future marketing:

Some organisations provide pre-ticked opt-in boxes, and rely on the user to untick it if they don’t want to consent. In effect, this is more like an opt-out box, as it assumes consent unless the user clicks the box. A pre-ticked box will not automatically be enough to demonstrate consent, as it will be harder to show that the presence of the tick represents a positive, informed choice by the user.

The Article 29 Working Party goes further, saying in its opinion on unsolicited communications for marketing purposes that inferring consent to marketing from the use of pre-ticked boxes is not compatible with the data protection directive. By extension, therefore, any marketing subsequently sent on the basis of a pre-ticked box will be a contravention of the data protection directive (and, in the UK, the Data Protection Act 1998) and the ePrivacy directive (in the UK, the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (PECR)).

Nothwithstanding this, I certainly did not want to consent to receive subsequent marketing, so, as well as making a smart-arse tweet, I unticked the box. However, to my consternation, if not my huge surprise, I have subsequently received several marketing emails from Which? They do not have my consent to send these, so they are manifestly in contravention of regulation 22 of PECR.

It’s not clear how this has happened. Could it be a deliberate tactic by Which?  to ignore subscribers’ wishes? One presumes not: Which? says it “exists to make individuals as powerful as the organisations they deal with in their daily live” – deliberately ignoring clear expressions regarding consent would hardly sit well with that mission statement. So is it a general website glitch – which means that those expressions are lost in the sign-up process? If so, how many individuals are affected? Or is it just a one-off glitch, affecting only me?

Let’s hope it’s the last. Because the ignoring or overriding of expressions of consent, and the use of pre-ticked boxes for gathering consent, are some of the key things which fuel trade in and disrespect for personal data. The fact that I’ve experience this issue with a charity which exists to represent consumers, as a result of my wish to read their report into misuse of personal data, is shoddy, to say the least.

I approached Which? for a comment, and a spokesman said:

We have noted all of your comments relating to new Which? members signing up, including correspondence received after sign-up, and we are considering these in relation to our process.

I appreciate the response, although I’m not sure it really addresses my concerns.

1Which? Annual Report 2015/2016

The views in this post (and indeed all posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Any Safe Harbor in a storm…?

The ICO has contacted me to say that it actually selected SnapSurveys because they offered clients the option of hosting survey response on UK servers, and it has checked with SnapSurveys that this remains the case. I’ve been pointed me to http://www.snapsurveys.com/survey-software/security-accessibility-and-professional-outline/ which confirms this point.

So the answer to my question

Is the ICO making unlawful transfers of personal data to the US?

I’m pleased to confirm, appears to be “no”.

Earlier this week the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) published a blogpost by Deputy Commissioner David Smith, entitled The US Safe Harbor – breached but perhaps not destroyed!

“Don’t panic” says David to those data controllers who are currently relying on Safe Harbor as a means of ensuring that personal data transferred by them to the United States has adequate protection (in line with the requirements of Article 25 of the European Data Protection Directive, and the eighth principle of schedule one of the UK’s Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA)). He is referring, of course, to the recent decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Schrems. which Data controllers should, he says, “take stock” and “make their own minds up”:

businesses in the UK don’t have to rely on Commission decisions on adequacy. Although you won’t get the same degree of legal certainty, UK law allows you to rely on your own adequacy assessment. Our guidance tells you how to go about doing this.  Much depend [sic] here on the nature of the data that you are transferring and who you are transferring it to but the big question is can you reduce the risks to the personal data, or rather the individuals whose personal data it is, to a level where the data are adequately protected after transfer? The Safe Harbor can still play a role here.

Smith also refers to a recent statement by the Article 29 Working Party – the grouping of representatives of the various European data protection authorities, of which he is a member – and refers to “the substance of the statement being measured, albeit expressed strongly”. What he doesn’t say is how unequivocal it is in saying that

transfers that are still taking place under the Safe Harbour decision after the CJEU judgment are unlawful

And this is particularly interesting because, as I discovered today, the ICO itself appears (still) to be making transfers under Safe Harbor. I reported a nuisance call using its online tool (in doing so I included some sensitive personal data about a family member) and noticed that the tool was operated by SnapSurveys. The ICO’s own website privacy notice says

We collect information volunteered by members of the public about nuisance calls and texts using an online reporting tool hosted by Snap Surveys. This company is a data processor for the ICO and only processes personal information in line with our instructions.

while SnapSurveys’ privacy policy explains that

Snap Surveys NH, Inc. complies with the U.S. – E.U. Safe Harbor framework

This does not unambiguously say that SnapSurveys are transferring the personal data of those submitting reports to the ICO to the US under Safe Harbor – it is possible that the ICO has set up some bespoke arrangement with its processor, under which they process that specific ICO data within the European Economic Area – but it strongly suggests it.

It is understandable that a certain amount of regulatory leeway and leniency be offered to data controllers who have relied on Safe Harbor until now – to that extent I agree with the light-touch approach of the ICO. But if it is really the case that peoples’ personal data are actually being transferred by the regulator to the US, three weeks after the European Commission decision of 2000 that Safe Harbor provided adequate protection was struck down, serious issues arise. I will be asking the ICO for confirmation about this, and whether, if it is indeed making these transfers, it has undertaken its own adequacy assessment.

The views in this post (and indeed all posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

 

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Anti-EU campaign database – in contravention of data protection laws?

The politics.co.uk site reports that an anti-EU umbrella campaign called Leave.EU (or is it theknow.eu?) has been written to by the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) after allegedly sending unsolicited emails to people who appear to have been “signed up” by friends or family. The campaign’s bank-roller, UKIP donor Aaron Banks, reportedly said

We have 70,000 people registered and people have been asked to supply 10 emails of friends or family to build out (sic) database

Emails sent to those signed up in this way are highly likely to have been sent in breach of the campaign’s obligations under the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (PECR), and the ICO is reported to have to written to the campaign to

inform them of their obligations under the PECR and to ask them to suppress [the recipient’s] email address from their databases

But is this really the main concern here? Or, rather, should we (and the ICO) be asking what on earth is a political campaign doing building a huge database of people, and identifying them as (potential) supporters without their knowledge? Such concerns go to the very heart of modern privacy and data protection law.

Data protection law’s genesis lie, in part, in the desire, post-war, of European nations to ensure “a foundation of justice and peace in the world”, as the preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights states. The first recital to the European Community Data Protection Directive of 1995 makes clear that the importance of those fundamental rights to data protection law.

The Directive is, of course, given domestic effect by the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA). Section 2 of the same states that information as to someone’s political beliefs is her personal data: I would submit that presence on a database purporting to show that someone supports the UK”s withdrawal from the European Union is also her personal data. Placing someone on that database, without her knowledge or ability to object, will be manifestly “unfair” when it comes to compliance with the first data protection principle. It may also be inaccurate, when it comes to compliance with the fourth principle.

I would urge the ICO to look much more closely at this – the compiling of (query inaccurate) of secret databases of people’s political opinions has very scary antecedents.

The views in this post (and indeed all posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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No Information Rights Levy for ICO – where now for funding?

The ICO’s plan for an “information rights levy” appears to have been scuppered by the government. But is retaining data protection notification fees the way to solve the funding problem?

Back in the heady days of January 2012, when a naive but optimistic European Commission proposed a General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), to replace the existing 1995 Directive, one of the less-commented-on proposals was to remove the requirement for data controllers to notify their processing activities to the national data protection authority. However, the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) certainly noticed it, because the implications were that, at a stroke, a large amount of ICO funding would disappear. Currently, section 18(5) of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA), and accompanying secondary legislation, mean that data controllers (unless they have an exemption) must pay an annual fee to the ICO of either £35 or £500 (depending upon the size of the organisation). In 2012-2013 this equated to an estimated income of £17.4m, and this income effectively funds all of the ICO’s data protection regulatory actions (its FOI functions are funded by grant-in-aid from the Ministry of Justice).

Three years later, and the GDPR is still not with us. However, it will eventually be passed, and when it is, it seems certain that the requirement under European law to notify will be gone. Because of this, as the Justice Committee recognised in 2013, alternative ICO funding means need to be identified as soon as possible. The ICO’s preferred choice, and one which Christopher Graham has certainly been pushing for, was an “Information Rights Levy”, the details of which were not specified, but which it appears was proposed to be paid by data controllers and public authorities (subject to FOI) alike. In the 2013/14 ICO Annual Report Graham was bullish in calling for action:

Parliament needs to get on with the task of establishing a single, graduated information rights levy to fund the important work of the ICO as the effective upholder of our vital right to privacy and right to know

But this robust approach doesn’t seem to have worked. At a recent meeting of the ICO Management Board a much more pessimistic view emerges. In a report entitled “Registration Fee Strategy” it is said that

The ICO has previously highlighted the need for an ‘information rights fee’ or one fee, paid by organisations directly to the ICO, to fund all information rights activities. Given concerns across government that this would result in private sector cross subsidising public sector work, the ICO recognises that this is unlikely in the short term

The report goes on, therefore, to talk about proposed changes to the current fee/notification process, and about ways of identifying who needs to pay. 

But, oddly, it seems to assume that although the GDPR will remove the requirement for a data controller  to notify processing to the ICO, the UK will retain the discretion to continue with such arrangements (and to charge a fee). I’m not sure this is right. As I’ve written previously, under data protection law at least some recreational bloggers have a requirement to notify (and pay a fee), and the legal authorities are clear that the law’s ambit extends to, for instance, individuals operating domestic CCTV, if that CCTV covers public places where identifiable individuals are. Indeed, as the 2004 Lindqvist case found 

The act of referring, on an internet page, to various persons and identifying them by name or by other means, for instance by giving their telephone number…constitutes ‘the processing of personal data…[and] is not covered by any of the exceptionsin Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46 [section 36 of the DPA transposes Article 3(2) into domestic law]

It is arguable that, to varying extents, we are all data controllers now (and ones who will struggle to avail ourselves of the data protection exemption for domestic purposes). Levying a fee on all of us, in order that we can lawfully express ourselves, has the potential to be a serious infringement of our right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and even more directly, Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

The problem of how to effectively fund the ICO in a time of austerity is a challenging one, and I don’t envy those at the ICO and in government who are trying to solve it, but levying a tax on freedom of expression (which notification arguably already is, and would almost certainly be if the GDPR doesn’t actually require notification) is not the way to do so.

The views in this post (and indeed all posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with..

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Vidal-Hall v Google, and the rise of data protection ambulance-chasing

Everyone knows the concept of ambulance chasers – personal injury lawyers who seek out victims of accidents or negligence to help/persuade the latter to make compensation claims. With today’s judgment in the Court of Appeal in the case of Vidal-Hall & Ors v Google [2015] EWCA Civ 311 one wonders if we will start to see data protection ambulance chasers, arriving at the scene of serious “data breaches” with their business cards.

This is because the Court has made a definitive ruling on the issue, discussed several times previously on this blog, of whether compensation can be claimed under the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) in circumstances where a data subject has suffered distress but no tangible, pecuniary damage. Section 13 of the DPA provides that

(1)An individual who suffers damage by reason of any contravention by a data controller of any of the requirements of this Act is entitled to compensation from the data controller for that damage.

(2)An individual who suffers distress by reason of any contravention by a data controller of any of the requirements of this Act is entitled to compensation from the data controller for that distress if—

(a)the individual also suffers damage by reason of the contravention

This differs from the wording of the European Data Protection Directive 95/46/ec, which, at Article 23(1) says

Member States shall provide that any person who has suffered damage as a result of an unlawful processing operation or of any act incompatible with the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive is entitled to receive compensation from the controller for the damage suffered

It can be seen that, in the domestic statutory scheme “distress” is distinct from “damage”, but in the Directive, there is just a single category of “damage”. The position until relatively recently, following Johnson v Medical Defence Union [2007] EWCA Civ 262, had been that it meant pecuniary damage, and this in turn meant, as Buxton LJ said in that case, that “section 13 distress damages are only available if damage in the sense of pecuniary loss has been suffered”. So, absent pecuniary damage, no compensation for distress was available (except in certain specific circumstances involving processing of personal data for journalistic, literary or artistic purposes). But, this, said Lord Dyson and Lady Justice Sharp, in a joint judgment, was wrong, and, in any case, they were not bound by Johnson because the relevant remarks in that case were in fact obiter.  In fact, they said, section 13(2) DPA was incompatible with Article 23 of the Directive:

What is required in order to make section 13(2) compatible with EU law is the disapplication of section 13(2), no more and no less. The consequence of this would be that compensation would be recoverable under section 13(1) for any damage suffered as a result of a contravention by a data controller of any of the requirements of the DPA

As Christopher Knight says, in a characteristically fine and exuberant piece on the Panopticon blog, “And thus, section 13(2) was no more”.

And this means a few things. It certainly means that it will be much easier for an aggrieved data subject to bring a claim for compensation against a data controller which has contravened its obligations under the DPA in circumstances where there is little, or no, tangible or pecuniary damage, but only distress. It also means that we may well start to see the rise of data protection ambulance chasers – the DPA may not give rise to massive settlements, but it is a relatively easy claim to make – a contravention is often effectively a matter of fact, or is found to be such by the Information Commissioner, or is conceded/admitted by the data controller – and there is the prospect of group litigation (in 2013 Islington Council settled claims brought jointly by fourteen claimants following disclosure of their personal data to unauthorised third parties – the settlement totalled £43,000).

I mentioned in that last paragraph that data controller sometimes concede or admit to contraventions of their obligations under the DPA. Indeed, they are expected to by the Information Commissioner, and the draft European General Data Protection Regulation proposes to make it mandatory to do so, and to inform data subjects. And this is where I wonder if we might see another effect of the Vidal-Hall case – if data controller know that by owning up to contraventions they may be exposing themselves to multiple legal claims for distress compensation, they (or their shareholders, or insurers) may start to question why they should do this. Breach notification may be seen as even more of a risky exercise than it is now.

There are other interesting aspects to the Vidal-Hall case – misuse of private information is, indeed, a tort, allowing service of the claims against Google outside jurisdiction, and there are profound issues regarding the definition of personal data which are undecided and, if they go to trial, will be extremely important – but the disapplying of section 13(2) DPA looks likely to have profound effects for data controllers, for data subjects, for lawyers and for the landscape of data protection litigation in this country.

The views in this post (and indeed all posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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A data protection justice gap?

On the 4th March the Supreme Court handed down judgment in the conjoined cases of Catt and T v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis ([2015] UKSC 9). Almost unanimously (there was one dissenting opinion in Catt) the appeals by the Met were allowed. In brief, the judgments held that the retention of historical criminal conviction data was proportionate. But what I thought was particularly interesting was the suggestion (at paragraph 45) by Lord Sumption (described to me recently as “by far the cleverest man in England”) that T‘s claim at least had been unnecessary:

[this] was a straightforward dispute about retention which could have been more appropriately resolved by applying to the Information Commissioner. As it is, the parties have gone through three levels of judicial decision, at a cost out of all proportion to the questions at stake

and as this blog post suggests, there was certainly a hint that costs might flow in future towards those who choose to litigate rather than apply to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO).

But I think there’s a potential justice gap here. Last year the ICO consulted on changing how it handled concerns from data subjects about handling of their personal data. During the consultation period Dr David Erdos wrote a guest post for this blog, arguing that

The ICO’s suggested approach is hugely problematic from a rule of law point of view. Section 42 of the Data Protection Act [DPA] is crystal clear that “any person who is, or believes himself to be, directly affect by any processing of personal data” may make a request for assessment to the ICO “as to whether it is likely or unlikely that the processing has been or is being carried out in compliance with the provisions” of the Act. On receiving such a request the Commissioner “shall make an assessment” (s. 42 (1)) (emphasis added). This duty is an absolute one

but the ICO’s response to the consultation suggested that

We are…planning to make much greater use of the discretion afforded to us under section 42 of the legislation…so long as a data controller has provided an individual with a clear explanation of their processing of personal information, they are unlikely to need to describe their actions again to us if the matter in question does not appear to us to represent a serious issue or we don’t believe there is an opportunity for the data controller to improve their information rights practice

which is problematic, as section 42 confers a discretion on the ICO only as to the manner in which an assessment shall be made. Section 42(3) describes some matters to which he may have regard in determining the manner, and these include (so are not exhaustive) “the extent to which the request appears to him to raise a matter of substance”. I don’t think “a matter of substance” gets close to being the same as “a serious issue”: a matter can surely be non-serious yet still of substance. So if the discretion afforded to the ICO under section 42 as to the manner of the assessment includes a discretion to rely solely on prior correspondence between the data controller and the data subject, this is not specified in (and can only be inferred from) section 42.

Moreover, and interestingly, Article 28(4) of the European Data Protection Directive, which is transposed in section 42 DPA, confers no such discretion as to the manner of assessment, and this may well have been one of the reasons the European Commission began protracted infraction proceedings against the UK (see Chris Pounder blog posts passim).

Nonetheless, the outcome of the ICO consultation was indeed a new procedure for dealing with data subjects’ concerns. Their website now says

Should I raise my concern with the ICO?

If the organisation has been unable, or unwilling, to resolve your information rights concern, you can raise the matter with us.  We will use the information you have provided, including the organisation’s response to your concerns, to decide if your concern provides an opportunity to improve information rights practice.

If we think it does provide that opportunity, we will take appropriate action

“Improving information rights practice” refers to the ICO’s general duties under section 51 DPA, but what is notable by its absence there, though, is any statement that the ICO’s general duty, under section 42, to make an assessment as to whether it is likely or unlikely that the processing has been or is being carried out in compliance with the provisions of the DPA.

Lord Sumption in Catt (at 34) also said that “Mr Catt could have complained about the retention of his personal data to the Information Commissioner”. This is true, but would the ICO have actually done anything? Would it have represented a “serious issue”? Possibly not  – Lord Sumption describes the background to Mrs T’s complaints as a “minor incident” and the retention of her data as a “straightforward dispute”. But if there are hints from the highest court of the land that bringing judicial review proceedings on data protection matters might results in adverse costs, because a complaint to the ICO is available, and if the ICO, however, shows reluctance to consider complaints and concerns from aggrieved data subjects, is there an issue with access to data protection justice? Is there a privacy justice gap?

The views in this post (and indeed all posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Filed under Data Protection, Directive 95/46/EC, Information Commissioner

Are we all journalists?

The ICO has said that Global Witness can claim the data protection exemption for journalism, regarding their investigations in BSGR. This fascinating case continues to raise difficult and important questions.

Data protection law rightly gives strong protection to journalism; this is something that the 2012 Leveson inquiry dealt with in considerable detail, but, as the inquiry’s terms of reference were expressly concerned with “the press”, with “commercial journalism”, it didn’t really grapple with the rather profound question of “what is journalism?” But the question does need to be asked, because in the balancing exercise between privacy and freedom of expression too much weight afforded to one side can result in detriment to the other. If personal privacy is given too much weight, freedom of expression is weakened, but equally if “journalism” is construed too widely, and the protection afforded to journalism is consequently too wide, then privacy rights of individuals will suffer.

In 2008 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) was asked, in the Satamedia case, to consider the extent of the exemption from a large part of data protection law for processing of personal data for “journalistic” purposes. Article 9 of the European Data Protection Directive (the Directive) provides that

Member States shall provide for exemptions or derogations…for the processing of personal data carried out solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary expression only if they are necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing freedom of expression.

and recital 37 says

Whereas the processing of personal data for purposes of journalism or for purposes of literary of artistic expression, in particular in the audiovisual field, should qualify for exemption from the requirements of certain provisions of this Directive in so far as this is necessary to reconcile the fundamental rights of individuals with freedom of information and notably the right to receive and impart information

In Satamedia one of the questions the CJEU was asked to consider was whether the publishing of public-domain taxpayer data by two Swedish companies could be “regarded as the processing of personal data carried out solely for journalistic purposes within the meaning of Article 9 of the directive”. To this, the Court replied “yes”

Article 9 of Directive 95/46 is to be interpreted as meaning that the activities [in question], must be considered as activities involving the processing of personal data carried out ‘solely for journalistic purposes’, within the meaning of that provision, if the sole object of those activities is the disclosure to the public of information, opinions or ideas [emphasis added]

One can see that, to the extent that Article 9 is transposed effectively in domestic legislation, it affords significant and potentially wide protection for “journalism”. In the UK it is transposed as section 32 of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA). This provides that

Personal data which are processed only for the special purposes are exempt from any provision to which this subsection relates if—

(a)the processing is undertaken with a view to the publication by any person of any journalistic, literary or artistic material,

(b)the data controller reasonably believes that, having regard in particular to the special importance of the public interest in freedom of expression, publication would be in the public interest, and

(c)the data controller reasonably believes that, in all the circumstances, compliance with that provision is incompatible with the special purposes.

where “the special purposes” are one or more of “the purposes of journalism”, “artistic purposes”, and “literary purposes”. Section 32 DPA exempts data processed for the special purposes from all of the data protection principles (save the 7th, data security, principle) and, importantly from provisions of sections 7 and 10. Section 7 is the “subject access” provision, and normally requires a data controller, upon receipt of written request by an individual, to inform them if their personal data is being processed, and, if it is, to give the particulars and to “communicate” the data to the individual. Section 10 broadly allows a data subject to object to processing which is likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress, and to require the data to controller to cease (or not begin) processing (and the data controller must either comply or state reasons why it will not). Personal data processed for the special purposes are, therefore, exempt from subject access and from the right to prevent processing likely to cause damage or distress. It is not difficult to see why – if the subject of, say, investigative journalism, could find out what a journalist was doing, and prevent her from doing it, freedom of expression would be inordinately harmed.

The issue of the extent of the journalistic data protection exemption came into sharp focus towards the end of last year, when Benny Steinmetz and three other claimants employed by or associated with mining and minerals group Benny Steinmetz Group Resources (BSGR) brought proceedings in the High Court under the DPA seeking orders that would require campaigning group Global Witness to comply with subject access requests by the claimants, and to cease processing their data. The BSGR claimants had previously asked the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), pursuant to the latter’s duties under section 42 DPA, to assess the likelihood of the lawfulness of Global Witness’s processing, and the ICO had determined that it was unlikely that Global Witness were complying with their obligations under the DPA.

However, under section 32(4) DPA, if, in any relevant proceedings, the data controller claims (or it appears to the court) that the processing in question was for the special purposes and with a view to publication, the court must stay the proceedings in order for the ICO to consider whether to make a specific “special purposes” determination by the ICO. Such a determination would be (under section 45 DPA) that the processing was not for the special purposes nor was it with a view to publication, and it would result in a “special information notice”. Such a stay was applied to the BSGR proceedings and, on 15 December, after some considerable wait, the ICO conveyed to the parties that it was “satisfied that Global Witness is only processing the personal data requested … for the purposes of journalism”. Accordingly, no special information notice was served, and the proceedings remain stayed. Although media reports (e.g. Guardian and Financial Times) talk of appeals and tribunals, no direct appeal right exists for a data subject in these circumstances, so, if as seems likely, BSGR want to revive the proceedings, they will presumably either have to apply to have the stay lifted or/and issue judicial review proceedings against the ICO.

The case remains fascinating. It is easy to applaud a decision in which a plucky environmental campaign group claims journalistic data protection exemption regarding its investigations of a huge mining group. But would people be so quick to support, say, a fascist group which decided to investigate and publish private information about anti-fascist campaigners? Could that group also gain data protection exemption claiming that the sole object of their processing was the disclosure to the public of information, opinions or ideas? Global Witness say that

The ruling confirms that the Section 32 exemption for journalism in the Data Protection Act applies to anyone engaged in public-interest reporting, not just the conventional media

but it is not immediately clear from where they import the “public-interest” aspect – this does not appear, at least not in explicit terms, in either the Directive or the DPA. It is possible that it can be inferred, when one considers that processing for special purposes which is not in the public interest might constitute an interference with respect for data subjects’ fundamental rights and freedoms (per recital 2 of the Directive). And, of course, with talk about public interest journalism, we walk straight back into the arguments provoked by the Leveson inquiry.

Furthermore, one notes that the Directive talks about exemption for processing of personal data carried out solely for journalistic purposes, and the DPA says “personal data which are processed only for the special purposes are exempt…”. This was why I emphasised the words in the Satamedia judgment quoted above, which talks similarly of the exemption applying if the “sole object of those activities is the disclosure to the public of information, opinions or ideas”. One might ask whether a campaigning group’s sole or only purpose for processing personal data is for journalism. Might they not, in processing the data, be trying to achieve further ends? Might, in fact, one say that the people who engage solely in the disclosure to public of information, opinions or ideas are in fact those we more traditionally think of in these terms…the press, the commercial journalists?

P.S. Global Witness have uploaded a copy of the ICO’s decision letter. This clarifies that the latter was satisfied that the former was processing for the special purposes because it was part of “campaigning journalism” even though the proposed future publication of the information “forms part of a wider campaign to promote a particular cause”. This chimes with the ICO’s data protection guidance for the media, but it will be interesting if it is challenged on the basis that it doesn’t support a view that the processing is “only” or “solely” for the special purposes.

The views in this post (and indeed all posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Filed under Data Protection, Directive 95/46/EC, Information Commissioner, journalism, Leveson