For reasons I found myself browsing the privacy notices on the websites of some data protection consultancies this morning. In a large number of cases, where they address the situation of a potential client (which is highly likely to be a corporate entity) instructing them, they say/imply that they will process the personal data of people working for that potential client under the lawful basis of “contract”.
As well as this being, er, wrong, it concerns me for a couple of reasons.
First, why it’s wrong.
Article 5(1)(a) of the UK GDPR obliges a controller to process personal data lawfully. Article 6(1) provides a list of bases of which at least one must be met for processing to be lawful. The basis at Article 6(1)(b) is “processing is necessary for the performance of a contract…”.
I fear that many people stop there (in fact, I fear more that they don’t look at the actual law, and merely refer to some template or notes that were wrong in the first place). But there’s a reason I put an ellipsis: the full lawful basis is “processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract”.
A service contract with a corporate entity does not constitute the sort of contract which is dealt with by Article 6(1)(b).
The reason this really concerns me is that if these consultancies can’t get this fundamental point right in their own documentation, they are presumably advising clients along similar lines.
Such advice might well be negligent. Assuming the consultancies have professional indemnity insurance, it might be affected by matters like this. And there might be notification obligations arising if they become aware of the fact that they’ve given incorrect, and possibly negligent, advice.
The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.
During every recent general election campaign I can remember, there have been social media posts where people complain that they’ve received campaign material sent to them, by name, in the post. Electoral law (whether one likes it or not) permits a candidate to send, free of charge, one such item of post regardless of whether the recipient has objected to postal marketing, in general or specific terms. This right is contained in section 91 of The Representation of the People Act 1983. So, if you don’t like it, lobby your new MP in a few weeks’ time to get it changed.
What the guidance does not address, however, is a conflict of laws point. Article 21(2-3) of the UK GDPR create an absolute right to object to direct marketing and a consequent absolute obligation on a person not to process personal data for direct marketing purposes upon receipt of an objection. So how does this talk with the right given to electoral candidates to send one such communication?
Tim Turner has written on this point, in his “DPO Daily”, and says “I don’t think the Representation of the People Act trumps the DP opt-out right”, but – on this rare occasion – I think I disagree with him. This is because section 3(1) of the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023 provides that retained direct EU legislation – such as the UK GDPR – must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with all domestic enactments, and, insofar as it is incompatible with them, those domestic enactments prevail.
So, the short answer to the title of this blog is “no” (although they can only send you just one personally addressed item).
The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.
A very significant subject access judgment has been handed down in the High Court. Key rulings have been made to the effect that 1) requesters are entitled, in principle, to be informed of the identities of the recipients of their personal data (not just the categories of recipient), and 2) the subject access regime has a “specific and limited purpose, which is to enable a person to check whether a data controller’s processing of his or her personal data unlawfully infringes privacy rights and, if so, to take such steps as the data protection law provides.
The underlying details of the case are interesting and alarming in themselves. A director of a gardening company (Mr Cameron) had covertly recorded threatening calls made by a wealthy homeowner working in the property investment industry (Mr Harrison) with whom the company was coming into dispute, and subsequently circulated the recordings to a limited number of unnamed family members and others.
The recordings found their way to a wider circle of people, including some of Mr Harrison’s peers and competitors in the property investment sector. Mr Harrison contended that the circulation of the recordings had caused his own company to lose out on a significant property acquisition. Accordingly, he made subject access requests, under Article 15 of the UK GDPR both to and Cameron and to Mr Cameron’s company (“ACL”). Those requests were rejected on the grounds that i) Mr Cameron, when circulating the recordings, was processing Mr Harrison’s personal data in a “purely personal and household” context, and so the processing was out of scope of the UK GDPR, ii) Mr Cameron was not personally a controller under the UK GDPR, iii) ACL could rely on the exemption to disclosure where it would involve disclosing information relating to another individual who did not consent to disclosure, and where – in the absence of such consent – it was not reasonable in the circumstances to disclose (see Article 15(4) UK GDPR and paragraph 16 of Schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act 2018).
In a lengthy judgment (dealing mostly with the facts and evidence) Mrs Justice Steyn held that Mr Cameron’s processing was not for purely personal and household reasons: he was clearly acting as a director of ACL in making the recordings and circulating them. However, she agreed that he was not a controller – he was acting in his capacity as a director, and – following Ittihadieh and In re Southern Pacific Loans – a director processing data in the course of their duties for their company is not a controller; the company is.
A crucial part of the judgment, in terms of wider relevance, is on the interpretation of Article 15(1)(c) of the UK GDPR. This provides that a data subject should be given information on “the recipients or categories of recipient” to whom personal data have been or will be disclosed. Many practitioners, and lawyers, have taken this be an option available to the controller (i.e. the controller can decide whether to provide information on the specific recipient or just on categories thereof). Not so, said Steyn J, agreeing with the CJEU in the Austrian Post case (which, as a post-Brexit case, wasn’t binding on her, but to which she could have regard, so far as it was relevant to the issues (see section 6(2) of the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018)): the choice lies with the data subject, and, if the data subject chooses to receive information on individual recipients, he or she is entitled, in principle, to that information (unless it would be impossible or manifestly excessive to do so).
Notwithstanding this, Mr Harrison was not entitled in this case to have the identities. Mr Harrison had previously sent subject access requests individually to at least 23 employees of ACL and ACL, and he had an intention to pursue further legal options other than under the UK GDPR, if he was to identify potential claimants. ACL believed that disclosing identities of recipients of the recordings would put them at “significant risk of being the object of intimidating, harassing and hostile legal correspondence and litigation”. The judge agreed that it was “not unreasonable for the Defendants to give significant weight to [Mr Harrison’s] sustained and menacing behaviour in considering whether to protect or disclose the identities of friends, colleagues and family members”. The fact that “hostile litigation”, against the third parties to whom the recordings were disclosed, was being contemplated was a relevant factor to take into account when balancing their interests with Mr Harrison’s access rights, under paragraph 16 of Schedule 2. The judge held that
[Although there] is no general principle that the interests of the request should be treated as devalued by reason of a motive to obtain information to assist the requester in litigation…as Farbey J observed in X v Transcription Agency…the SAR regime “has a specific and limited purpose, which is to enable a person to check whether a data controller’s processing of his or her ‘personal data’ unlawfully infringes privacy rights and, if so, to take such steps as the DPA 2018 provides“…[and so] it was reasonable for the Defendants to give weight to their desire to protect family, friends and colleagues from hostile litigation going beyond the exercise of rights under the UK GDPR and the DPA 2018
So, the perennial question of the extent to which a requester’s motive is relevant when responding to a subject access request rears its head again. Steyn J’s analysis is compelling, and so it certainly appears that – at the very least when it comes to the balancing test implied by paragraph 16 of Schedule 2 – the motive is capable of being taken into account.
The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.
Three years ago, at the end of the Brexit Implementation Period, I helped prepare a version of the UK GDPR for the Mishcon de Reya website. At the time, it was difficult to find a consolidated version of the instrument, and the idea was to offer a user-friendly version showing the changes made to the retained version of the GDPR, as modified by the Data Protection, Privacy and Electronic Communications (Amendments Etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, and the Data Protection, Privacy and Electronic Communications (Amendments Etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020.
Since then, the main legislation.gov.uk has offered a version. However, with respect to that site, it’s not always the easiest to use.
The burden now, though, falls to me and Mishcon, of updating our pages as and when the UK GDPR itself gets amended. Major changes are likely to made when the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill gets enacted, but, first, we have the minor amendments (minor in number, of not in significance) effected by The Data Protection (Fundamental Rights and Freedoms) (Amendment) Regulations 2023 (which came into force at 23:59:59 on 31.12.23).
The changes have been made to Articles 1, 4, 9, 50, 85 and 86.
The Mishcon pages have been very well used, and we’ve had some great feedback on them. They don’t profess to be an authoritative version (and certainly should not be relied on as such) but we hope they’ll continue to be a useful resource.
The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has published reprimands against seven separate organisations all of whom committed serious infringements of data protection law by inadvertently disclosing highly sensitive information in the context of cases involving victims of domestic abuse.
The ICO trumpets the announcement, but does not appear to consider the point that, until recently, most, if not all, of these infringements would have resulted in a hefty fine, not a regulatory soft tap on the wrist. Nor does it contemplate the argument that precisely this sort of light-touch regulation might lead to more of these sorts of incidents, if organisations believe they can act (or fail to act) with impunity.
I think it is incumbent on the Information Commissioner, John Edwards, to answer this question: are you confident that your approach is not leading to poorer compliance?
The cases include
Four cases of organisations revealing the safe addresses of the victims to their alleged abuser. In one case a family had to be immediately moved to emergency accommodation.
Revealing identities of women seeking information about their partners to those partners.
Disclosing the home address of two adopted children to their birth father, who was in prison on three counts of raping their mother.
Sending an unredacted assessment report about children at risk of harm to their mother’s ex-partners.
The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.
There is no update. Nothing from the ICO at all, other than, at four weeks – after chasing – a message saying it’s taking six to eight weeks to allocate cases.
don’t have “reject all” on your top level [cookie banner]…are breaking the law. ..There is no excuse for that. The ICO is paying attention in this area and will absolutely issue fines if we see organizations are not taking that seriously and taking steps.
Having a ‘reject all’ button on a cookies banner that is just as prominent as an ‘accept all’ button helps people to more easily exercise their information rights. The ICO is closely monitoring how cookie banners are used in the UK and invites industry to review their cookies compliance now. If the ICO finds that cookies banners breach the law, it will seriously consider using the full range of its powers, including fines.
Then, on 9 August, in conjunction with the Competition and Markets Authority, your office stated
One clear example of often harmful design are cookie consent banners. A website’s cookie banner should make it as easy to reject non-essential cookies as it is to accept them. Users should be able to make an informed choice on whether they want to give consent for their personal information to be used, for example, to profile them for targeted advertising. The ICO will be assessing cookie banners of the most frequently used websites in the UK, and taking action where harmful design is affecting consumers.
In view of all of these statements, I wish to complain, under Article 77 UK GDPR, and simultaneously request, under regulation 32 of the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (“PECR”), that you exercise your enforcement functions, in relation to the use of cookies and similar technology by Associated Newspapers Limited, or alternatively DMG Media (whichever is applicable) as controller of, and person responsible for confidentiality of communications on, the “MailOnline” website at https://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/index.html (the “Website”).
The Website presents a visitor using the Safari browser on an iPhone 11 Pro with a “cookie banner” (see attached screenshot) which does not offer visitors a “reject all” option.
Furthermore, the whole set-up is opaque. If one clicks “Cookie Settings” one is faced with an initially straightforward set of options (one of them set by default to accept cookies for personalised advertising on the basis of “legitimate interest”, which is clearly not compliant with regulation 6 of PECR). However, if one then clicks on the tab for “Vendors”, one is faced with a frankly farcically long list of such “vendors”, and options, many of them set by default to “legitimate interest”. I consider myself reasonably knowledgeable in this area, but it is far from clear what is actually going on, other than to say it plainly appears to be falling short of compliance with regulation 6, and, to the extent my personal data is being processed, the processing plainly appears to be in contravention of the UK GDPR, for want – at least – of fairness, lawful basis and transparency.
It is worth noting that much of MailOnline’s content is likely to be of interest to and accessed by children (particularly its sports and “celebrity news” content), even if the publisher does not actively target children. You state, in your guidance
if children are likely to access your service you will need to ensure that both the information you provide and the consent mechanism you use are appropriate for children.
But the complexity and opacity of the Website’s cookie use means that it is largely incomprehensible to adults, let alone children.
It is, obviously, not for me to specify how you undertake an investigation of my complaint, but you must, of course, by reference to Article 57(1)(f) UK GDPR, investigate to the “extent appropriate”. Given the clear messages your office has delivered about cookie banners and the like, and given the weight of evidence as to non-compliance, I would suggest an investigation to the extent appropriate must – at the very least – result in a clear finding as to legality, with reasons, and recommendations for the investigated party.
I cannot claim to be distressed by the infringements I allege, but I do claim to be irritated, and to have, cumulatively, been put to excess time and effort repeatedly trying to “opt out” of receiving cookies on the Website and understand what sort of processing is being undertaken, and what sort of confidentiality of communications exists on it.
Of course the Website here is not the only example of apparent non-compliance: poor practice is rife. Arguably, it is rife because of a prolonged unwillingness by your office and your predecessors to take firm action. However, if you would like me to refer to other examples, or require any further information, please don’t hesitate to ask.
Yours sincerely
Jon Baines
The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.
I’d like you to imagine two people (Person A and Person B). Both receive an unsolicited direct marketing call to their personal mobile phone, in which the caller says the recipient’s name (e.g. “am I speaking to Jon Baines?”) Both are registered with the Telephone Preference Service. Both are aggrieved at receiving the unlawful call.
Person A knows nothing much about electronic marketing laws, and nothing much about data protection law. But, to them, quite reasonably, the call would seem to offend their data protection rights (the caller has their name, and their number). They do know that the Information Commissioner enforces the data protection laws.
Person B knows a lot about electronic marketing and data protection law. They know that the unsolicited direct marketing call was not just an infringement of the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, but also involved the processing of their personal data, thus engaging the UK GDPR.
Both decide to complain to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). Both see this page on the ICO website
They see a page for reporting Nuisance calls and messages, and, so, fill in the form on that page.
And never hear anything more.
Why? Because, as the subsequent page says “We will use the information you provide to help us investigate and take action against those responsible. We don’t respond to complaints individually” (emphasis added).
But isn’t this a problem? If Person A’s and Person B’s complaints are (as they seem to be) “hybrid” PECR and UK GDPR complaints, then Article 57(1)(f) of the latter requires the ICO to
handle complaints lodged by a data subject…and investigate, to the extent appropriate, the subject matter of the complaint and inform the complainant of the progress and the outcome of the investigation within a reasonable period (emphasis added)
What Article 57(1)(f) and the words “investigate, to the extent appropriate” mean, has been the subject of quite a bit of litigation in recent years (the basic summary of which is that the ICO has broad discretion as to how to investigate, and even a mere decision to cease handling a complaint will be likely to suffice (see Killock & Veale & others v Information Commissioner(GI/113/2021 & others)).
But nowhere has anyone suggested that ICO can simply decide not to “inform the complainant of the progress and the outcome of the investigation”, in hybrid complaints like the Person A’s and Person B’s would be.
Yet that is what undoubtedly happens in many cases. And – it strikes me – it has happened to me countless times (I have complained about many, many unsolicited calls over the years, but never heard anything of the progress and outcome). Maybe you might say that I (who, after all, have found time to think about and write this post) can’t play the innocent. But I strongly believe that there are lots of Person As (and a fair few Person Bs) who would, if they knew that – to the extent theirs is a UK GDPR complaint – the law obliges the ICO to investigate and inform them of the progress and the outcome of that investigation, rightly feel aggrieved to have heard nothing.
This isn’t just academic: unsolicited direct marketing is the one area that the ICO still sees as worthy of fines (all but two of the twenty-three fines in the last year have been under that regime). So a complaint about such a practice is potentially a serious matter. Sometimes, a single complaint about such marketing has resulted in a large fine for the miscreant, yet – to the extent that the issue is also a UK GDPR one – the complainant themselves often never hears directly about the complaint.
In addition to the Killock & Veale case, there have been a number of cases looking at the limits to (and discretion regarding) ICO’s investigation of complaints. As far as I know no one has actually yet raised what seems to be a plain failure to investigate and inform in these “hybrid” PECR and UK GDPR cases.
The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.
When Parliament passed the Data Protection Act 1984 it created a role of a regulator for that new data protection law. Section 3(1)(a) said that
For the purposes of this Act there shall be…an officer known as the Data Protection Registrar
The office remained in this form until the passing of the Data Protection Act 1998, section 6(1) of which provided that
The office originally established by section 3(1)(a) of the Data Protection Act 1984 as the office of Data Protection Registrar shall continue to exist for the purposes of this Act but shall be known as the office of Data Protection Commissioner
The advent of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 necessitated a change, so as to create a role of regulator for that Act. Paragraph 13(2) of Schedule 2 to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 amended section 6(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998 so it read
For the purposes of this Act and of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 there shall be an officer known as the Information Commissioner
So, at this point, and indeed, until 25 May 2018, there was an Information Commissioner “for the purposes of” the Data Protection Act 1998, and “for the purposes of” the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
25 May 2018 marked, of course the date from which (by effect of its Article 99) Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, or “GDPR“, applied.
There is to continue to be an Information Commissioner.
However, paragraph 44 of schedule 19 to the Data Protection Act 2018 (commenced also by effect of the Data Protection Act 2018 (Commencement No. 1 and Transitional and Saving Provisions) Regulations 2018) repealed the “FOIA purpose” provisions of section 6(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998 (which, to recall, said that “for the purposes of…the Freedom of Information Act 2000 there shall be an officer known as the Information Commissioner“). At the same time, paragraph 59 of schedule 19 to the Data Protection Act 2018 repealed section 18(1) (which had provided that “The Data Protection Commissioner shall be known instead as the Information Commissioner“).
So, the Information Commissioner is no longer described, in statute, as an officer which shall be for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
Probably nothing turns on this. Elsewhere in the Freedom of Information Act 2000 it is clear that the Information Commissioner has various functions, powers and duties, which are not removed by the repeal (and subsequent absence of) the “FOIA purpose” provisions. However, the repeal (and absence) do raise some interesting questions. If Parliament thought it right previously to say that, for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 there should have been an Information Commissioner, why does it now think it right not to? No such questions arise when it comes to the data protection laws, because section 114 and schedule 12 of the Data Protection Act 2018, and Articles 57 and 58 of the UK GDPR, clearly define the purposes (for those laws) of the Information Commissioner.
Maybe all of this rather painful crashing through the thickets of the information rights laws is just an excuse for me to build up to a punchline of “what’s the purpose of the Information Commissioner?” But I don’t think that is solely what I’m getting at: the implied uncoupling of the office from its purposes seems odd, and something that could easily have been avoided (or could easily be remedied). If I’m wrong, or am missing something – and I very much invite comment and correction – then I’ll happily withdraw/update this post.
Please note that links to statutes here on the legislation.gov.uk website are generally to versions as they were originally enacted.
The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.
At the NADPO annual conference last year Information Commissioner John Edwards discussed his policy of reserving fines under UK GDPR to public bodies only for the most egregious cases. The policy had been announced a few months earlier in an open letter (interestingly addressed to “public sector colleagues”).
Since then, it seems that fines (other than for Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations (PECR) matters) are – in general – almost off the Information Commissioner’s agenda. Just this week a reprimand – only – was issued to a video sharing platform (the contents of which tend towards the conspiratorial, and the users of which might have particular concerns about exposure) which suffered an exfiltration attack involving 345000 user names, email addresses and passwords.
Earlier this year I made a Freedom of Information request for the evidential basis for Edwards’ policy. The response placed primary focus on a paper entitled “An Introduction to Outcome Based Cooperative Regulation (OBCR)” by Christopher Hodges, from the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at Oxford. Hodges is also Chair of the government’s Regulatory Horizons Council.
The paper does not present empirical evidence of the effects of fines (or the effects of not-fining) but proposes a staged model (OBCR) of cooperation between businesses (not, one notes, public bodies) and regulators to achieve common purposes and outcomes. OBCR, it says, enables organisations to “opt for basing their activities around demonstrating they can be trusted”. The stages proposed involve agreement amongst all stakeholders of purposes, objectives and desired outcomes, as well as evidence and metrics to identify those outcomes.
But what was notable about Edwards’ policy, was that it arrived without fanfare, and – apparently – without consultation or indeed any involvement of stakeholders. If the aim of OBCR is cooperation, one might reasonably question whether such a failure to consult vitiates, or at least hobbles, the policy from the start.
And, to the extent that the judiciary is one of those stakeholders, it would appear from the judgment of Upper Tribunal Judge Mitchell, in the first GDPR/UK GDPR fining case (concerning the very first GDPR fine in the UK) to reach the appellate courts, that there is not a consensus on the lack of utility of fines. At paragraph 178, when discussing the fact that fines (which are, by section 155 Data Protection Act 2018, “penalty” notices) the judge says
There is clearly also a dissuasive aspect to [monetary penalty notices]. I do not think it can be sensibly disputed that, in general, the prospect of significant financial penalties for breach of data protection requirements makes a controller or processor more likely to eschew a lackadaisical approach to data protection compliance and less likely to take deliberate action in breach of data protection requirements.
This is a statement which should carry some weight, and, to the extent that it is an expression on regulatory theory (which I think it is) it illustrates why a policy such as John Edwards has adopted requires (indeed, required) more of a public debate that it appears to have had.
As the issuing of fines inevitably involves an exercise of discretion, it is essentially impossible to say how many fines have not been issued which would have been, but for the Edwards policy (although it might be possible to look at whether there has – which I suspect there has – been a corresponding increase in “reprimands”, and draw conclusions from that). Nonetheless, some recipients of fines from before the policy was introduced might well reasonably ask themselves whether, had Edwards’ policy been in place at the time, they would have escaped the penalty, and why, through an accident of timing, they were financially punished when others are not. Similarly, those companies which may still receive fines, including under the PECR regime, yet which can convincingly argue that they wish to, and can, demonstrate they can be trusted, might also reasonably asked why they are not being given the opportunity to do so.
The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.
An article in the Mail on the use of connected doorbells has led me again to one of the oddest pages on the ICO’s website, on the use of domestic CCTV. Odd, because (behoven to the outdated, and frankly somewhat silly, decision of the CJEU in the 2014 Ryneš case) it approaches the issue on the basis that if a camera captures footage outside the curtilage of one’s home, then the home owner cannot avail themselves of the carve-out from the UK GDPR (at Article 2(2)) for “processing of personal data by an individual in the course of a purely personal or household activity”. But the law says nothing at all about the location or visual range of cameras – it is all about the processing purposes.
Also odd is that the ICO goes on to say that people operating CCTV that captures footage beyond their home’s curtilage will be required to comply with data subject rights (such as providing a privacy notice, and responding to access/erasure/stop requests). But, says the ICO, “we probably won’t do anything if people ignore us”:
You can complain to us when a user of domestic CCTV doesn’t follow the rules. We can send a letter asking them to resolve things, eg put up the appropriate signage or respond to data protection requests.
There is a limited amount of action the ICO can take after this point to make the person comply. It is highly unlikely the ICO will consider it fair or balanced to take enforcement action against a domestic CCTV user.
But oddest of all, the ICO says:
“These rules only apply to fixed cameras. They do not cover roaming cameras, such as drones or dashboard cameras (dashcams) as long as the drone or dashcam is used only for your domestic or household purposes”
I simply don’t understand this distinction between fixed cameras and “roaming” cameras, despite the fact that the ICO states that “data protection law” says this. I’m unaware of any law that provides a basis for the assertion (if anyone knows, please let me know). I would, in fact, be prepared to mount an argument that “roaming” cameras are more, or have the potential to be more, intrusive on others’ rights than fixed cameras.
The Article 2(2) “purely personal or household activity” carve-out is a complex provision, and one that has got the ICO into choppy waters in the past (see the trenchant criticism of Tugendhat J in the “Solicitors from Hell” litigation, at paras 93-101, which considered the similar carve-out under the prior law). There are some very interesting questions and arguments to be considered (especially when the gloss provided by recital 18 is taken into account, with its reference to online personal or household activities also being outwith the material scope of the law). However, the ICO’s guidance here will likely serve only to confuse most householders, and – I suspect – has the potential in some cases to escalate private disputes.
The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.
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