Category Archives: UK GDPR

April 2, 2025 · 5:02 am

The legality of data processing in the course of litigation

There is very convoluted litigation taking place which has as its focus a witness statement, prepared by a solicitor acting for a number of insurance companies who are defending personal injury claims arising from road traffic accidents (RTAs). And part of the argument (and a satellite claim) has now become about compliance with data protection law.

Five original claims were made for damages arising from RTAs. The defendant insurance companies were represented by law firm DWF, and one of DWF’s solicitors prepared a witness statement which contained an analysis of claims data collected by DWF in relation to a number of claims submitted by claimants represented by the solicitors who acted on behalf of the five claimants. The statement sought to adduce that in an unusually high number of the claims claimants had been referred for further psychological assessment, by a doctor who in 100% of those cases diagnosed a psychiatric condition and in two thirds of those cases said that the recovery period would be over two years. In short, a large number of claimants in the relevant RTAs appeared to develop long-term psychiatric conditions.

The claimant sought unsuccessfully to debar the witness statement, although the judge (on appeal) noted that it would be “for the Judge at trial to make of this evidence what they will [although] there are questions as to the extent to which this evidence assists without more in proving fundamental dishonesty”.

Notwithstanding this, an initial 317 (now reduced to three) claims were then made by people whose personal data was accepted to have been processed by DWF for the purposes of preparing the witness statement above. The claims here are for various breaches of the UK GDPR (such as excessive processing, and lack of fairness, lawful basis and transparency).

In a judgment handed down on 1 April, on an application by the claimants for specific disclosure in the UK GDPR claim (and an application by the defendant to amend its defence and strike out a witness statement of the claimants’ solicitor) Mrs Justice Eady DBE dismissed the disclosure applications (made under various headings), on the basis that much of the information would clearly be privileged material, or not relevant, or that the application was a fishing expedition.

If this gets to trial it will be interesting though. This sort of processing of personal data takes place in the course of (non-data-protection) private litigation routinely. It is generally not assumed that any issues of illegality arise. Any ultimate findings would be notable for litigators, and those who need to advise them on data protection compliance.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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March 27, 2025 · 4:53 am

A new data protection duty?

I’ve been looking in more detail at the recent subject access judgment in Ashley v HMRC. One key point of general application stands out for me, and that is that it states that in some cases (i.e. where it is necessary for intelligibility purposes) a controller has a duty to provide contextual information in addition to copies of personal data.

As the judge put it

Article 15(1) and 15(3), read with Article 12(1) and (2) of the UK GDPR, did require the Defendant to go beyond providing a copy of the Claimant’s personal data where contextual information was necessary for that personal data to be intelligible in the sense of enabling the data subject to exercise their rights conferred by the UK GDPR effectively. It follows that insofar as the Defendant did not adopt this approach, it was in breach of this duty.

And although she couched the following as “guidance” for the HMRC when reconsidering the request, I feel it has general application:

…it is unlikely that providing an extract that simply comprises the Claimant’s name or his initials or other entirely decontextualised personal data of that sort, will amount to compliance with this obligation.

In arriving at this conclusion the judge drew in part on both pre- and post-Brexit case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Most notably she decided to have regard to case C-487/21. Even though this does not bind the domestic courts, the effect of section 6(2) of European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 is that courts may have regard to EU case law where it is relevant to the matter before them.

Of course, there are also times when merely providing a snippet in the form of a name constitutes a failure to provide all of the personal data in scope (omitting the final five words of “Jon Baines works at Mishcon de Reya” would be to omit some of my personal data). But the “context duty” seems to me to go further, and creates, where it is necessary, an obligation to provide information beyond what is in the source documents.

Most of the other points in the judgment, as important as they were to the facts, and as interesting they are, particularly on the concept of “relating to” in the definition of “personal data”, will not necessarily change things for most data subjects and controllers.

But this “context duty” feels to me to be an advancement of the law. And I suspect controllers can now expect to see data subjects and their lawyers, when making subject access requests (or when challenging responses), begin to argue that the “context duty” applies.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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March 22, 2025 · 5:55 am

O’Carroll v Meta – what now for targeted adverts on Facebook

Following the news that claimant Tanya O’Carroll and defendant Meta have settled ahead of what was likely to be a landmark data protection case, what are the implications?

Ms O’Carroll argued that advertising served to her on Facebook, because it was targeted at her, met the definition of “direct marketing” under section 122(5) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“the communication (by whatever means) of advertising or marketing material which is directed to particular individuals”) and thus the processing of her personal data for the purposes of serving that direct marketing was subject to the absolute right to object under Article 21(2) and (3) UK GDPR.

Meta had disputed that the advertising was direct marketing.

The “mutually agreed statement” from Ms O’Carroll says “In agreeing to conclude the case, Meta Platforms, Inc. has agreed that it will not display any direct marketing ads to me on Facebook, will not process my data for direct marketing purposes and will not undertake such processing (including any profiling) to the extent it is related to such direct marketing”.

One concludes from this that Meta will, at least insofar as the UK GDPR applies to its processing, now comply with any Article 21(2) objection, and, indeed, that is how it is being reported.

But will the upshot of this be that Meta will introduce ad-free services in the UK, but for a charge (because its advertising revenues will be likely to drop if people object to targeted ads)? It is indicating so, with a statement saying “Facebook and Instagram cost a significant amount of money to build and maintain, and these services are free for British consumers because of personalised advertising. Like many internet services, we are exploring the option of offering people based in the UK a subscription and will share further information in due course”.

The ICO intervened in the case, and have uploaded a summary of their arguments, which were supportive of Ms O’Carroll’s case, and her lawyers AWO Agency have also posted an article on the news.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Filed under Data Protection, Data Protection Act 2018, facebook, Information Commissioner, marketing, Meta, Right to object, UK GDPR

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February 4, 2025 · 6:15 am

NHS England and publication of the Calocane report

[reposted from my LinkedIn account]

[Edited to add: the day following the upload of this post NHS England did an about turn, and published the report in full, saying “The NHS has taken the decision to publish the report in full in line with the wishes of the families and given the level of detail already in the public domain”]

NHS England is reported to be refusing, partly on data protection grounds, to publish the full independent review report into the care and treatment of Valdo Calocane prior to his manslaughter of three people in Nottingham in 2023.

The report is said to be over 200 pages long, and although a summary will be published, families of the victims are calling for the full report (which they only saw after pressure from their lawyers) to be published on public interest grounds, saying “we have grave concerns about the conduct of the NHS”.

So does data protection law prevent disclosure?

The report will clearly contain details of Calocane’s health, and as such it constitutes a special category of personal data, requiring a condition for processing from Article 9 of the UK GDPR. The most likely candidate would be Article 9(2)(g):

processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest, on the basis of domestic law….

The domestic law provisions referred to are contained in schedule 1 to the Data Protection Act 2018. And at first glance, it is not straightforward to identify a provision which would permit disclosure.

However, paragraph 11 potentially does. It deals with processing which is necessary for a “protective function”, must be carried without the consent of the data subject so as not to prejudice that protective function and which is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest. A “protective function” includes a function which is intended to protect members of the public against failures in services provided by a body or association.

Reports into homicides by patients in receipt of mental health care are commissioned by NHS England under the Serious Incident Framework “Supporting learning to prevent recurrence”, and this says that “publication of serious incident investigation reports and action plans is considered best practice”, although “reports should not contain confidential personal information unless…there is an overriding public interest”.

I’m not saying it’s a straightforward legal question, as to whether the report can be published, but an argument can be made that there is a substantial, overriding, public interest in disclosure in order that the public can be aware of any failings and understand what actions are being taken to address them. No doubt though that NHS England’s argument would be that this is achieved by publication of the summary report.

I imagine, in any case, that freedom of information requests will be made for the full report, so ultimately we may see the Information Commissioner’s Office, and maybe the courts, rule on this.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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January 26, 2025 · 9:45 am

Consent is not the only basis

In 2017 I attended a free event run by a “GDPR consultancy”. The presenter confidently told us that we were going to have to get consent from customers in order to process their personal data. One attendee said they worked at the DWP, so how were they going to get consent from benefits claimants who didn’t want to disclose their income, to which the presenter rather awkwardly said “I think that’s one you’ll have to discuss with your lawyers”. Another attendee, who was now most irritated that he’d taken time out from work for this, could hold his thoughts in no longer, and rudely announced that this was complete nonsense.

That attendee was the – much ruder in those days – 2017 version of me.

I never imagined (although I probably should have done) that eight years on the same nonsense would still be spouted.

Just as the Data Protection Act 2018 did not implement the GDPR in the UK (despite the embarrassing government page that until recently, despite people raising it countless times, said so) just as the GDPR does not limit its protections to “EU citizens”, so GDPR and the UK GDPR do not require consent for all processing.

Anyone who says so has not applied a smidgeon of thought or research to the question, and is probably taking content from generative AI, which, on the time-honoured principle of garbage-in, garbage-out, has been in part trained on the existing nonsense. To realise why it’s garbage, they should just start with the DWP example above and work outwards from there.

Consent is one of the six lawful bases, any one or more of which can justify processing. No one basis is better than or takes precedence over the other.

To those who know this, I apologise for having to write it down, but I want to have a sign to tap for any time I see someone amplifying the garbage on LinkedIn.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Filed under Data Protection, Data Protection Act 2018, DWP, GDPR, Let's Blame Data Protection, UK GDPR

Tagged as data protection, DPA, GDPR, UK GDPR

November 19, 2024 · 5:15 am

Can directors and trustees of charities be controllers?

[reposted from LinkedIn]

Savva v Leather Inside Out & Ors [2024] EWHC 2867 (KB), Sam Jacobs of Doughty Street Chambers, instructed by Forsters LLP for the defendants (the applicant in the instant application)

Is it the case that a director or trustee of a charity (which is a controller) cannot be a controller? That, in effect, was one of the grounds of an application by two defendants to strike out and grant summary judgment in a claim arising from alleged failures to comply with subject access requests.

The claim arises from a dispute between the claimant, a former prisoner, employed by a subsidiary of a charity (“Leather Inside Out” – currently in administration), and the charity itself. The claim is advanced against the charity, but also against the charity’s founder and two trustees, who are said on the claim form to be controllers of the claimant’s data, in addition to, or jointly with, the charity.

In a solid judgment, Deputy Master Alleyne refused to accept that such natural persons were not capable of being a controller: the term is given a broad definition in Article 4(7) UK GDPR, and “includes a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body and that there may be joint controllers. On plain reading of the provisions, it is incorrect to suggest that an allegation of joint controllers is, per se, not a legally recognisable claim” (re Southern Pacific Loans applied).

However, on the specific facts of this case, the pleading of the claimant (the respondent to the strike out application) failed “to allege any decisions or acts in respect of personal data which were outside the authority of the trustees as agents for [the charity]…the Respondent’s submissions demonstrated he wrongly conflated the immutable fact that a legal person must have a natural person through whom its decisions are carried into effect, with his case that the natural person must be assuming the defined status of data controller in their personal capacity”. That was not the case here – the founder and the trustees had not acted other than as agents for the charity.

Accordingly, the strike out application succeeded (notably, though, there Deputy Master said he had reached his conclusion
“not without some caution”).

Assuming the claim goes forward to trial, therefore, it can only be advanced against the charity, as sole controller.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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October 30, 2024 · 6:09 am

Pacini & Geyer v Dow Jones – at the interface between libel and data protection

[reposted from LinkedIn]

This is an important judgment on preliminary issues (the second preliminary issues judgment in the case – the first was on an unsuccessful strike out application by the defendants) in a data protection claim brought by two businessmen against Dow Jones, in relation to articles in the Wall Street Journal in 2017 and 2018. The claim is for damages and for erasure of personal data which is said to be inaccurate.

It is believed to be the first time in a data protection claim that a court has been required to determine the meaning of personal data as a preliminary issue in an accuracy claim.

Determination of meaning is, of course, something that is common in defamation claims. The judgment is a fascinating, but complex, analysis of the parallels between determining the meaning of personal data in a publication and determining the meaning of allegedly defamatory statements in a publication. Although the judge is wary of importing rules of defamation law, such as the “single meaning rule” and “repetition rule” a key part of the discussion is taken up by them.

The single meaning rule, whereby “the court must identify the single meaning of a publication by reference to the response of the ordinary reader to the entire publication” (NT 1 & NT 2 v Google LLC [2018] EWHC 799 (QB)) is potentially problematic in a data protection claim such as this where the claimants argue that it is not the ordinary reader they are concerned about, but a reader who might be a potential business investor.

Similarly, it is not at all clear that the repetition rule, which broadly seeks to avoid a defamatory loophole by which someone argues “but I’m only reporting what someone else said – their words might be defamatory, but mine merely report the fact that they said them”, should carry over to data protection claims, not least because what will matter in defamation claims is the factual matrix at the time of publication, whereas with data protection claims “a claim for inaccuracy may be made on the basis that personal data are inaccurate at the time of the processing complained of, including because they have become misleading or out of date, regardless of whether they were accurate at the time of original publication. In that event, what matters is the factual matrix at the time when relief is sought” (at 66).

Nonetheless, and in a leap I can’t quite follow on first of the judgment, but which seems to be on the basis that the potential problems raised can be addressed at trial when fairness of processing (rather than accuracy) arises, the judge decides to determine meaning on a single meaning/repetition rule basis (at 82-84).

There’s a huge amount to take in though, and the judgment demands close reading (and re-reading). If a full trial and judgment ensue, the case will probably be a landmark one.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Filed under accuracy, Data Protection, Data Protection Act 2018, judgments, UK GDPR

Tagged as data protection, UK GDPR

October 11, 2024 · 6:24 am

Still no clearer on reprimands

[reposted from LinkedIn]

What is a reprimand, and how does the ICO decide to issue one? This, bizarrely, remains a bit of a mystery – apparently even to the ICO themselves.

Under Article 58(2)(b) of the UK GDPR the Information Commissioner’s Office has the power to issue reprimands to a controller or a processor where processing operations have infringed provisions of the UK GDPR.

Since January 2022 the ICO has issued 84 reprimands that it has made public (it’s possible there are others it hasn’t published – that’s certainly happened in the past). Yet there is still no clearly documented process that the ICO will follow to decide what might trigger the decision to issue a reprimand.

In February 2023 I was informed by the ICO that “there is no specific written policy or procedure covering the issuing of reprimands [but that they were] currently working on putting together a formalised process specifically for reprimands, which will be added to our Investigations Manual once finalised”.

So I followed this up recently (18 months on from the previous request). And I’ve had a couple of documents disclosed to me, one a checklist that begins “Once reprimand agreed…” and another on how to apply redactions, but, otherwise, there appears still to be no way of an organisation – or even the ICO themselves(!) – knowing what might lead to a reprimand being issued, and how the decision will be made.

So, six years on from the ICO getting the power, those organisations placed on the naughty step appear to be no clearer to understanding what exactly they did to deserve it.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Tagged as data protection, ICO

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