Tag Archives: DPA

Why does the UK stop students accessing their mock exam and assignments data?

UPDATE: 23.08.20 In this piece Chris Pounder identifies what the government sees as a justification for the exam scripts exemption. In a document prepared to assist adequacy discussions with the European Commission, it is said that the exemption “aims to protect the integrity of exams by ensuring that exam scripts cannot be accessed outside established processes” (on the basis that exam boards often re-use or re-purpose exam questions). However, and as Chris implies, this simply isn’t sufficient to justify the blanket exemption, not the breadth of its scope. Moreover the ICO’s meek acceptance that it permits an interpretation which even covers assignments and, presumably, other coursework, is deeply disappointing. END UPDATE.

Domestic data protection law says that students can’t later access data recorded by themselves during an exam or assessment. Why is that? And is it compatible with the UK’s obligations under GDPR and more general human rights law?

As is well known, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has direct effect on member states of the EU. This is, however, subject to certain provisions which allow member states to legislate for specific exemptions or restrictions. An example is Article 23 of GDPR, which allows member states to restrict by way of a legislative measure the scope of certain data subject rights, including the right of access at Article 15. Such restrictions must, though, respect “the essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms” and be a “necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society” to safeguard, among a list of things, important objectives of general public interest.

The specific UK restrictions made in respect of Article 23 lie primarily in Schedule 2 of the Data Protection Act 2018. Of particular interest at the current time is the Schedule 2, paragraph 25(1) exemption to the Article 15 right of subject access which says that the right does “not apply to personal data consisting of information recorded by candidates during an exam” (and paragraph 25(4) says that “‘exam’ means an academic, professional or other examination used for determining the knowledge, intelligence, skill or ability of a candidate and may include an exam consisting of an assessment of the candidate’s performance while undertaking work or any other activity”).

Thus it is that guidance from the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) says, in relation to this year’s exam awards

The exam script exemption applies to information that has been recorded by the students themselves during an exam or assessment. Therefore students do not have a right to get copies of their answers from mock exams or assignments used to assess their performance

But why does this exemption exist? Search me. Why did it also exist in the 1998 Data Protection Act? Also, search me. Also search Hansard, like I have done, and you may struggle to find out. (Please let me know if I’ve missed something).

So in what way can the exam script exemption be said to respect the essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms and be a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society? Is this a case where Parliament merely nodded through a provision which it also merely nodded through 22 years ago?

Note that this is not a question as to whether information recorded by candidates during an exam is their personal data. It most certainly is, as the CJEU found in 2017 in Nowak. But note also that the court, in that case, observed that “the use of [such] information, one consequence of [the use of the information] being the candidate’s success or failure at the examination concerned, is liable to have an effect on his or her rights and interests, in that it may determine or influence, for example, the chance of entering the profession aspired to or of obtaining the post sought”. The court also noted, in holding that such information was personal data, the importance of the data subject’s rights of access, rectification and objection.

And let us remember recital 63 GDPR, which reminds us that one purpose of the right of subject access is to be able to “verify the lawfulness of the processing”. In the absence of any indication as to why the UK decided to restrict the right of access in such a way as to prevent students, especially this year’s students, accessing their own assignment and mock exam data, one must query how those students can adequately verify the lawfulness of the processing by those who determined their grades.

P.S. there is an argument that the ICO should do something about this, under its Article 57 tasks to monitor and enforce GDPR, to handle complaints from data subjects, and to advise parliament, the government, and other institutions and bodies. It has the power under Article 58 to issue an opinion to those bodies.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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BA hints at massively reduced size of ICO proposed fine

A new piece by me on the Mishcon de Reya website – BA’s parent company’s latest financial filings indicate it’s planning for (at most?) a E22m fine.

 

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High Court – subject access, breach of confidence and the offence of reidentification

(See also the follow-up piece here)

An interesting case is being heard in the High Court, arising from an apparent error whereby, in responding to a subject access request (SAR), the London Borough of Lambeth allowed the recipient (and now defendant) data subject to electronically manipulate the information sent to him. This in turn enabled him to remove redactions, and identify someone who had made allegations against him and his wife (about the care they were providing to their child).

This is nightmare scenario for a controller – to inadvertently disclose extremely sensitive information, while responding to a SAR. In this instance, Lambeth have now brought a claim in breach of confidence against the defendant data subject, on the grounds that: the data was provided to the data subject in circumstances where he knew it was confidential; that he breached that confidentiality by unredacting the data, retaining an unredacted copy of the file, using the evidence to write a pre-action letter to the person who made allegations against him and his wife and threatening to bring court proceedings against them based on the information; and that it is integral to the work of Children’s Services that people who bring to its attention instances of perceived inadequate care or neglect of children are able to do so under conditions of confidentiality and can be assured that their confidentiality will be respected.

The instant proceedings were primarily concerned with a strike-out application by the defendant data subject, on the grounds of non-compliance by Lambeth with its (litigation) disclosure obligations. This application was roundly dismissed, and the matter will proceed to trial.

But of particular note is that, notwithstanding that the original error was Lambeth’s, it was revealed in the proceedings that the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) is also prosecuting the defendant data subject on charges of committing the offences of knowingly or recklessly re-identifying de-identified personal data, without the consent of the data controller, and knowingly or recklessly processing re-identified personal data, without the consent of the data controller. These are new offences created by sections 171(1) and 171(5) of the Data Protection Act 2018, and, when that Act was passed, it appeared that the mischief the provisions sought to address was the risk of hackers and fraudsters attempting to identify data subjects from large datasets (see the debates at Bill stage). It will be interesting to see if the ICO’s prosecution here results in a conviction. But it will also be interesting to see if ICO considers similar prosecutions in other circumstances. Although there is a public interest defence (among others) to section 171 charges, it is not an uncommon occurrence for public authorities (particularly) to inadvertently disclose or publish information with imperfect redactions. It certainly appears, on a plain reading of section 171, that someone re-identifying de-identified personal data (even if, say, for idle reasons of curiosity) might not always be able to avail themselves of the public interest defence.

And what is unsaid in the judgment, is whether Lambeth are facing any sort of civil, regulatory action from the ICO, arising from their error in sending the imperfectly redacted information in the first place.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Filed under anonymisation, Data Protection, Data Protection Act 2018, Information Commissioner, local government, subject access

Yet more delays to proposed ICO BA and Marriott fines

I have this piece on the Mishcon de Reya website. More than a year since they were first proposed, ICO has still not converted its notices of intent into actual fines. Will it ever?

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COVID-19 and ICO’s proposed fines for BA and Marriott

I have a piece on the Mishcon de Reya website, questioning whether the Coronavirus might fundamentally affect the likelihood of BA and Marriott receiving huge GDPR fines.

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Why the big pause? ICO delay agreed re GDPR fines

On the Mishcon website: ICO agrees delay over GDPR fines with both BA and Marriott

 

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First prosecution under DPA 2018?

The Information Commissioner has successfully prosecuted a former Social Services Support Officer at Dorset County Council for an offence under section 170 of the Data Protection Act 2018 – I think that this is the first such prosecution under the 2018 Act. Section 170 is in broadly similar terms to section 55 of the Data Protection Act 1998, under which any number of prosecutions were brought for unlawfully obtaining (etc) personal data without the consent of the controller.

Just as the 1998 Act did, the 2018 Act reserves such prosecutions to the Commissioner (except that they may also be brought by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions – see s197 of the 2018 Act).

What we have not yet seen is a prosecution of the “new” offence at section 170(1)(c) of retaining personal data (after obtaining it) without the consent of the person who was the controller when it was obtained. This is a most interesting provision – I have wondered whether the mischief it aims to address is that which arises when someone inadvertently obtains personal data (perhaps as a result of a mistake by the controller) but then refuses to hand it back. This is not an infrequent occurrence, and powers at civil law to address the issue are potentially complex and expensive to exercise. It will be interesting to see whether prosecutions in this regard emerge in due course.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Whither the ICO fines for BA and Marriott?

I have a new post on the Mishcon de Reya website, asking what is happening regarding the notices of intent served some months ago on BA and Marriott Inc.

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The most boring blogpost on this blog?

Although GDPR, and the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA18), took effect from 25 May 2018, it has been notable that the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has continued to exercise its enforcement powers under the prior law. There is no problem with this, and it is only to be expected, given that regulatory investigations can take some time. The DPA18 contains transitional provisions which mean that certain sections of the Data Protection Act 1998 continue to have effect, despite its general repeal. This is the reason, for instance, why the ICO could serve its recent enforcement notice on Hudson Bay Finance Ltd using the powers in section 40 of the 1998 – paragraph 33 of Schedule 20 to the DPA18 provides that section 40 of the 1998 Act continues to apply if the ICO is satisfied that the controller contravened the old data protection principles before the rest of the 1998 Act was repealed.

However, what is noticeable in the Hudson Bay Finance Ltd enforcement notice is that it says that it was prompted by a request for assessment by the complainant, apparently made on 21 September 2018, purportedly made under section 42 of the 1998 Act. I say “purportedly” because the transitional provisions in Schedule 20 of DPA18 require the ICO to consider a request for assessment made before 25 May 2018, but in all other respects, section 42 is repealed. Accordingly, as a matter of law, a data subject can (after 25 May 2018) no longer exercise their right to request an assessment under section 42 of the 1998 Act.

This is all rather academic, because it appears to me that the ICO has discretion – even if it does not have an obligation – to consider a complaint by a data subject relating to compliance with the 1998 Act. And ICO clearly (as described above) has the power still to take enforcement action for contraventions of the 1998 Act. But no one ever told me I can’t use my blog to make arid academic points.

The views in this post (and indeed all posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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Blagging as academic research

A white paper on GDPR subject access rights, presented at the Blackhat USA 2019 conference, got a lot of UK media coverage recently. Less discussion was had, however, about whether the research raised questions about the ethics and legality of “blagging”.

The paper, by Oxford University DPhil researcher James Pavur and Casey Knerr, talked of “Using Privacy Laws to Steal Identities” and describes Pavur’s attempts to acquire another person’s (Knerr’s) data, by purporting to be that person and pretending to exercise their access rights under Article 15 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). It should be emphasised that Knerr was fully acquiescent in the exercise.

Pavur and Knerr’s paper has a section entitled “Ethical and legal concerns” but what it notably fails to address is the fact that deliberately obtaining personal data without the consent of the controller is potentially a criminal offence under UK law.

Since 1998 it has been an offence to deliberately obtain personal data by deception, with defences available where the obtaining was, for instance, justified as being in the public interest. The Data Protection Act 2018 introduces, at section 170, a new defence where the obtaining is for academic purposes, with a view to publication and where the person doing the obtaining reasonably believes that it was justified in the public interest. Previously, this defence was only available where the obtaining was for the “special purposes” of journalism, literature or art.

It would certainly appear that Pavur obtained some of the data without the consent of the controller (the controller cannot properly be said to have consented to its disclosure if it was effected by deception – indeed, such is the very nature of “blagging”), but it also appears that the obtaining was done for academic purposes and with a view to publication and (it is likely) in the reasonable belief that the obtaining was justified in the public interest.

However, one would expect that prior to conducting the research, some analysis of the legal framework would have revealed the risk of an offence being committed, and that, if this analysis had been undertaken, it would have made its way into the paper. Its absence makes the publicity given to the paper by Simon McDougall, of the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), rather surprising (McDougall initially mistakenly thought the paper was by the BBC’s Leo Kelion). Because although Pavur (and Knell) could almost certainly fall back on the “academic purposes” defence to the section 170 offence, a fear I have is that others might follow their example, and not have the same defence. Another fear is that an exercise like this (which highlights risks and issues with which controllers have wrestled for years, as Tim Turner points out in his excellent blogpost on the subject) might have the effect of controllers becoming even more keen to demand excessive identification credentials for requesters, without considering – as they must – the proportionality of doing so.

The views in this post (and indeed all posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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