Category Archives: Data Protection Act 2018

June 4, 2024 · 6:16 pm

How far can a legal fiction go?

When the Information Commissioner, as a public authority subject to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA), is required to consider, as regulator, his own handling of a FOIA request, he enters into a legal fiction, whereby he separates himself into two, along these lines (taken from a decision notice):

This decision notice concerns a complaint made against the Information Commissioner (‘the Commissioner’). The Commissioner is both the regulator of FOIA and a public authority subject to FOIA. He’s therefore under a duty as regulator to make a formal determination of a complaint made against him as a public authority…In this notice the term ‘ICO’ is used to denote the ICO dealing with the request, and the term ‘Commissioner’ denotes the ICO dealing with the complaint.

It’s a legal fiction because the Information Commissioner is a corporation sole: every single function he has vests in him (and he has powers of delegation).

With this in mind, it is interesting to consider section 132(1) of the Data Protection Act 2018. This provides that

A person who is or has been the Commissioner, or a member of the Commissioner’s staff or an agent of the Commissioner, must not disclose information which— (a) has been obtained by, or provided to, the Commissioner in the course of, or for the purposes of, the discharging of the Commissioner’s functions, (b) relates to an identified or identifiable individual or business, and (c) is not available to the public from other sources at the time of the disclosure and has not previously been available to the public from other sources. (Unless the disclosure is made with lawful authority.)

When partaking in the legal fiction described above, can it be said that the Commissioner, or the Commissioner’s staff, have obtained, or been provided with, information, when the Commissioner is the person who holds the information? I think not. And if I’m right, that should mean that the Commissioner cannot rely on the exemption at section 44 of FOIA, on the grounds that there is a statutory bar on disclosure. But that’s what he does in response to this recent FOIA request. It will be interesting if the applicant asks for a decision notice.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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March 1, 2024 · 6:48 am

How did George Galloway come to send different canvassing info to different electors?

As electors went to the polls in the Rochdale by-election on 29 February, a few posts were made on social media showing the disparity between letters sent to different electors by candidate George Galloway. An example is here

On the face of it, Galloway appears to have hoped to persuade Muslim voters to vote for him based on his views on a topic or topics he felt would appeal to them, and others to vote for him based on his views on different topics.

It should be stressed that there is nothing at all wrong that in principle.

What interests me is how Galloway identified which elector to send which letter to.

It is quite possible that a candidate might identify specific roads which were likely to contain properties with Muslim residents. And that, also would not be wrong.

But an alternative possibility is that a candidate with access to the full electoral register, might seek to identify individual electors, and infer their ethnicity and religion from their name. A candidate who did this would be processing special categories of personal data, and (to the extent any form of automated processing was involved) profiling them on that basis.

Article 9(1) of the UK GDPR introduces a general prohibition on the processing of special categories of personal data, which can only be set aside if one of the conditions in Article 9(2) is met. None of these immediately would seem available to a candidate who processes religious and/or ethnic origin data for the purposes of sending targeted electoral post. Article 9(2)(g) provides a condition for processing necessary for reasons of substantial public interest, and Schedule One to the Data Protection Act 2018 gives specific examples, but, again, none of these would seem to be available: paragraph 22 of the Schedule permits such processing by a candidate where it is of “personal data revealing political opinions”, but there is no similar condition dealing with religious or ethnic origin personal data.

If such processing took place in contravention of the prohibition in Article 9, it would be likely to be a serious infringement of a candidate’s obligations under the data protection law, potentially attracting regulatory enforcement from the Information Commissioner, and exposure to the risk of complaints or legal claims from electors.

To be clear, I am not saying that I know how Galloway came to send different letters to different electors, and I’m not accusing him of contravening data protection law. But it strikes me as an issue the Information Commissioner might want to look into.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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September 12, 2023 · 8:49 am

Arbitrary criminality and data protection

It shouldn’t be too controversial to state that to commit a criminal offence is a serious matter: although there are – obviously – different levels of severity, certain acts or omissions are so injurious to society as a whole that they warrant prosecution.

The majority of infringements of data protection law are not criminal offences, but, rather, contravention of civil law. But there are a few offences in the statutory scheme. Section 132 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) is one such. It says that it is an offence for the Information Commissioner, or a member of his staff, to disclose information

which—

(a)has been obtained by, or provided to, the Commissioner in the course of, or for the purposes of, the discharging of the Commissioner’s functions,

(b)relates to an identified or identifiable individual or business, and

(c)is not available to the public from other sources at the time of the disclosure and has not previously been available to the public from other sources,

However, it will not be an offence if the disclosure is made with “lawful authority”, and a disclosure is made with lawful authority only if and to the extent that

(a)the disclosure was made with the consent of the individual or of the person for the time being carrying on the business,

(b)the information was obtained or provided as described in subsection (1)(a) for the purpose of its being made available to the public (in whatever manner),

(c)the disclosure was made for the purposes of, and is necessary for, the discharge of one or more of the Commissioner’s functions,

(d)the disclosure was made for the purposes of, and is necessary for, the discharge of an EU obligation,

(e)the disclosure was made for the purposes of criminal or civil proceedings, however arising, or

(f)having regard to the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of any person, the disclosure was necessary in the public interest.

This means that, for instance, if an individual or a business has given (willingly or under compulsion) information to the Commissioner for the purposes of a regulatory investigation, and the information is not already public, then the Commissioner must not disclose it, unless he has lawful authority to do so.

Where, also for instance, the Commissioner publishes a legal decision notice, or monetary penalty notice, or the like, this will ordinarily contain information of this kind, but the Commissioner can point to the lawful authority he has under section 132(2)(c) – namely that the disclosure was made for the purposes of, and is necessary for, the discharge of one or more of the Commissioner’s functions. No offence committed.

But section 132 is why the Commissioner’s Office might refuse, under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA), to disclose information it has received from an individual or business. For instance, a notification report a controller has submitted pursuant to its “personal data breach” obligations under Article 33 UK GDPR. Here is an example. The ICO withholds the “breach report” in question, citing the exemption at section 44, because of the offence provisions at section 132 DPA.

Whether this is an over-cautious stance is one thing, but it is understandable.

What puzzles me, though, is the inconsistency, because elsewhere, in very similar circumstances, in response to a FOIA request, the ICO has disclosed a personal data report (albeit with redactions). Here, also.

If the Commissioner’s staff in the first example feel that they would commit an offence by disclosing the report, do the staff dealing with the second or third examples not feel that they would also?

One thing that should certainly not happen is claiming exemptions because it is easier to do so than not. I am not saying that has happened here, but there certainly seems to be inconsistency. And inconsistency, or uncertainty, about whether a regulator and his staff might commit a criminal offence is not a good situation.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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August 22, 2023 · 8:55 pm

“Text pests” and data protection criminal offences

The modern digital economy allows us to order goods (and have them delivered) with a few taps on our phones. But the infrastructure behind locating, packaging and delivering those goods necessitates that a chain of people have access to the specific of our orders, and, in some cases, our contact details. A consequence of this appears to be an extraordinary prevalence of customers receiving unwanted contact as a result: research commissioned by the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) indicates that 29% of 18-34-year-olds have received unwanted contact after giving their personal details to a business.

It is to the ICO’s credit that it is looking at this issue, and calling for evidence of what it correctly calls this “illegal behaviour”. But I found it surprising that the ICO did not explain, in its communications, that if someone obtains a customer’s contact details from a business, and uses it for personal purposes which are different from (and not approved by) the business, they are very likely to be committing the criminal offence of unlawfully obtaining personal data without the consent of the controller, under section 170(1)(a) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA).

The ICO says it will be contacting

some of the major customer-facing employers in the country to emphasise their legal responsibilities as well as to learn more about what safeguards they have in place

Which is all fine, but maybe a quicker and more effective action would be to remind those employers in turn to make their staff aware that using customer data for such purposes may well see them ending up with a criminal record.

Under section 197 of the DPA prosecutions for section 170 offences can only be brought, in England, Wales and Northern Ireland at least, by the ICO itself (or with the permission of the Director of Public Prosecutions or equivalent). One wonders if the sheer numbers of incidents where customer data is being obtained and misused in this way means that the ICO’s criminal prosecution team simply doesn’t have the capacity to deal with it. If so, maybe Parliament needs to look at giving the CPS a role, or even whether private prosecutions could be allowed.

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July 30, 2023 · 11:05 am

Has the Information Commissioner’s Office lost its FOI purposes?

When Parliament passed the Data Protection Act 1984 it created a role of a regulator for that new data protection law. Section 3(1)(a) said that

For the purposes of this Act there shall be…an officer known as the Data Protection Registrar

The office remained in this form until the passing of the Data Protection Act 1998, section 6(1) of which provided that

The office originally established by section 3(1)(a) of the Data Protection Act 1984 as the office of Data Protection Registrar shall continue to exist for the purposes of this Act but shall be known as the office of Data Protection Commissioner

The advent of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 necessitated a change, so as to create a role of regulator for that Act. Paragraph 13(2) of Schedule 2 to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 amended section 6(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998 so it read

For the purposes of this Act and of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 there shall be an officer known as the Information Commissioner

So, at this point, and indeed, until 25 May 2018, there was an Information Commissioner “for the purposes of” the Data Protection Act 1998, and “for the purposes of” the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

25 May 2018 marked, of course the date from which (by effect of its Article 99) Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, or “GDPR“, applied.

Also on 25 May 2018, by effect of the Data Protection Act 2018 (Commencement No. 1 and Transitional and Saving Provisions) Regulations 2018, section 114 of the Data Protection Act 2018 commenced. This provided (and provides)

There is to continue to be an Information Commissioner.

However, paragraph 44 of schedule 19 to the Data Protection Act 2018 (commenced also by effect of the Data Protection Act 2018 (Commencement No. 1 and Transitional and Saving Provisions) Regulations 2018) repealed the “FOIA purpose” provisions of section 6(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998 (which, to recall, said that “for the purposes of…the Freedom of Information Act 2000 there shall be an officer known as the Information Commissioner“). At the same time, paragraph 59 of schedule 19 to the Data Protection Act 2018 repealed section 18(1) (which had provided that “The Data Protection Commissioner shall be known instead as the Information Commissioner“).

So, the Information Commissioner is no longer described, in statute, as an officer which shall be for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

Probably nothing turns on this. Elsewhere in the Freedom of Information Act 2000 it is clear that the Information Commissioner has various functions, powers and duties, which are not removed by the repeal (and subsequent absence of) the “FOIA purpose” provisions. However, the repeal (and absence) do raise some interesting questions. If Parliament thought it right previously to say that, for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 there should have been an Information Commissioner, why does it now think it right not to? No such questions arise when it comes to the data protection laws, because section 114 and schedule 12 of the Data Protection Act 2018, and Articles 57 and 58 of the UK GDPR, clearly define the purposes (for those laws) of the Information Commissioner.

Maybe all of this rather painful crashing through the thickets of the information rights laws is just an excuse for me to build up to a punchline of “what’s the purpose of the Information Commissioner?” But I don’t think that is solely what I’m getting at: the implied uncoupling of the office from its purposes seems odd, and something that could easily have been avoided (or could easily be remedied). If I’m wrong, or am missing something – and I very much invite comment and correction – then I’ll happily withdraw/update this post.

Please note that links to statutes here on the legislation.gov.uk website are generally to versions as they were originally enacted.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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July 28, 2023 · 9:32 am

Has ICO “no fines” policy been introduced without proper debate?

At the NADPO annual conference last year Information Commissioner John Edwards discussed his policy of reserving fines under UK GDPR to public bodies only for the most egregious cases. The policy had been announced a few months earlier in an open letter (interestingly addressed to “public sector colleagues”).

Since then, it seems that fines (other than for Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations (PECR) matters) are – in general – almost off the Information Commissioner’s agenda. Just this week a reprimand – only – was issued to a video sharing platform (the contents of which tend towards the conspiratorial, and the users of which might have particular concerns about exposure) which suffered an exfiltration attack involving 345000 user names, email addresses and passwords.

Earlier this year I made a Freedom of Information request for the evidential basis for Edwards’ policy. The response placed primary focus on a paper entitled “An Introduction to Outcome Based Cooperative Regulation (OBCR)” by Christopher Hodges, from the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at Oxford. Hodges is also Chair of the government’s Regulatory Horizons Council.

The paper does not present empirical evidence of the effects of fines (or the effects of not-fining) but proposes a staged model (OBCR) of cooperation between businesses (not, one notes, public bodies) and regulators to achieve common purposes and outcomes. OBCR, it says, enables organisations to “opt for basing their activities around demonstrating they can be trusted”. The stages proposed involve agreement amongst all stakeholders of purposes, objectives and desired outcomes, as well as evidence and metrics to identify those outcomes.

But what was notable about Edwards’ policy, was that it arrived without fanfare, and – apparently – without consultation or indeed any involvement of stakeholders. If the aim of OBCR is cooperation, one might reasonably question whether such a failure to consult vitiates, or at least hobbles, the policy from the start.

And, to the extent that the judiciary is one of those stakeholders, it would appear from the judgment of Upper Tribunal Judge Mitchell, in the first GDPR/UK GDPR fining case (concerning the very first GDPR fine in the UK) to reach the appellate courts, that there is not a consensus on the lack of utility of fines. At paragraph 178, when discussing the fact that fines (which are, by section 155 Data Protection Act 2018, “penalty” notices) the judge says

There is clearly also a dissuasive aspect to [monetary penalty notices]. I do not think it can be sensibly disputed that, in general, the prospect of significant financial penalties for breach of data protection requirements makes a controller or processor more likely to eschew a lackadaisical approach to data protection compliance and less likely to take deliberate action in breach of data protection requirements.

This is a statement which should carry some weight, and, to the extent that it is an expression on regulatory theory (which I think it is) it illustrates why a policy such as John Edwards has adopted requires (indeed, required) more of a public debate that it appears to have had.

As the issuing of fines inevitably involves an exercise of discretion, it is essentially impossible to say how many fines have not been issued which would have been, but for the Edwards policy (although it might be possible to look at whether there has – which I suspect there has – been a corresponding increase in “reprimands”, and draw conclusions from that). Nonetheless, some recipients of fines from before the policy was introduced might well reasonably ask themselves whether, had Edwards’ policy been in place at the time, they would have escaped the penalty, and why, through an accident of timing, they were financially punished when others are not. Similarly, those companies which may still receive fines, including under the PECR regime, yet which can convincingly argue that they wish to, and can, demonstrate they can be trusted, might also reasonably asked why they are not being given the opportunity to do so.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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February 22, 2023 · 8:24 am

Monitoring of lawyers by the state

In the Commons on Monday Robert Jenrick, minister for immigration, said, in the context of a debate on the implications of the violent disorder outside a hotel providing refuge for asylum seekers, in Knowsley on 10 February, and in answer to a question about why no “small boats bill” has been introduced into Parliament

this is one of the most litigious areas of public life. It is an area where, I am afraid, human rights lawyers abuse and exploit our laws at times, and where the courts have taken an expansive approach in the past. That is why we must get this right, but we will be bringing forward that legislation very soon

When pressed on his reference to abuse of the law by lawyers, and asked “how many solicitors, advocates and barristers have been reported by the Home Office in the last 12 months to the regulatory authorities”, Mr Jenrick replied

We are monitoring the activities, as it so happens, of a small number of legal practitioners, but it is not appropriate for me to discuss that here.

This is a remarkable statement, both in its lack of detail and in its potential effect. The prospect of the monitoring of lawyers by the state carries chilling implications. It may well be that Mr Jenrick had no intention of making what could be interpreted as an oppressive statement, but words are important, and words said in Parliament carry particular weight.

It may also be that the “monitoring” in question consists of legitimate investigation into potential criminality by that “small number” of lawyers, but if that was the case, why not say so?

But “monitoring”, in itself, must be done in accordance with the law. If it is in the context of a criminal investigation, or surveillance, there are specific laws which may apply.

And to the extent that it involves the processing of personal data of the lawyers in question (which, inevitably, it surely must, when one considers that “processing” means, among other things “collection, recording, organisation, structuring or storage” performed on personal data) the monitoring must comply with applicable data protection laws).

As a fundamental general principle, processing of personal data must be transparent (see Articles 5(1)(a), 13 and 14 UK GDPR, or, for law enforcement processing, section 44 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA), or, for Intelligence Services Processing, section 93 of the DPA.

There are qualifications to and exemptions from this general principle, but, in the absence of circumstances providing such an exemption, a data subject (here, the lawyers who are apparently being monitored) should be made aware of the processing. The information they should receive includes, among other things: the identity and the contact details of the person directing the processing; the legal basis and the purposes of the processing, and; the recipients or categories of recipients of the personal data.

We tend to call the notices we receive under these provisions “privacy notices”. Those of us who have practised data protection law for a long time will remember the term “fair processing notice” which is arguably a better term. Whatever one calls them, though, such notices are a bedrock of the law – without being aware of the processing, and the risks, rules, safeguards and rights in relation to it, data subjects cannot properly exercise their rights.

With all that in mind, has the Home Office – or whoever it is who is directing the monitoring of the “small number of lawyers” – informed them that they are being monitored? If not, why not?

Returning to my earlier comments about the oppressiveness of comments to the effect that, or the giving of a perception that, the coercive powers of the state are being deployed against lawyers by monitoring them, one wonders if the Information Commissioner should take steps to investigate the background to Mr Jenrick’s comments.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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November 2, 2022 · 5:11 pm

ICO threatened Matt Hancock with £17.5m fine (sort of)

It’s well known that, under the UK GDPR, and the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA), the Information Commissioner can fine a controller or a processor a maximum of £17.5m (or 4% of global annual turnover). Less well known (to me at least) is that he can fine any person, including you, or me, or Matt Hancock, the same, even if they are not a controller or processor.

Section 142 of the DPA empowers the Commissioner to serve “Information Notices”. These fall broadly into two types: those served on a controller or processor requiring them to provide information which the Commissioner reasonably requires for the purposes of carrying out his functions under the data protection legislation; and those requiring

any person to provide the Commissioner with information that the Commissioner reasonably requires for the purposes of—

(i)investigating a suspected failure of a type described in section 149(2) or a suspected offence under this Act, or

(ii)determining whether the processing of personal data is carried out by an individual in the course of a purely personal or household activity.

And by section 155(1) of the DPA, the Commissioner may serve a monetary penalty notice (aka “fine”) on any “person” who fails to comply with an Information Notice. That includes you, or me, or Matt Hancock. (Section 157(4) provides that the maximum amount is £17.5m, or 4% of global annual turnover – although I doubt that you, I, or Matt Hancock has an annual global turnover.)

All very interesting and theoretical, you might think. Well, so might Matt Hancock have thought, until an Information Notice (which the Commissioner has recently uploaded to the ICO website) dropped onto his figurative doormat last year. The Notice was in relation to the Commissioner’s investigation of the leaking of CCTV images showing the former Secretary of State for Health and Social Care and his former aide enjoying each other’s company. The investigation – which was into the circumstances of the leak, and not Matt Hancock’s conduct – concluded in April of this year, with the ICO deciding that there was insufficient evidence to justify further action. But the Notice states clearly at paragraph 7 that failure to comply is, indeed, punishable with a fine of up to £17.5m (etc.).

The Matt Hancock Notice admittedly addresses him as if he were a controller (it says the ICO is looking at his compliance with the UK GDPR) although I am not sure that is correct – Matt Hancock will indeed be a controller in respect of his constituency work, and his work as an MP outside ministerial duties, but the normal approach is that a ministerial department will be the relevant controller for personal data processed in the context of that department (thus, the Department for Health and Social Care shows as a controller on the ICO register of fee payers).

Nonetheless, the ICO also issued an Information Notice to Matt Hancock’s former aide (as well as to Helen Whateley MP, the Minister of State), and that one makes no mention of UK GDPR compliance or a suggestion she was a controller, but does also “threaten” a potential £17.5m fine.

Of course, realistically, no one, not even Matt Hancock, was really ever at risk of a huge fine (section 155(3) of the DPA requires the Commissioner to have regard to various factors, including proportionality), but it strikes me as a remarkable state of affairs that you, I or any member of the public caught up in a matter that leads to ICO investigation, and who might have relevant information, is as a matter of law vulnerable to a penalty of £17.5m if they don’t comply with an Information Notice.

Even Matt Hancock.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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October 3, 2022 · 8:21 pm

Certainly uncertain – data protection reform developments

In recent weeks the future of data protection law in the UK has been not just hard to predict, but also hard to keep up with.

Since Brexit, the UK has had its own version of the EU’s GDPR, called, obviously enough, the “UK GDPR“. Then, on 18 July, a Data Protection and Digital Information Bill was presented in Parliament – it proposed some significant (but possibly not hugely so) changes to the current regime, but it retained the UK GDPR. It was scheduled to have its second reading in the House of Commons on 5 September, but this was postponed “to allow Ministers to consider the legislation further”.  

Following this, on 22 September, the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill was introduced. This appeared to propose the “sunsetting” (i.e. the repeal) of multiple data and information laws, including the UK GDPR, by the end of 2023.

The next development, on the first day of the Conservative Party conference, is the announcement by the Culture Secretary, Michelle Donelan, that

we will be replacing GDPR with our own business and consumer-friendly data protection system… Many…smaller organisations and businesses only in fact employ a few people. They don’t have the resources or money to negotiate the regulatory minefield that is GDPR. Yet right now, in the main, they’re forced to follow this one-size-fits-all approach.

She also suggested that businesses had suffered from an 8% reduction in profit from GDPR. It is not immediately clear where this figure comes from, although some have suggested that an Oxford Martin School paper is the source. This paper contains some remarkably complex equations. I have no competence in assessing, and no reason to doubt, the authors’ economic and statistical prowess, but I can say (with a nod to the ageless concept of “garbage in, garbage out”) that their understanding of data protection law is so flawed as to compromise the whole paper. They say, for instance

websites are prohibited from sharing user data with third parties, without the consent from each user

and

companies that target EU residents are required to encrypt and anonymise any personal data it [sic] stores

and (probably most bizarrely)

as users incur a cost when prompted to give consent to using their data, they might reduce online purchases, leading to lower sales

To be quite clear (as politicians are fond of saying): websites are not prohibited from sharing data without the consent from “users” (if they were, most ecommerce would grind to a halt, and the internet economy would collapse); companies subject to GDPR are not required to anonymise personal data they store (if they did, they would no longer be able to operate, leading to the collapse of the economy in general); and “users” do not have to consent to the use of their data, and I am still scratching my head at why even if they did they would incur a cost.

If the authors base their findings on the economic cost of GDPR on these bases, then there are some very big questions for them to answer from anyone reviewing their paper.

I may have the wrong paper: I actually really hope the government will back up its 8% figure with something more sensible.

But regardless of the economic thinking this paper, or underpinning the developments in the statutory regime, it is possible that all the developments cohere: that the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill, when it re-emerges, will have been amended so as to have the effect of removing references to “GDPR” or the “UK GDPR”, and that this will mean that, in substance, if not in name, the principles of the UK GDPR are assimilated into a new piece of domestic legislation.

But (given that the government’s focus is on it) business, just as nature, abhors a vacuum – many business owners (and indeed many data protection practitioners) must be hoping that there is a clear route forward so that the UK’s data protection regime can be considered, and applied, with at least a degree of certainty.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

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August 9, 2022 · 8:41 am

ICO secures court-awarded compensation

ICO often say they can’t award compensation, but what they can do is – in criminal cases – make an application for the court to make an award (separate to any fines or costs). But as far as I know, until this case last week, they’d never done so:

https://www.mishcon.com/news/ico-recommends-compensation-awards-in-criminal-prosecution-case

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