Category Archives: Data Protection

Certainly uncertain – data protection reform developments

In recent weeks the future of data protection law in the UK has been not just hard to predict, but also hard to keep up with.

Since Brexit, the UK has had its own version of the EU’s GDPR, called, obviously enough, the “UK GDPR“. Then, on 18 July, a Data Protection and Digital Information Bill was presented in Parliament – it proposed some significant (but possibly not hugely so) changes to the current regime, but it retained the UK GDPR. It was scheduled to have its second reading in the House of Commons on 5 September, but this was postponed “to allow Ministers to consider the legislation further”.  

Following this, on 22 September, the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill was introduced. This appeared to propose the “sunsetting” (i.e. the repeal) of multiple data and information laws, including the UK GDPR, by the end of 2023.

The next development, on the first day of the Conservative Party conference, is the announcement by the Culture Secretary, Michelle Donelan, that

we will be replacing GDPR with our own business and consumer-friendly data protection system… Many…smaller organisations and businesses only in fact employ a few people. They don’t have the resources or money to negotiate the regulatory minefield that is GDPR. Yet right now, in the main, they’re forced to follow this one-size-fits-all approach.

She also suggested that businesses had suffered from an 8% reduction in profit from GDPR. It is not immediately clear where this figure comes from, although some have suggested that an Oxford Martin School paper is the source. This paper contains some remarkably complex equations. I have no competence in assessing, and no reason to doubt, the authors’ economic and statistical prowess, but I can say (with a nod to the ageless concept of “garbage in, garbage out”) that their understanding of data protection law is so flawed as to compromise the whole paper. They say, for instance

websites are prohibited from sharing user data with third parties, without the consent from each user

and

companies that target EU residents are required to encrypt and anonymise any personal data it [sic] stores

and (probably most bizarrely)

as users incur a cost when prompted to give consent to using their data, they might reduce online purchases, leading to lower sales

To be quite clear (as politicians are fond of saying): websites are not prohibited from sharing data without the consent from “users” (if they were, most ecommerce would grind to a halt, and the internet economy would collapse); companies subject to GDPR are not required to anonymise personal data they store (if they did, they would no longer be able to operate, leading to the collapse of the economy in general); and “users” do not have to consent to the use of their data, and I am still scratching my head at why even if they did they would incur a cost.

If the authors base their findings on the economic cost of GDPR on these bases, then there are some very big questions for them to answer from anyone reviewing their paper.

I may have the wrong paper: I actually really hope the government will back up its 8% figure with something more sensible.

But regardless of the economic thinking this paper, or underpinning the developments in the statutory regime, it is possible that all the developments cohere: that the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill, when it re-emerges, will have been amended so as to have the effect of removing references to “GDPR” or the “UK GDPR”, and that this will mean that, in substance, if not in name, the principles of the UK GDPR are assimilated into a new piece of domestic legislation.

But (given that the government’s focus is on it) business, just as nature, abhors a vacuum – many business owners (and indeed many data protection practitioners) must be hoping that there is a clear route forward so that the UK’s data protection regime can be considered, and applied, with at least a degree of certainty.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

Leave a comment

Filed under adequacy, consent, Data Protection, Data Protection Act 2018, Data Protection Bill, GDPR, parliament, UK GDPR

Government urged to take action to protect UK citizens’ information rights

The Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill was introduced to Parliament on 22 September 2022. The Bill sets a “sunset date” of 31 December 2023 by which all remaining retained EU Law will either be repealed, unless expressly assimilated into UK domestic law. The sunset may be extended for specified pieces of retained EU Law until 2026. A large number of UK laws which cover “information rights” appear to be caught by the Bill.

Mishcon de Reya has written an open letter to the Minister of State at the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, Julia Lopez, to highlight the risk to these laws.

Government urged to take action to protect UK citizens’ (mishcon.com)

Leave a comment

Filed under access to information, Data Protection, DCMS, Environmental Information Regulations, Freedom of Information, UK GDPR

Data Protection reform Bill on ice

A piece by me on the Mishcon de Reya website on yesterday’s news that the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill has been paused

https://www.mishcon.com/news/data-protection-reform-progress-paused

Leave a comment

Filed under Data Protection, Data Protection Bill

ICO investigates collection of barristers’ names

News from the Mishcon de Reya website on data protection concerns arising from criminal barristers’ dispute with the MoJ

https://www.mishcon.com/news/information-commissioner-investigates-collection-of-criminal-barristers-names

Leave a comment

Filed under Data Protection, fairness, Information Commissioner, Ministry of Justice, UK GDPR

OMG – OCG attacks HMRC

ICO declines to take action after 1000 HMRC customer records apparently altered in 2020 by Organised Crime Gang and used to make fraudulent claims

Rather hidden away on the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) website is information, disclosed under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA), in relation to an ICO investigation of a security incident involving HMRC, and an organised crime gang (OCG).

It appears that, in June 2020, an OCG had used 193 genuine National Insurance Numbers (NINOs) which it had managed to “hijack” (it is not clear how) from external sources, and set up bogus Government Gateway (GG) accounts. This subsequently “enabled the OCG to carry out enrolments on the bogus GG accounts of genuine Self-Assessment customer Unique Tax References”, which in turn enabled the submission of fraudulent tax returns with the aim of the OCG being to make fraudulent expenses claims.

It was also discovered that details of 130 of the data subjects whose NINOs had been compromised were also used to “utilise” the DWP universal credit service.

HMRC did not become aware of this incident until 2 December 2020, and it notified the ICO (pursuant to its obligations under Article 33 GDPR) on 14 December 2020.

Details of the incident also appear to be contained in HMRC’s Annual Report for the period in question, where (at page 188) it refers to an incident involving 1023 people where “Personal information [was] used to make changes to customer records on HMRC systems without authorisation”.

There are many redactions in the information that the ICO has now published, but the headline point is that it did not view the incident as a serious enough infringement of HMRC’s obligations under GDPR so as to warrant a monetary penalty. The ICO noted that

…there is no indication that any of the originating personal data used to commit the fraud was obtained from HMRC.

However, it does appear that some people might have lost money, although this has since been repaid to them:

…any repayments due to genuine customers have been (or will be) made good…and therefore all the financial losses will be HMRC’s.

Also redacted are what would probably be details of systems changes that HMRC has taken or agreed to undertake as a result of the incident. These would, says the ICO

increase the protection applied to customer records and data and make stacks of this nature more difficult…

This wording suggests that the ICO felt that the level of protection had not been adequate, in line with HMRC’s security obligations under the GDPR. That being the case, the ICO must have decided that, in this instance, despite the infringement, it wasn’t necessary, or appropriate, to issue a fine or take other enforcement action.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

Leave a comment

Filed under Breach Notification, Data Protection, GDPR, HMRC, Information Commissioner, security

ICO secures court-awarded compensation

ICO often say they can’t award compensation, but what they can do is – in criminal cases – make an application for the court to make an award (separate to any fines or costs). But as far as I know, until this case last week, they’d never done so:

https://www.mishcon.com/news/ico-recommends-compensation-awards-in-criminal-prosecution-case

Leave a comment

Filed under crime, damages, Data Protection, Data Protection Act 2018, Information Commissioner

High Court muddle over data protection regime

A relatively common error by those unaccustomed to the rather odd structure of the data protection statutory regime in the UK, is to look first to the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA”) for the applicable law, instead of the UK GDPR. This is despite the fact that the very first section of the DPA instructs us in how the regime works. Section 1(2) provides that “most processing of personal data is subject to the UK GDPR”, and then sections 1(4) and (5) explain that Parts 3 and 4 of the DPA deal with those parts of the regime (law enforcement processing and intelligence services processing) which are out of the scope of UK GDPR.

“Put me to one side” – says the DPA tactfully – “you should have picked up your copy of the UK GDPR first, and not me”.

Accordingly, the key provisions, and the basic principles, applying to most processing, are to be found in the UK GDPR.

The result of this relatively common error, is that people will sometimes cite, say, section 45 of the DPA in relation to a generic subject access request, when in fact, the applicable provision is Article 15 of the UK GDPR (section 45 applies to subject access requests to competent authorities for the purposes of law enforcement).

Occasionally, I have seen non-specialist lawyers make this mistake.

And now, I have seen a high court judge do the same. In a judicial review case in the High Court of Northern Ireland, challenging the accuracy of a child’s social care records, part of the claim (which was primarily an Article 8 human rights claim) was pleaded as also a breach of Article 5(1) and (6) of the “GDPR” (the correct pleading should have been, and maybe was, by reference to the UK GDPR) and Part 1 of the DPA. Article 5(1) of the UK GDPR contains the data protection principles.

The judge, however, stated that

It seems to the court that in fact the relevant part of the 2018 Act are sections 86 to 91 which set out the six data protection principles in relation to data processing.

This is simply wrong. Sections 86 to 91 of the DPA lay out the data protection principles only in relation to intelligence services processing (i.e. processing of personal data by the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service or by the Government Communications Headquarters).

It isn’t clear whether there was any discussion about this in the court (quite possibly not), but it appears not to have been picked up when the judgment was circulated in draft or published to the parties. As it is, it seems very likely that nothing turns on it. This is because the Part 4 DPA principles, like the Part 3 DPA principles, effectively mirror the principles in Article 5(1) UK GDPR, and so the analysis, for the purposes of the substantive matter, was sound.

So this was an error of form, more than substance.

However, there are some differences between the UK GDPR regime, the Part 3 DPA regime and the Part 4 DPA regime, and in different circumstances an error like this could result in an outcome which is wrong, and harmful.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

Leave a comment

Filed under accuracy, Data Protection, Data Protection Act 2018, GDPR, human rights, Ireland, judiciary, UK GDPR

Data Protection reform bill – all that? or not all that?

I’ve written an “initial thoughts” analysis on the Mishcon de Reya website of the some of the key provisions of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill:

The Data Protection and Digital Information Bill – an (mishcon.com)

Leave a comment

Filed under adequacy, Data Protection, Data Protection Act 2018, Data Protection Bill, DPO, GDPR, Information Commissioner, PECR, UK GDPR

Data protection nonsense on gov.uk

It feels like a while since I randomly picked on some wild online disinformation about data protection, but when you get an itch, you gotta scratch, and this page of government guidance for businesses – “Get your business ready to employ staff: step by step” – specifically on “Personal data an employer can keep about an employee” certainly got me itching. It starts off sensibly enough by saying that

Employers must keep their employees’ personal data safe, secure and up to date.

This is true (Article 5(1)(f) and part of 5(1)(c) UK GDPR). And the page goes on to list some information can be “kept” (for which I charitably read “processed”) without employees’ permission, such as: name, address, date of birth, sex, education and qualifications, work experience, National Insurance number, tax code, emergency contact details, employment history with the organisation, employment terms and conditions, any accidents connected with work, any training taken, any disciplinary action. All pretty inoffensive, although I’m not sure what it’s trying to achieve. But then…oh my. Then, it says

Employers need their employees’ permission to keep certain types of ’sensitive’ data

We could stop there really, and snigger cruelly, Consent (aka “permission”) as a condition for processing personal data is complicated and quite frankly to be avoided if possible. It comes laden with quite strict requirements. The Information Commissioner puts it quite well

Consent is appropriate if you can offer people real choice and control over how you use their data, and want to build their trust and engagement. But if you cannot offer a genuine choice, consent is not appropriate. If you would still process the personal data without consent, asking for consent is misleading and inherently unfair…employers and other organisations in a position of power over individuals should avoid relying on consent unless they are confident they can demonstrate it is freely given

And let’s consider the categories of personal data the government page thinks employers should get “permission” to “keep”: race and ethnicity, religion, political membership or opinions, trade union membership, genetics [sic], biometrics, , health and medical conditions, sexual history or orientation.

But how quickly would an employer’s wheels grind to a halt if it couldn’t process personal data on an employee’s health “without her permission”? It would be unable to refer her to occupational health if she didn’t “permit” it. It would be unable to keep a record of her sickness absence if she withdrew her consent (consent should be as easy to withdraw as it is to give (see Article 7(3)). During the COVID pandemic, it would have been unable to keep a record of whether she had tested positive or not, if she said she didn’t want a record kept.

It’s nonsense, of course. There’s a whole range of gateways, plus a whole Schedule of the Data Protection Act 2018), which provide conditions for processing special categories of data without having to get someone’s consent. They include pressing social imperatives, like compliance with public health law, and promotion of equality of treatment and safeguarding of children or other vulnerable people. The conditions don’t apply across the board, but the point is that employees’ permission – their consent – is rarely, if ever, required when there is another compelling reason for processing their data.

I don’t really understand what need, what gap, the government page is trying to fill, but the guidance is pretty calamitous. And it is only likely to lead to confusion for business owners and employers, and runs the risk of pitting themselves against each other – with disputes arising – amidst the confusion.

BAH!

Now, that felt better. Like I say, sometimes it’s good to scratch that itch.

The views in this post (and indeed most posts on this blog) are my personal ones, and do not represent the views of any organisation I am involved with.

Leave a comment

Filed under consent, Data Protection, Data Protection Act 2018, Let's Blame Data Protection, UK GDPR

Podcast on UK data protection reforms

My Mishcon de Reya colleague Adam Rose and I have recorded a short (25 minute) podcast on the government’s recent announcement of proposed data protection reforms.

UK Data Reform – what’s being proposed? (mishcon.com)

Leave a comment

Filed under adequacy, Data Protection, Data Protection Act 2018, GDPR, UK GDPR